Football finance, from the outside inThe Orange LedgerFor professionals

Nottingham Forest: what has changed

Every change to the Orange Engine that moved Nottingham Forest's figure or the way it is treated, newest first, with what exposed it.

97.5%squad cost ratio now, 1 March 2027 test
124.5%before player-sale profit
87.6–99.4%range
14changes that moved this club

Changes, newest first

All versions →
  1. V2CGCorrection

    Sixteen transfer entries at eleven clubs corrected after a check of every transfer against published sources, each read on the page cited. Add-ons that have not yet fallen due on a signing now count in the range only, as the rules count a fee when it is payable. Eight clubs' estimates move by less than a percentage point; none crosses a line.

    • Arsenal are at 60.7%, from 60.1%: Bruno Guimaraes's contract runs to June 2030, not June 2031, because the option year is not part of it, so his fee is spread over a shorter contract (Rule A.1.22(c)).
    • Sunderland are at 61.2%, from 60.6%: Kevin Danso's £2.5m loan fee is a squad cost (Rule A.1.22(e)).
    • Chelsea are at 88.6%, from 88.3%: Geovany Quenda's guaranteed fee is £43.4m, not £40.0m, and Pedro Neto's £51.4m, not £54.0m, each with the part not yet due left out (Rules A.1.43 and A.1.22(c)); Kian Best's contract runs to June 2027, not June 2029, so his fee is spread over a shorter contract (Rule A.1.22(c)).
    • Coventry City are at 64.0%, from 64.6%: Ethan Pinnock's contract runs to June 2029, not June 2028, so his fee is spread over a longer contract (Rule A.1.22(c)).
    • Nottingham Forest are at 97.4%, from 97.6%: Daniel Munoz cost £20m guaranteed, not £22m, with £2m of add-ons not yet due in the range only (Rules A.1.43 and A.1.22(c)); Mason Ayre's scholarship runs to June 2028, not June 2029.
    • Crystal Palace are at 78.2%, from 78.1%, and Tottenham at 81.0%, from 80.9%: Munoz's sale brought Palace £20m guaranteed, not £22m, and Djed Spence's sale brought Tottenham £26.9m, not £30.0m, with add-ons counted only when they fall due (Rule A.1.29(g)).
    • Bournemouth are at 85.4%, from 85.5%: Alex Toth's contract runs to June 2031, not June 2030, so his fee is spread over a longer contract (Rule A.1.22(c)).
    • Brentford (Sam Sene-Richardson to June 2028 and Darwin Guagua to June 2031), Brighton (Michael Dike to June 2027 and Nils Ramming to June 2030) and Fulham (Cesar Palacios from 3 August 2026) take corrections to contract lengths and a date (Rule A.1.22(c)); no published figure moves.

    What moved: Arsenal 60.1% → 60.7%; Sunderland 60.6% → 61.2%; Chelsea 88.3% → 88.6%; Crystal Palace 78.1% → 78.2%; Tottenham 80.9% → 81.0%; Coventry City 64.6% → 64.0%; Nottingham Forest 97.6% → 97.4%; Bournemouth 85.5% → 85.4%.

    Also moved:ArsenalSunderlandChelseaCrystal PalaceTottenhamCoventry CityBournemouthBrentfordBrightonFulham

  2. V2CACorrection

    We had averaged each club's profit on player sales over three financial years, but the rule averages the sales made in the six most recent transfer windows, which for the March 2027 test start in February 2024. Sales between February and June 2024 now count, among them several made before the June 2024 deadline of the previous rules, and ten estimates move: Chelsea's to 88.6%, from 92.5%, and Newcastle's to 81.3%, from 84.9%, the largest.

    • The period the rule averages: the profit or loss on player sales over the six most recent transfer windows, divided by three, not over three financial years. For the March 2027 test the period starts on 2 February 2024, so sales from then until each club's 2024/25 year began now count.
    • Brentford: David Raya's sale to Arsenal, which Brentford booked in June 2024, now counts, and Mark Flekken's sale to Bayer Leverkusen in June 2025 is no longer counted twice.
    • Figures for later tests: where an article gives a club's figure for a later year, it is now worked out window by window; where we have not yet done that, the figure is withdrawn while we recheck it.

    What moved: Chelsea 92.5% → 88.6%; Newcastle 84.9% → 81.3%; Aston Villa 77.4% → 74.4%; Nottingham Forest 99.3% → 97.6%; Brentford 83.8% → 82.3%; Everton 73.3% → 72.3%; Manchester City 73.8% → 73.1%; Tottenham 80.4% → 80.9%; Leeds 68.6% → 68.3%; Manchester United 56.9% → 56.8%

    Also moved:ChelseaNewcastleAston VillaBrentfordEvertonManchester CityTottenhamLeedsManchester United

  3. V2BZCorrection

    Corrections found while checking our inputs against the clubs' own pages: thirteen signing, sale and contract dates now follow the club's own completion announcement, three fees agreed in euros now use the official exchange rate on the day the deal completed, and one contract end is corrected. Two estimates move: Crystal Palace's to 77.8%, from 78.1%, and Everton's to 73.3%, from 73.4%.

    • Dates: where a club's own announcement of a completed signing, sale or new contract gives a different day from the one we held, the club's day now counts. Thirteen dates at Chelsea, Everton, Bournemouth, Brighton and Crystal Palace move, by between one day and about a month, and each contract's length is measured again from its corrected start.
    • Fees in euros: three fees agreed in euros are now converted at the European Central Bank's rate on the day each deal completed: Dan Ndoye's and Ousmane Diomande's at Nottingham Forest, and Anthony Gordon's sale by Newcastle.
    • Crystal Palace: Quinten Timber's contract runs to 2031, as the club announced, not 2030, so his fee is spread over one more season.

    What moved: Crystal Palace 78.1% → 77.8%; Everton 73.4% → 73.3%

    Also moved:Crystal PalaceEvertonChelseaBournemouthBrightonNewcastle

  4. V2BYModel

    Players a club has loaned out are now recorded at all twenty clubs, with an allowance for the part of their wages the borrowing club pays. Where a named source says how much the borrower pays, the saving counts in our central figure; where nobody says, it only widens the range. Four central figures move, the largest Nottingham Forest's, from 102.3% to 99.3%.

    • A club that loans a player out often stops paying some or all of his wages, which lowers the squad cost the rule counts. We had recorded loans out at some clubs and not at others. Every club's squad is now checked against its own website and the League's registration return, and every player out on loan in 2026/27 is recorded with the loan.
    • Wages are not published, so each loaned player carries an estimated salary range based on what the club paid for him. How much of it the borrowing club pays is stated for only a few players. Where a named outlet reports the split, we count the saving in the central figure. Where nobody states it, we no longer assume a half share: the saving can be anything from nothing to the whole wage, so it widens the range and leaves the central figure where it was.
    • The same treatment applies to last season's loans, which lowered the wages in the accounts we start from. Where a player is back, or was counted out of the wage bill at his full salary, we add his saving back; where the split is not stated, that too goes into the range.
    • Nottingham Forest's central figure falls from 102.3% to 99.3%. Omari Hutchinson's wages at AC Milan are reported to be paid in full by Milan, which takes off 1.7 points. Gustavo Sá was sold to Olympiacos on 30 July 2026, and we had still counted him in the squad. No fee has been published, so we record the sale at what Forest paid for him, as an estimate; that takes off 1.2 points. Forest are still above 85%.
    • Manchester United's figure moves from 57.3% to 56.9%, Arsenal's from 59.9% to 60.1% and Liverpool's from 72.9% to 72.7%, on reported or relayed wage splits.
    • At nine other clubs only the range moves. Because the possible saving on this season's loans is larger than the possible add-back for last season's, the bottom of each range falls further than the top: Chelsea's range is now 83.0% to 97.2%, Brighton's 70.7% to 82.1%.
    • Tottenham's saving on this season's loans is held out for now, because the club's own wage figures already include part of it. Newcastle's is held out because last season's loans could not be checked against a source we accept.

    What moved: Nottingham Forest 102.3% → 99.3% (range 90.5 to 102.0%); Manchester United 57.3% → 56.9%; Arsenal 59.9% → 60.1%; Liverpool 72.9% → 72.7%; ranges only: Chelsea, Brighton, Brentford, Bournemouth, Aston Villa, Crystal Palace, Manchester City, Everton, Tottenham; league 75.8% → 75.6%

    Also moved:Manchester UnitedArsenalLiverpoolChelseaBrightonBrentfordBournemouthAston VillaCrystal PalaceManchester CityEvertonTottenham

  5. V2BVModel

    Last season's commercial revenue is not in any club's filed accounts yet, so we estimate it. Until now each estimate was a judgement of ours. From this release every club's estimate is made by one published method, fitted on 81 filed year-on-year changes, with an assumption range sized from how far such forecasts have missed in the past. Seventeen estimates move. No club changes side of a threshold.

    • The rule counts a club's commercial revenue for last season, 2025/26. Those accounts are filed between late 2026 and spring 2027, so for 19 clubs the figure is an estimate. We had built each one by hand, from the last filed figure and our own view of the club's season, and gave each a margin of 7% either way.
    • The new method starts from the club's last filed commercial revenue and grows it by a rate that depends only on the size of that revenue: larger commercial businesses have grown more slowly in percentage terms. The rate is 19.3% for a club starting from £20m and 6.8% for one starting from £350m. It is fitted on 81 changes taken from filed accounts, every figure read on the page.
    • We chose the method on one test only: how well it would have forecast commercial revenue in past seasons. It was compared with assuming no growth and with a rule that also used each club's own last change. We did not look at what any method did to a club's squad cost ratio, or at which side of 85% it left a club.
    • The margin of 7% either way was too narrow. Past forecasts of this kind have missed by more, and by more for small clubs than for large ones. The new assumption range is sized from those misses and is wider on the upper side for smaller clubs. Most clubs' published ranges are wider as a result.
    • Four clubs' assumption ranges now span the 85% line: Bournemouth (central figure 85.5%, range 79.5 to 87.8%), Brentford (83.8%, 79.5 to 87.5%), Newcastle (84.7%, 78.9 to 88.6%) and Tottenham (80.4%, 76.4 to 85.6%). For these the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line the club is on.
    • Sunderland and Ipswich Town changed division, where the size rule does not apply. Sunderland's estimate is the typical change of nine promoted clubs and Ipswich's the typical change of six relegated clubs. Both are provisional until their accounts are filed. Coventry City's and Hull City's ratios do not move: the rule counts its £15m minimum for both, and their own commercial revenue is below it. Our estimate of that revenue does change: it is now each club's last filed figure with no growth assumed, provisional until their accounts are filed.
    • Manchester United does not move: its 2025/26 figure is filed. Leeds now has the cost of its merchandise taken off, as the rule requires and as at every other club; that cost is estimated, not filed.
    • Two figures measured before player trading now sit a fraction of a percentage point from a line: Manchester City 84.9%, from 87.1%, which is 0.1 percentage points below 85%, and Chelsea 114.4%, from 115.5%, which is 0.6 percentage points below 115%. Both margins are smaller than the uncertainty in the commercial estimate, so the estimate does not reliably tell which side of either line the club is on before player trading. No published ratio changes side of a threshold.
    • We have withdrawn our estimate of what the five-year amortisation cap would add at Chelsea if it reached the eight registrations signed before it. Two ways of calculating it give different answers, and we will publish neither until they are reconciled.
    • From this release we write movements and margins of a ratio in percentage points and sporting deductions in league points, so the two are never confused.
    • The forecasts of record are frozen and scored as frozen. The forecasts we published before this release stand in the track record as published and will be scored against the 2025/26 accounts as they were. The estimates of this release are held in its own timestamped record and will be compared with the accounts when they are filed.

    What moved: Arsenal 59.5% → 59.9%; Bournemouth 85.5% → 85.5% (range 79.5 to 87.8%); Brentford 84.2% → 83.8%; Brighton 79.5% → 79.1%; Chelsea 93.2% → 92.5%; Everton 73.3% → 73.4%; Nottingham Forest 103.4% → 102.3%; Fulham 104.0% → 102.7%; Ipswich Town 95.8% → 97.1%; Leeds 67.4% → 68.6%; Liverpool 74.0% → 72.9%; Manchester City 75.4% → 73.8%; Newcastle 83.9% → 84.7%; Crystal Palace 78.9% → 78.1%; Sunderland 63.4% → 60.8%; Tottenham 82.3% → 80.4%; Aston Villa 76.0% → 77.4%

    Also moved:ArsenalBournemouthBrentfordBrightonChelseaEvertonFulhamIpswich TownLeedsLiverpoolManchester CityNewcastleCrystal PalaceSunderlandTottenhamAston Villa

  6. V2BOModel

    We now measure every contract from the day a player was registered to the day the contract ends. A player who signs in August on a "five-year deal" has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June. We had spread his cost over five full years, which made each year's charge a little too small. On that change every club's ratio rises, by 0.1 to 0.9 points. Five clubs also move because we now read the accounts of the group the rule describes, not the club company alone. No club's central figure crosses a threshold.

    • The cost of signing a player is spread over the length of his contract. We had used the length as announced, in whole years. We now use the time between the registration date and the contract's end date.
    • 504 contract lengths changed. For 190 of them a source states the end date. For the other 314 we have derived it as the 30 June that the announced length points to, which is when contracts in English football end, and we mark those dates as derived until we have a source for each.
    • No length changed by as much as half a year. The effect is a few weeks per player, added up across each squad.
    • Bournemouth's central figure moves from 85.2% to 85.5%, in an assumption range of 80.1% to 87.7%. The range still spans the 85% line, so the estimate does not tell which side of the line the club is on.
    • Brentford (84.1%) and Tottenham (82.3%) move closer to the line. Neither is above it at the central figure.
    • The same rule now applies to the contract a loan with an obligation to buy would create. One published figure moves on it, Fulham's, by 0.1 points.
    • The rule tests a club together with its football companies. At Brighton and Sunderland the women's team is a separate company whose revenue the rule counts, so their ratios fall, by 0.3 and 0.2 points. At Ipswich the group's accounts remove a fee the club charges its own parent, so its commercial revenue is lower and its ratio rises by a further 0.9 points.
    • Newcastle's group includes the women's team and a fan zone beside the stadium that opened in August 2024. We count the women's team's revenue in full and the fan zone at its profit, which lowers the ratio from 84.7% to 83.9%. This rests on our reading of the rule. The rule counts matchday food and drink in full, and if the League treats the fan zone that way the figure is lower, so the assumption range now runs from 80.7% to 86.0%.
    • Manchester City's women's team sits in another company of the same group. We add its ticket and broadcasting income, which lowers the ratio by 0.3 points. We do not add its sponsorship income, because the accounts do not show that it comes from outside the group.
    • A women's team's company often receives money from its own club. We count only what comes from outside the group, and nothing extra where the team is already inside the accounts we read.
    • For seven clubs the group's accounts cannot yet be applied, because the documents do not print what is needed or, at Manchester United, because the change is large enough to need a release of its own. Their figures are unchanged on this point and each club's article says so.
    • A check that used to require whole years for a summer signing now requires each length to agree with its dates. It still refuses the error it was written to catch.
    • A new check stops a club's European revenue being switched off by mistake. It compares each club's record with the list of clubs in the league phase of their competition.
    • We read every figure we take from the clubs' accounts against its page again. Twelve did not match. None of them is used in the ratio, and all are corrected. One, Nottingham Forest's amortisation for 2023/24, had been quoted in our article and was corrected there on 4 October.

    What moved: Arsenal 60.4% → 60.7%; Aston Villa 75.7% → 76.0%; Bournemouth 85.2% → 85.5%; Brentford 83.9% → 84.1%; Brighton 79.7% → 79.5%; Chelsea 94.0% → 94.3%; Coventry 63.5% → 64.1%; Crystal Palace 78.0% → 78.5%; Everton 72.8% → 73.3%; Fulham 106.0% → 106.4%; Hull 66.4% → 67.0%; Ipswich 94.1% → 95.8%; Leeds 67.0% → 67.4%; Liverpool 73.9% → 74.0%; Manchester United 58.8% → 59.0%; Newcastle 84.2% → 83.9%; Nottingham Forest 102.5% → 103.4%; Sunderland 63.2% → 63.4%; Tottenham 82.1% → 82.3%

    Also moved:ArsenalAston VillaBournemouthBrentfordBrightonChelseaCoventry CityCrystal PalaceEvertonFulhamHull CityIpswich TownLeedsLiverpoolManchester CityManchester UnitedNewcastleSunderlandTottenham

  7. V2BLCorrection

    We rebuilt the matchday income that the rule counts for every club. The rule takes last season's gate receipts per home match and multiplies by this season's home matches. We had not counted the matches properly and had not written down how we estimated the receipts. Both are now done: the matches are counted from archived match reports, and the receipts follow a published method. Fourteen clubs' squad cost ratios move, eight down and six up, and no club crosses a threshold.

    • Home cup ties. The rule counts the average number of home FA Cup and League Cup matches over three seasons, rounded up. Twelve clubs had too few. Newcastle and Chelsea each played 13 in three seasons, so the rule counts five a season.
    • Last season's home matches. The rule divides last season's receipts by every home match played. Eleven clubs' counts were wrong. Newcastle played 31 home matches, not 24; Crystal Palace 28, not 24; Chelsea 26, not 28.
    • Last season's receipts. Most clubs have not filed 2025/26 accounts, so the figure is an estimate. For thirteen clubs it now starts from the last filed year, adjusted for the change in cup and European home matches and for 5% growth. Arsenal's earlier figure, raised for a European run that was no longer than the year before, is withdrawn.
    • The largest movements are Tottenham, 79.4% to 77.6%, and Newcastle, 77.7% to 79.4%. At Fulham and Brentford the corrections cancel and the figure does not move.
    • Manchester United's records take five small corrections to a signing date, two fees and two contract lengths, worth less than a hundredth of a point together.
    • Every figure on the site is now rounded once, from the model's exact value. Three printed ranges change by a tenth of a point as a result.
    • The method is set out in "How we estimate matchday revenue". A separate review of agents' fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise these figures; we will report its result.

    What moved: Tottenham 79.4% → 77.6%; Newcastle 77.7% → 79.4%; Crystal Palace 73.6% → 74.9%; Liverpool 70.6% → 69.6%; Everton 71.7% → 70.7%; Arsenal 55.8% → 56.6%; Chelsea 88.6% → 88.0%; Manchester United 58.7% → 58.1%; Aston Villa 71.9% → 72.5%; Brighton 77.8% → 77.4%; Nottingham Forest 96.7% → 97.0%; Bournemouth 83.0% → 82.8%; Coventry 61.2% → 61.0%; Manchester City 74.1% → 74.2%

    Also moved:TottenhamNewcastleCrystal PalaceLiverpoolEvertonArsenalChelseaManchester UnitedAston VillaBrightonBournemouthCoventry CityManchester CityFulhamBrentfordLeeds

  8. V2BHCorrection

    A further check of the transfer records behind every figure: players recorded as costing nothing, sale fees that included add-ons, contract terms and extensions, and fees a selling club owed to a player's former club. It also corrects the date at which departed players' remaining cost is measured for clubs whose year does not end on 30 June. Thirteen published ratios move, by between 0.1 and 1.0 points; no club crosses the 85% or 115% threshold.

    • Aston Villa's ratio rises from 70.8% to 71.7%, because Middlesbrough are owed a fifth of Villa's profit on Morgan Rogers, about £20m, which the figures had counted as Villa's.
    • Fees owed to former clubs are now deducted on the largest sales where a reliable report states them, which also raises Newcastle (Bruno Guimarães and Alexander Isak) to 77.7%, Bournemouth (Antoine Semenyo) to 83.5% and, with a sale fee that had been recorded in euros as pounds, Brighton to 78.1%.
    • Every player sold for a fee while recorded as costing nothing is now checked; those who were in fact bought are either restored to their cost or listed with the most the gap could matter.
    • Sale fees are now the guaranteed fee wherever the clubs or a reliable outlet state it, with add-ons kept separate; Chelsea's ratio rises to 88.6% and Liverpool's to 70.6%, and Crystal Palace's falls to 73.0%.
    • Contract terms and extensions were corrected where a reliable source dates them; smaller moves follow for Tottenham, Arsenal, Nottingham Forest, Leeds, Coventry City and Ipswich Town.
    • For Arsenal, Liverpool and Coventry, whose accounts end on 31 May, the remaining cost of players who have left is now measured at that date rather than 30 June; Arsenal's ratio falls to 55.7%.
    • Where no reliable source exists yet, the figure is kept and the most it could matter is recorded.

    What moved: Aston Villa 70.8% → 71.7%; Brighton 77.2% → 78.1%; Newcastle 76.7% → 77.7%; Bournemouth 83.1% → 83.5%; Chelsea 88.4% → 88.6%; Liverpool 70.5% → 70.6%; Crystal Palace 73.1% → 73.0%; Nottingham Forest 96.9% → 96.7%; Tottenham 79.3% → 79.4%; Arsenal 55.8% → 55.7%; Leeds 64.6% → 64.5%; Coventry City 61.3% → 61.2%; Ipswich Town 88.9% → 88.8%

    Also moved:Aston VillaBrightonNewcastleBournemouthChelseaLiverpoolCrystal PalaceTottenhamArsenalLeedsCoventry CityIpswich Town

  9. V2BFCorrection

    Agents' fees now come from the Football Association's published figures for every club. Thirteen clubs had carried estimates although the FA had published the actual payments in April; with the published figures, thirteen ratios move, by between 0.1 and 2.5 points.

    • Nottingham Forest paid agents £12.2m, not the £22m estimated, and its ratio falls by 2.5 points; Bournemouth paid £20.9m, not £15m, and its ratio rises by 1.4 points.
    • Manchester City, Tottenham, Arsenal and Everton paid less than estimated and their ratios fall by about a point; Chelsea, Aston Villa, Crystal Palace, Fulham, Brighton and Brentford paid more and theirs rise slightly; Liverpool's falls slightly.
    • Newcastle and Manchester United now carry the FA's exact figures rather than rounded ones; their published ratios do not change.
    • No club crosses the 85% or 115% threshold.
    • Any input still waiting for a source now carries the date that source is expected, and the checks fail once it passes.

    What moved: Nottingham Forest 99.4% → 96.9%; Bournemouth 80.8% → 82.2%; Manchester City 75.4% → 74.2%; Tottenham 81.7% → 80.6%; Arsenal 56.8% → 55.8%; Everton 73.3% → 72.3%; Chelsea 87.6% → 88.4%; Aston Villa 70.4% → 71.0%; Crystal Palace 72.8% → 73.2%; Fulham 102.0% → 102.4%; Liverpool 71.5% → 71.2%; Brighton 76.9% → 77.2%; Brentford 81.2% → 81.3%

    Also moved:BournemouthManchester CityTottenhamArsenalEvertonChelseaAston VillaCrystal PalaceFulhamLiverpoolBrightonBrentford

  10. V2BBCorrection

    Two Manchester City sale fees taken to their reported base rather than an estimate, on both clubs’ ledgers.

    • McAtee to Nottingham Forest: an estimated £25m (Forest’s rejected opening bid) replaced by the reported £22m base, on City’s sale and Forest’s purchase alike.
    • Heskey to Köln: £7m, which included add-ons, replaced by the £2.1m base.
    • Two duplicate placeholder rows removed from City’s squad census.

    What moved: Manchester City 78.9% → 79.1%; Nottingham Forest 99.6% → 99.4%.

    Also moved:Manchester City

  11. V2AF–V2AYPublishing gate

    Every club’s departures are now declared from sources, window by window, and reconciled against its ledger in both directions. All 20 clubs were migrated to the new check, and it is enforced: a departure missing on either side refuses the run.

    • A declared departure with no matching sale in the ledger refuses; a sale in the ledger missing from the declaration refuses. Dates that differ by more than a week, or fall in a different financial year, refuse.
    • Free transfers, releases, retirements and contract expiries are exits, not sales, and are never counted as departures.
    • Migrating each club from its sources found missing sales, wrong dates and misclassified exits at several clubs. Each was corrected under its own record before the club was declared.

    What moved: Chelsea 103.1% → 101.5%; Fulham 101.3% → 102.0%; Nottingham Forest 99.5% → 99.6% (missing sales, sale dates and the Jota Silva sale); Newcastle 76.7% → 77.1%; Brighton 77.6% → 77.8%; Brentford 84.2% → 84.5%; Everton 73.5% → 73.3%; Manchester United 58.6% → 58.7%. Others unchanged at published precision.

    Also moved:ArsenalAston VillaBournemouthBrentfordBrightonChelseaCoventry CityCrystal PalaceEvertonFulhamHull CityIpswich TownLeedsLiverpoolManchester CityManchester UnitedNewcastleSunderlandTottenham

  12. V2Y–V2ACCorrection

    A day of frozen-ledger corrections, each signed off separately, most found by checking one club’s ledger against another’s.

    • Nottingham Forest: 2025/26 sales corrected.
    • Tottenham: the Højbjerg transaction corrected.
    • Arsenal: Nørgaard and Vieira recorded as departed, where the ledger still had them at the club.
    • Crystal Palace: academy sales corrected, including removal of a sale that had not happened.
    • Fulham: the dates of Diop’s and Lukić’s sales to Ipswich corrected from the club’s own announcements. An earlier sale date means more book value at sale and slightly less profit.

    What moved: Nottingham Forest 105.1% → 99.5%; Arsenal 58.0% → 56.8%; Tottenham 78.8% → 79.5%; Crystal Palace 73.2% → 72.8%; Fulham unchanged at 101.3% (range 98.2 to 104.7%).

    Also moved:TottenhamArsenalCrystal PalaceFulham

  13. V2NData

    Every wage roll-forward in the series now covers every completed window. Six clubs of twelve had been pricing squads as they stood before windows that had already happened.

    • The wage input is a share of a filed staff-cost line carried forward through the windows closed since, and six clubs carried an incomplete one.
    • The baseline and all twelve articles were brought into agreement in the same pass.

    What moved: Arsenal 56.7% → 58.1%, Everton 73.0% → 72.6%, Brentford 84.0% → 84.2%, Fulham 99.6% → 101.3%, Nottingham Forest 106.3% → 105.1%

    Also moved:ArsenalEvertonBrentfordFulham

  14. v1pPublishing gate

    Ninth and final club of the completeness audit, and the largest correction in the programme, not from one bad fee but because the transfer census was structurally incomplete.

    • Test 1j: a conditional obligation that FAILS must capitalise nothing. The third and last of the three obligation states to get a fixture, and the mirror of the two that fire.
    • Six missing arrivals, a miscohorted player, two unrecorded loans in, and five fees corrected against the club’s own squad table.
    • A registration bought and immediately loaned to a sister club, absent from every squad-based source because the player never appeared.
    • A loan out that had already converted to a permanent sale while the season record still described a loan.
    • Source hierarchy extended: a season article is a presence source, never a completeness source, and at a multi-club group it fails in both directions.

    What moved: 98.6% → 106.3% regulatory, 121.4% → 130.4% underlying

Other clubs