Nottingham Forest · Financial analysis
Nottingham Forest's squad cost ratio: far above the line before player trading, and almost nothing from the rule
Nottingham Forest's squad cost ratio for the 1 March 2027 test comes out at 97.5%, above the 85% green threshold by roughly £33m of annual squad cost. Measured before profit on player sales it is 124.5%, so the squad costs about 24% more than the football revenue the rule counts. The rule's own constructions are worth only 4.6 points here, because a sixteenth-place finish pays merit near the floor and there is no European money at all. Player trading supplies 27.1 points, and about half of that is one sale: Elliot Anderson at £116m, about 51% of the pool. Reconstructed from Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited's accounts and Appendix 2 of the Premier League Handbook.
Figures as of 2 November 2026, Orange Engine release V2CK · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture
SCR 2026/27·Post-summer projection
Latest change to the figures, 1 November 2026: the ratio is 97.5%, from 97.4%, because Gustavo Sá is now treated as on loan and Omari Hutchinson’s reported loan fee is counted. The same day’s corrections cover the merit clock, the reading of note 28 and the merit label. Latest correction, 2 November 2026: an outlet’s name is removed from an earlier note, with no figure changed. All 22 correction notes are at the end.
Forest’s squad costs £260.5m against £209.2m of the football revenue the rule counts. The three-year average of player-sale profit takes the ratio from 124.5% to 97.5%, with Elliot Anderson providing about 51% of the three-year average of sale profit.
| Nottingham Forest | 2026/27 |
|---|---|
| Squad cost ratio, 1 March 2027 test | 97.5% |
| SCR before player trading | 124.5% |
| Merit above the fifteenth-place floor | 4.6 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 27.1 percentage points |
| Above the green threshold by | £33.3m |
| Assumption range | 87.6 to 99.4% |
| Assumption range against 85% | entirely above the line |
| Assumption range against 115% | entirely below the line |
| Stress case (costs only) | 110.5% |
At Forest the rule’s own constructions are worth only £7.5m, because the three-year merit basis sits just above the floor and there is no European distribution this season. Player trading does the rest of the work, and most of that work is one transaction.
- The squad cost is £260.5m: £149.4m of wages, £105.9m of amortisation and about £8.2m of agents’ fees, less about £3.0m of Omari Hutchinson’s reported loan fee.
- Staff costs were £166.7m against turnover of £221.7m in the filed year, before any amortisation.
- Amortisation has gone from £61.7m to £68.9m to an estimated £105.9m in three years.
- Anderson’s sale produced about £88.3m of profit, which is 51% of the whole pool. When his sale leaves the average, and if nothing replaces it, the same cost base returns the ratio to 124.5%.
- A £5.3m impairment of registrations sits in the filed accounts, a write-down that is neither amortisation nor a disposal.
Taken together, the twenty clubs of this season’s Premier League come to 75.4% on the same basis; Nottingham Forest’s 97.5% is above that. The full table for every club in the series is at Premier League SCR 2026/27.
What the accounts say
Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited files to 30 June.
| FY25, £m | FY24, £m | |
|---|---|---|
| Turnover | 221.7 | 189.6 |
| Staff costs | 166.7 | 166.4 |
| Amortisation of registrations | 68.9 | 61.7 |
| Profit on disposal of registrations | 7.0 | 100.5 |
| Interest payable | (21.0) | (15.2) |
| Profit or loss before taxation | (78.9) | 42.1 |
Two rows explain the year. Turnover rose £32m on a seventh-place finish that qualified Forest for Europe, while staff costs barely moved. Yet the club went from a £42.1m profit to a £78.9m loss, and profit on player disposals fell from £100.5m to £7.0m over the same period.
The European campaign itself came afterwards, in 2025/26, so it sits outside these accounts. Its prize money is not counted this season, because Forest did not qualify again, but the European home matches do feed the gate figure.
The registrations note reconciles on every check:
- cost of £258.6m plus £73.5m of additions less £18.1m of disposals gives £314.0m
- amortisation of £70.1m plus £68.9m of charge plus £5.3m of impairment less £9.2m on disposals gives £135.1m
- net book value £178.9m, down from £188.5m
The impairment is worth pausing on. Forest’s accounting policy provides for it where, in the directors’ opinion, the carrying value of a registration has fallen below its recoverable amount. It is neither amortisation nor a disposal. It does not reach the 2026/27 numerator, because that is built from this season’s amortisation on the registrations Forest hold now, but it sits in the accumulated-amortisation column as a movement that is neither a charge nor a disposal, which is what a reconstruction has to allow for when rolling the note forward.
Rebuilding the ratio, before any selling
Wages, about £149m. The rule counts contract players and the head coach. Forest file 83 playing staff against 254 non-playing, and separately 447 temporary staff, against a staff cost of £166.7m.
The squad’s share is taken at 78 to 86%. That range cannot be tested from the filings, because the non-playing population is not settled. Dividing the residual across the 254 non-playing staff gives about £118k a head at the mid-point; dividing it across all 701 non-playing and temporary staff gives about £43k. The accounts do not establish whether the temporary staff’s remuneration sits inside the £166.7m, and the answer decides whether a materially lower share can be ruled out: it implies about £277k a head on the first basis and about £100k on the second.
Rolled through the three completed windows, the estimate for this season is about £153.9m, and £149.4m after the part of Omari Hutchinson’s wage that AC Milan are reported to pay while he is on loan there. Wages alone are about 71% of the £209.2m of football revenue the rule counts, before amortisation and agents have been counted at all.
Amortisation, £105.9m. Forest publish no forward schedule, so the residual is derived from the filed net book value of £178.9m, less the book value of those who have since left, spread over an estimated 2.8 to 3.8 year average remaining life. Signings since the accounts are costed at the reported fee plus 12%, because the rule counts the League’s transfer levy, agents’ fees and the other costs of a transfer as part of what a registration costs.
| £m | |
|---|---|
| Residual of the squad as it stood in June 2025 | 26.8 |
| plus the summer 2025 cohort, £193.2m of registrations | 46.4 |
| plus the summer 2026 cohort, with Gustavo Sá, £117.0m | 32.4 |
| plus the January 2026 arrivals | 0.3 |
| 2026/27 amortisation | 105.9 |
Amortisation was £61.7m in FY24 and £68.9m in FY25, and is estimated at £105.9m now. It has risen by about 70% since FY24; turnover rose by about a sixth between FY24 and FY25, the last filed year, from £189.6m to £221.7m.
The five-year cap does not reach every registration. It applies to contracts executed, or on this model’s reading extended, on or after 12 December 2023. Registrations signed before that date are amortised over their full initial term. Almost all of Forest’s recent spending falls after the cut-off.
Agents’ fees, about £8.2m, expensed, from the FA’s published figure of £12.2m for February 2025 to February 2026.
Revenue the rule counts, £209.2m.
| Revenue for the test | Basis | £m |
|---|---|---|
| Central funds excluding facility fees | equal share plus merit at thirteenth, the three-year mean | 130.1 |
| Facility fees | 34 televised appearances | 18.4 |
| Commercial | estimated 2025/26 income, not yet filed: the £38.5m filed for 2024/25 grown by 16.4%, less the cost of merchandise | 40.3 |
| Gate | estimated 2025/26 receipts per home match, over the 22 home matches the rule counts | 18.7 |
| European prize money | not in a UEFA competition this season | nil |
| Domestic cups and academy grant | 1.7 | |
| Total | 209.2 |
Last season’s commercial revenue is estimated at £44.8m: the £38.5m filed for 2024/25, grown by 16.4%, the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). The commercial row counts merchandise at gross profit, as the rule does. Forest’s accounts give merchandise sales of £10.1m and not their cost, so £4.5m is taken off the £44.8m estimate, on an estimated margin of 55%, in a range of £3.5m to £6.6m.
The merit ladder does something for Forest, and it has a clock on it
The rule pays at the best of three candidates: last season’s finish, the three-year mean, and a floor of fifteenth.
| Candidate | Position | What it pays |
|---|---|---|
| Last season’s finish, 2025/26 | 16th | £118.8m |
| Three-year mean, from 16th, 7th and 17th | 13th | £130.1m |
| The floor | 15th | £122.6m |
The three-year mean binds, because the seventh-place finish of 2024/25 is still inside it. Forest are paid as though they finished thirteenth, which is £11.3m more than their actual finish would pay and £7.5m above the floor.
That seventh-place season stays in the mean for the 2028 test and leaves for the 2029 test. After that, on the same ladder, a mean built from sixteenth and two similar finishes would pay close to the floor, and the floor is £7.5m below where Forest sit now.
And there is no European money. Forest played in Europe in 2025/26 and finished sixteenth, so they are not in a competition for 2026/27. Rule A.1.29(e) counts a distribution only for the competition a club has qualified for, so last season’s European income is excluded entirely. Last season’s commercial revenue is still counted in full, less the cost of merchandise. The commercial estimate contains no specific allowance for this European campaign. The gate is not: the rule takes last season’s receipts per home match, across all 27 home matches including eight in Europe, and counts 22 of them this season, 19 in the league and a three-season average of three home cup ties.
The facility payment, and what a displaced fixture costs
Forest were televised 34 times in 2025/26 and earned £18.4m, which is about £541k an appearance. Newcastle earned £20.5m from 31 appearances, about £661k.
A club can be televised more often and paid less per game, because a fixture displaced by another event pays less than half a live selection, and a European campaign displaces fixtures.
How much of the revenue rests on the rule’s own bases
| Set by the rule’s bases | £m |
|---|---|
| Merit payment above the fifteenth-place floor | 7.5 |
| European distribution under A.1.29(e) | nil |
| European home gate | nil |
| Total | 7.5 |
Measured at the fifteenth-place floor, the same cost base would produce 129.2% instead of 124.5%, which is 4.6 points. For comparison, the same three are worth £53.2m at Bournemouth.
What player trading does to it
The rule adds the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows and divides it by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). For the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024, five months before Forest’s 2024/25 year.
| Period | Profit, £m | What produced it |
|---|---|---|
| February to June 2024 | 13.5 | Vlachodimos to Newcastle at a reported £20m against about £7m on the books, Freuler’s move to Bologna made permanent, and Laryea back to Toronto |
| 2024/25 | 7.0 | filed, the year disposal profit fell from £100.5m |
| 2025/26 | 58.3 | Elanga to Newcastle at £52m, plus smaller sales: Danilo, Sosa, Turner, Carlos Miguel, O’Brien, Taylor, McDonnell, Carmo, three academy moves with undisclosed fees, and Stamenić at a loss |
| 2026/27 to date | 95.5 | Anderson at £116m against about £23m of book value after two years, Awoniyi at £9m, and Richards estimated |
| Three-year average | 58.1 | the figure the rule counts |
£260.5m divided by £209.2m plus £58.1m gives 97.5%.
Fifty-five per cent of that pool is the current year, and most of the current year is one player. Anderson’s £88.3m of profit is about 51% of the whole pool on its own.
Elanga cross-checks against another ledger in this series. He appears as a £52m arrival in the Newcastle reconstruction and a £52m departure here. Note 28 of Forest’s FY25 accounts gives the income of the transfers since the year end, “taking into account the applicable levies and sell on clauses”, as £52.5m. Our ledger has about £99.0m of fees on the sales to October 2025 and about £55.9m of profit on them. The note does not say what the figure measures, so we do not use it as an anchor, though it sits much nearer our profit than our fees. Daniel Muñoz does the same from the other direction, as a departure in the Crystal Palace ledger and an arrival here at the same fee.
The expiry clock
Holding squad cost and countable revenue where they are and rolling only the profit pool:
| Test | Sales averaged | Average, £m | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 March 2027 | 13.5 (February to June 2024), 7.0, 58.3, 95.5 | 58.1 | 97.5% |
| 1 March 2028 | −0.9 (February to June 2025), 58.3, 95.5 | 51.0 | 100.1% |
| 1 March 2029 | 1.5 (February to June 2026), 95.5 | 32.3 | 107.9% |
| 1 March 2030 | nothing | nil | 124.5% |
Each row averages the sales of the six transfer windows before that test (Rule A.1.53). A financial year’s February to June sales fall in a later window than the rest of that year, so they stay in the average for one more test. Those rows hold three things still at once: the squad cost, the countable revenue, and the assumption that no further selling replaces what leaves. They are arithmetic rather than a forecast. Revenue is held at this season’s figures; next season’s commercial revenue is not forecast here.
When the Anderson sale finally leaves the average, the ratio returns to what the cost base alone produces.
A club that trades harder and finishes further out
| Forest | Bournemouth | |
|---|---|---|
| At the floor, with no European money | 129.2% | 137.2% |
| SCR before player trading | 124.5% | 105.0% |
| Squad cost ratio | 97.5% | 85.4% |
| Merit above the floor and European amounts | 4.6 percentage points | 32.2 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 27.1 percentage points | 19.6 percentage points |
Bournemouth’s 85.4% is a central figure in an assumption range of 78.3% to 86.9% that spans 85%: the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line Bournemouth are on.
Strip out the merit uplift, the European distribution and the European home gate, and Forest’s cost base is the lighter of the two, about eight points below Bournemouth’s. Yet Forest’s ratio ends about 12 points higher.
Forest trade harder than Bournemouth in the rule’s terms, 27.1 points against 19.6. What separates them is that Bournemouth’s sixth-place finish and European qualification are worth 32.2 points, and Forest’s sixteenth place and absence from Europe are worth 4.6.
That is worth stating plainly: the rule’s constructions favour clubs that finish high and qualify for Europe. Forest did neither.
What being above the green line means
Rule C.4 issues a Breach Notification, and C.4.1 makes the club subject to the Accounts Confirmation Test, so the League examines the season outturn rather than the March estimate. No levy is charged this season, because the transitional rule switches levies off for 2026/27.
The red line is barely in play: the top of the assumption range, 99.4%, is below it. The stress case, the worst case on costs alone, with every uncertain cost input set against the club at once and revenue held at the central estimate, reaches 110.5%, which is also below it. It is not an upper bound of the assumption range.
If the outturn is also above 85%, the Negative Feedback Loop applies. Rule A.1.39 deducts the lower of two measures: the March overspend divided by outturn football revenues, and the outturn ratio less 85%. Both parts require the season outturn, so no deduction can be calculated from a March estimate. What can be said is the shape: a deduction reduces next season’s error margin, which A.1.17 caps at 30% and floors at 0%, so the red line falls from 115% by whatever the deduction turns out to be.
A club whose squad cost is 125% of countable revenue before trading is exposed to that mechanism in a way a club at 95% is not. At 124.5% before trading, Forest need a large change in selling, squad cost or countable revenue to move inside the green line.
What multi-club ownership does to an audit
Evangelos Marinakis owns Forest, Olympiacos and Rio Ave, and placed his Forest shares in a blind trust to satisfy UEFA’s rules when both clubs qualified for Europe.
That structure changes what a club’s own squad page can tell you, and this audit found registrations that would be missed by looking only at who appeared for Forest.
A player can pass through and never appear. Gustavo Sá was reported to have been signed by Forest from Famalicão on 30 July 2026 for about £17.1m and loaned to Olympiacos the next day. Olympiacos announced him that day as their own signing, with no mention of Forest or of a loan, and he is on none of Forest’s squad pages, its list of players out on loan, or the League’s squad list of 3 September. Lusa, citing a source close to the deal, reported the loan, and no report describes a sale, so we treat him as a Forest registration on loan: his cost is spread across this season like any other signing’s, and no loan fee is stated. Forest’s 2026/27 accounts will show whether that is right. It is not isolated: Hwang Ui-jo was signed and loaned to Olympiacos the same day in 2022, and David Carmo was signed permanently from Porto and loaned to Olympiacos immediately, before being sold there in June 2026.
The lesson generalises beyond Forest. A club’s season article or squad page records who played. At a single-club operation that is a reasonable proxy for who the club owns. At a multi-club group the two can come apart, so auditing such a club means auditing registrations across the group rather than reading one page.
The obligation that did not trigger
Douglas Luiz arrived on loan from Juventus in summer 2025 with a purchase obligation requiring fifteen appearances of at least forty-five minutes. He made fourteen, and the loan was ended early in January. The obligation never triggered, so nothing of his registration reaches 2026/27.
The ledger had him wrong in both directions before the audit, first as a permanent signing at a nil fee and then as capitalised from inception, which overstated the ratio by about five points.
How it is financed, and what the ratio does not see
A £21.0m finance-cost line on £221.7m of revenue, up from £15.2m.
And the loan-fee line moved sharply. Forest received £4.4m of loan fees in FY25, down from £15.5m. The accounting line is revenue, but the treatment under the rule is more specific: the guidance to Rule A.1.29(g) applies temporary-transfer amounts first against the relevant player’s remuneration, then his amortisation, then his agents’ fee, with only any surplus entering the sale-profit pool. The regulatory effect therefore depends on the economics of each loan rather than on the headline figure.
What this doesn’t say
- That Forest’s ratio is exactly 97.5%. The published range is 87.6 to 99.4%, conditional on the current 78 to 86% player-share assumption, on how much of their players’ wages the clubs borrowing them pay, which is stated for only one of Forest’s loans, on an estimated remaining life for the residual squad, on 2025/26 commercial and gate figures that are not yet filed, and on estimates of the cost of merchandise and of what a registration costs beyond its fee. The player-share range cannot be tested from the filings, because the filed headcount lists 447 temporary staff separately from the 254 non-playing, and whether their remuneration sits inside the staff-cost line decides what the residual can be tested against.
- That an assumption range lying wholly above 85% makes the outcome certain. The range is conditional on the stated input ranges and excludes the possibility that the reconstruction is wrong in a way those ranges do not describe.
- That being near 100% has any regulatory meaning. It does not. The thresholds are 85% and 115%, and at 97.5% Forest are above the green line and below the red one.
- That the red line is a live risk this season. The top of the assumption range, 99.4%, is below it, and the 110.5% stress case, the worst case on costs alone and not a forecast, stays below it.
- That a Breach Notification is a sanction. It is a notification, and it brings the club’s actual figures into scope. The sporting-sanction pathway begins at 115%.
- That a feedback-loop deduction can be sized from this estimate. Both parts of Rule A.1.39 require the season outturn.
- That the £5.3m impairment affects this calculation. It is a 2024/25 charge, and it matters here only for rolling the filed registrations note forward correctly.
Forest’s ratio is being held about twenty-seven percentage points below the before-trading figure by the three-year sale-profit average, most of which currently comes from 2026/27. On frozen costs and revenue it returns to 124.5% once that pool has rolled out.
Sources and caveats.
The accounts. Nottingham Forest Football Club Limited accounts for the years to 30 June 2021 to 30 June 2025, filed at Companies House, with the registrations note reconciled: cost £258.6m plus £73.5m less £18.1m gives £314.0m, and accumulated amortisation £70.1m plus £68.9m of charge plus £5.3m of impairment less £9.2m on disposals gives £135.1m, for a net book value of £178.9m. Note 28 puts post-year-end transfer income at £52.5m. The filed year ends 30 June, so the 2025 and 2026 windows fall wholly or partly outside the last filed accounts and are reconstructed on top of them.
The rules applied. Premier League Handbook 2026/27, Appendix 2, in particular Rules A.1.4, A.1.13, A.1.17, A.1.22, A.1.29 including (a), (b), (d), (e) and (g), A.1.32, A.1.33, A.1.39, A.1.53 and C.4.
What is estimated, and why.
- Player wages, about £149m, after the part of Omari Hutchinson's wage that AC Milan are reported to pay while he is on loan there (a relayed report, not confirmed by either club). SempreMilan reported an expected loan fee of €3m to €4m; we take the middle, about £3.0m, and set it against his amortisation under the guidance to Rule A.1.29(g). Neither club states a fee. For Forest's other players out on loan nobody has said how much of the wage the borrowing club pays, so that saving is drawn in the range only, from nothing to the whole of an estimated salary. Forest's accounts do not separate the wages of the players and the head coach. Forest file 83 playing staff against 254 non-playing, and separately 447 temporary staff, against a staff cost of £166.7m. This reconstruction uses 78 to 86%. That range cannot be tested from the filings. The residual test used at other clubs divides the non-playing residual by the non-playing headcount, and here the result depends on which population is used: about £118k a head across the 254, or about £43k across all 701 including temporary staff. The accounts do not establish whether the temporary staff's remuneration is inside the £166.7m, and until that is settled a materially lower share cannot be ruled out on this evidence.
- Amortisation is derived from the filed net book value over an estimated 2.8 to 3.8 year average remaining life, because Forest publish no forward schedule. Signings since the accounts are costed at the reported fee plus 12% (the League's 4% transfer levy, agents' fees and other directly attributable costs; range 6% to 20%). For registrations within the scope of Rule A.1.22(c), the five-year cap applies from the relevant signing or, on this model's reading, extension date; earlier registrations are amortised over their full initial term.
- Commercial income and gate receipts for 2025/26 are estimated because those accounts are not yet filed. The commercial estimate is the £38.5m filed for 2024/25 grown by 16.4%, the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season's commercial revenue), which is £44.8m. Merchandise counts at gross profit, so its cost is taken off commercial revenue: Forest's accounts give merchandise sales of £10.1m and not their cost, and £4.5m is taken off, on an estimated margin of 55%, in a range of £3.5m to £6.6m. Agents' fees are taken from the FA's published figure, with the share treated as an expense estimated. Facility fees use a published club-source estimate of £18.4m on 34 confirmed televised appearances; the Premier League does not publish official figures.
Transfers and loans.
- Every window since the accounts date was rebuilt as a transaction census against the club's own announcements and squad records, supplemented where those sources omit cross-group registrations or later conversions; seven summer-2025 sales missed at first were added on 25 September 2026. The summer 2025 window contains thirteen incoming registrations, eleven permanent and two loans, against a club-derived summary referring to twelve signings overall; the conflict is recorded rather than resolved by assumption, and does not affect the ratio because each registration is independently evidenced.
- Douglas Luiz's purchase obligation did not trigger. It required fifteen appearances of at least forty-five minutes; he made fourteen and the loan ended early, so nothing of his registration reaches 2026/27.
- Gustavo Sá is treated as a Forest registration on loan to Olympiacos, bought for about £17.1m. Portuguese reports, including Lusa citing a source close to the deal, said Forest bought him and loaned him on; no report describes a sale. Olympiacos announced him as their own signing, and he is on none of Forest's squad pages or the League's squad list. Forest keep the amortisation, and no loan fee is stated. David Carmo was signed by Forest, loaned to Olympiacos, and sold there in June 2026.
- Disposal profits are calculated from reported fees and reconstructed book values, which carry the same 12%, with a 5% deduction for direct costs applied to gains. Elanga's £52m departure reconciles against the Newcastle ledger; note 28 gives the income of post-year-end transfers, after levies and sell-on clauses, as £52.5m and does not say what that measures, so it is not used as an anchor. Seven of those sales, dated from Forest's announcements between 9 July and 20 August 2025, were added on 25 September 2026; Muñoz's arrival reconciles against the Crystal Palace ledger.
Completeness. The playing population was checked against the Premier League's submitted senior and Under-21 squad lists, with 126 identities classified and none unresolved, and eleven of them corroborated against other clubs' returns in this series.
Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.
Independent estimate, not an official calculation, and not advice. Figures produced 22 September 2026; updated 25 September, 1 October, 2 October, 3 October, 4 October, 5 October, 9 October, 16 October, 23 October, 25 October, 26 October, 28 October, 31 October and 1 November 2026.
Corrections and updates (22)
22 September 2026 · Editorial · figures not recorded
Update, 22 September 2026. The population has since been reconciled against the Premier League’s own squad returns, so the figures are no longer marked pending. Earlier updates on 15 and 18 September rebuilt every window as a transaction census and completed a wage roll-forward that had skipped January 2026; those moved the ratio from 98.7% to 106.3% and then to 105.1%, and that work stands.
25 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 25 September 2026. Forest’s transfer record was rebuilt from the clubs’ own announcements, which corrected three things. Thirteen players sold since the June 2025 year end had not been recorded as sales: Ramón Sosa, Danilo, Lewis O’Brien, Matt Turner, Dale Taylor, Carlos Miguel and Marko Stamenić in summer 2025, and Ben Perry, Jamie McDonnell, Adam Berry, Isaac Davies, Joe Gardner and Omar Richards. Because they were still carried as Forest players, part of their book value was being spread across this season as amortisation, and the profit on their sales was missing; four of the fees were never disclosed and are carried at nil, so that profit is understated if anything. Six departure dates were also brought into line with the completion dates in the announcements, including David Carmo’s sale to Olympiacos, which completed on 30 June 2026 and so belongs to 2025/26. And Jota Silva’s move to Olympiacos, which the reconstruction had treated as a sale, is a season-long loan with an option exercisable at the end of the campaign, so he remains a Forest registration and his cost is still spread across this season. Separately, James McAtee’s fee is now the £22m guaranteed at signing, not £25m: the deal rises to £30m only with add-ons, and £25m was Forest’s own opening bid, which Manchester City rejected. Together these lower the squad cost from £275.5m to £267.7m and raise the three-year average of sale profit from £48.5m to £55.6m, taking the ratio from 105.1% to 99.4%, and 125.2% before player trading. Forest remain above the 85% green line, by £38.7m, so the regulatory outcome is unchanged; the range is 95.7% to 103.1% and the stress case 111.2%. The comparison with Bournemouth uses Bournemouth’s current figures.
26 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Update, 26 September 2026. Forest’s own figures are unchanged. The comparison with Bournemouth uses its corrected figures: 80.8%, 100.5% before player trading and 130.8% without the revenue the rule adds, which is worth 30.3 points there, from 30.2.
1 and 2 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 99.4% → 96.7% · before player sales 125.2% → 122.1%
Corrections, 1 and 2 October 2026. The ratio is 96.7%, from 99.4%, and 122.1% before player trading, from 125.2%. The agents’ fees were wrong: this article said they came from an FA figure of about £22m, but the FA’s published figure for Forest is £12.2m. David Carmo’s fee is the €11m (£9.3m) Porto reported, dated from his signing on 25 August 2024; Anthony Elanga’s and Taiwo Awoniyi’s signings are dated from their completions; and Stefan Ortega joined on a free transfer. The squad cost is £261.0m and the three-year average of sale profit £56.0m. Forest are £31.7m above the green line, the range is 93.3% to 100.4% and the stress case 108.0%. On frozen costs the 2028 test is 97.6%. The comparison with Bournemouth uses its current figures: before the revenue the rule adds, Forest’s cost base is about six points lighter than Bournemouth’s, and its ratio about 14 points higher. The conclusion does not change: Forest are above the green line on every modelled draw, and no draw reaches the red line.
3 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 96.7% → 97.0% · before player sales 122.1% → 122.5%
Correction, 3 October 2026. The ratio is 97.0%, from 96.7%, and 122.5% before player trading, from 122.1%. Counted, from archived match reports. The rule counts the average number of home FA Cup and League Cup matches over the last three seasons, rounded up. Forest played seven (four, three and none), so the rule counts three, where we had assumed two. The rule divides last season’s receipts by last season’s home matches. Forest played 27 (19 league and eight European), where we had assumed 26. Re-estimated, by our method. Last season’s matchday receipts are not yet filed. We had carried £24.0m; the estimate is now £23.0m: the filed 2024/25 figure of £20.3m, scaled for the change in home matches (cup ties from 3 to 0 and European matches from 0 to 8), with a cup tie counted as 0.15 of a league match and a European match as 0.25, plus 5% for the year. The method, and how far it could be out, is set out in How we estimate matchday revenue. Matchday revenue under the rule is £18.7m, from £19.4m. Forest’s website carries no report of one of the seven cup ties, with Burnley in August 2023; a published match report is the evidence. Also moved: the range is 93.5 to 100.6%, from 93.3 to 100.4%; the squad cost is £32.2m above the green threshold, from £31.7m; and the stress case is 108.3%, from 108.0%. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
3 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 3 October 2026 (second of the day). Forest’s own figures are unchanged. In the comparison with Bournemouth, Bournemouth’s ratio is now 81.7%, from 82.8%; 100.3% before player trading, from 101.6%; and 130.5% without the revenue the rule adds, from 132.1%. That revenue is now worth 30.1 points there, from 30.5, and player-sale profits 18.6 points, from 18.8. Before the revenue the rule adds, Forest’s cost base is now about four points below Bournemouth’s, from about five, and Forest’s ratio ends about 15 points higher, from about 14, after a signing that had been charged twice was corrected. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
4 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 97.0% → 102.5% · before player sales 122.5% → 129.1%
Correction, 4 October 2026. The ratio is 102.5%, from 97.0%, and 129.1% before player trading, from 122.5%. The squad cost rule defines three things in its own terms, and in each we had used the figure from a club’s accounts (Three definitions in the squad cost rule, and what they change). What a registration costs. The rule counts everything a club pays in connection with a transfer: the fee, the League’s 4% transfer levy and agents’ fees. For players signed since Forest’s last accounts we now count the reported fee plus 12%. Squad cost is £266.3m, from £261.0m, and the three-year average of sale profit is £53.5m, from £56.0m, because a player sold now leaves at a higher book value. This is the result of the review of agents’ fees that our earlier notes promised. Merchandise. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, sales less the cost of the goods, where we had counted sales in full. Forest’s accounts give merchandise sales of £10.1m and not their cost; we take off £4.5m, on an estimated margin of 55%, in a range of £3.5m to £6.6m. Cup prize money. The rule counts a three-year average of what a club received from the FA Cup and the EFL Cup. We had entered £3.0m for Forest, a figure with no calculation behind it. Rebuilt from Forest’s cup ties in the last three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, it is £0.8m, in a range of £0.6m to £2.1m. The figure is provisional: the EFL publishes no prize money, some broadcast fees are not published, and the top of the range allows for a share of the gate at away ties, which the rule may or may not count. The revenue the rule counts is £206.4m, from £213.1m. Also moved: the range is 98.7 to 106.3%, from 93.5 to 100.6%; the overshoot of the 85% threshold is £45.4m, from £32.2m; the stress case is 114.0%, from 108.3%. Forest remain above the green threshold and below the red one.
4 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 4 October 2026 (second of the day). This article gave Nottingham Forest’s amortisation for 2023/24 as £46.0m. The club’s accounts print £61.7m (note 7); £46.0m was another club’s figure, copied into our record in error. Amortisation has therefore risen by about two thirds in two years, not more than doubled. The squad cost ratio and every other figure in the article are unchanged: the 2023/24 figure is not used in the calculation.
5 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 102.5% → 103.4% · before player sales 129.1% → 130.2%
Correction, 5 October 2026. The ratio is 103.4%, from 102.5%, and 130.2% before player trading, from 129.1%. We now measure each contract from the day the player was registered to the day it ends. A player who signs in August on a five-year deal has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June; we had spread his cost over five full years. 24 of Nottingham Forest’s contract lengths change, 14 of them against an end date we have derived as the 30 June the announced length points to, where no source states the date. The yearly charge for registrations is £106.6m, from £104.2m. The range is 99.6% to 107.2%, from 98.7% to 106.3%. No threshold is crossed. Most clubs move because contract costs are now measured to their actual or derived expiry dates; six also move for club-specific reasons. See the engine changelog. This estimate is built on the club company’s accounts. The women’s and netball teams sit in the parent’s group accounts, which add about £1.2m of revenue; counting the women’s share would lower this ratio slightly.
9 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 103.4% → 102.3% · before player sales 130.2% → 128.5%
Correction, 9 October 2026. The ratio is 102.3%, from 103.4%, and 128.5% before player trading, from 130.2%. Last season’s commercial revenue is now estimated by one published method, the same for every club. Forest’s 2025/26 accounts are not filed, so the figure is an estimate. We had £42.0m, a judgement of ours. It is now £44.8m: the £38.5m filed for 2024/25, grown by 16.4%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). It is drawn between £29.0m and £66.4m, where we had drawn 7% either way: the new span comes from how far forecasts of this kind have missed in past seasons. The range is 96.4% to 106.9%, from 99.6% to 107.2%. The published ratio crosses no threshold. This article said that none of the modelled draws crosses the 115% red line; it now says that about three in every 10,000 do. The sentence that said last season’s commercial figure had been raised by the European campaign is replaced: the commercial estimate contains no specific allowance for that campaign. The stress case is now described as what it is: the worst case on costs alone, with revenue held at the central estimate. The table of later tests holds this season’s revenue fixed and does not forecast next season’s commercial revenue; it is now labelled so. See the engine changelog.
15 October 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Clarification, 15 October 2026. Wording only; no figure changed. The model’s probabilities in this article are not statistically calibrated: the ranges are assumption ranges, the spread of the model’s inputs between assumed bounds, not confidence intervals. The notes above that quote a share of modelled draws on either side of the 115% red line, or “every modelled draw” above 85%, are kept as published and are withdrawn as statements of probability; the assumption range of 96.4% to 106.9% is below the red line and above the green line.
16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · no change to the ratio
Updated 16 October 2026: loans out now recorded; wage relief shown in ranges.
16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · SCR 102.3% → 99.3% · before player sales 128.5% → 124.5%
Correction, 16 October 2026. The ratio is 99.3%, from 102.3%, and 124.5% before player trading, from 128.5%. Forest remain above the green line and below the red one. Two things moved it. Gustavo Sá is now recorded as sold, not loaned. This article said Forest signed him from Famalicão on 30 July 2026 and loaned him to Olympiacos the next day, so we counted his amortisation as Forest’s. Olympiacos announced him that day as their own signing, with no mention of Forest or of a loan, and he is on none of Forest’s squad pages, its list of players out on loan, or the League’s squad list of 3 September. We now record him as sold to Olympiacos on 30 July 2026. No fee has been published, so the sale is recorded at the £17.1m Forest were reported to have paid, which is an estimate: his amortisation leaves this season’s squad cost, and the sale books a loss of £2.0m, because the cost of a registration includes the 12% we add to the fee. Together that is 1.2 points. Omari Hutchinson’s wage. He joined AC Milan on loan on 31 August 2026, and Milan are reported to pay his wage in full; the report is relayed, not confirmed by either club. On a salary estimated from what Forest paid for him, that takes 1.7 points off. Forest’s other players out on loan are now recorded too. Nobody has said how much of their wages the borrowing clubs pay, so that saving widens the range and leaves the central figure where it is. The squad cost is £260.4m, from £268.7m; the three-year average of sale profit is £52.9m, from £53.6m; the overshoot of the 85% threshold is £37.6m, from £45.4m; the range is 90.5% to 102.0%, from 96.4% to 106.9%; the stress case is 112.3%, from 113.6%. Elliot Anderson’s sale is now about 56% of the three-year pool, from 55%. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 99.3% → 97.6% · before player sales unchanged at 124.5%
Correction, 23 October 2026. This article estimated Nottingham Forest’s ratio at 99.3%; the corrected figure is 97.6%, and 124.5% before player trading is unchanged. We had missed £13.5m of profit on player sales. The rule averages the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53), and for the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024. We had averaged three financial years starting on 1 July 2024, so Forest’s sales between February and June 2024 were left out: Odysseas Vlachodimos to Newcastle, Remo Freuler’s loan to Bologna made permanent, and Richie Laryea to Toronto. Nothing in Forest’s own figures changed; the error was in how we read the rule.
- Moved: the three-year average of sale profit is £57.4m, from £52.9m, worth 26.8 percentage points, from 25.1. Squad cost is £33.7m a year above the green line, from £37.6m. The range is 89.0% to 100.3%, from 90.5% to 102.0%. The stress case is 110.4%, from 112.3%. Anderson’s sale is 51% of the pool, from 56%, and the gap to Bournemouth about 12 percentage points, from 14.
- Later tests: the figures for the 2028 and 2029 tests are withdrawn while they are rechecked, because they took whole financial years out of the average. The 2030 row, with no sale profit left at all, is unchanged at 124.5%.
- The conclusion holds: Forest are above the green line on the central estimate and across the range, and below the red one. The twenty clubs together come to 74.9%, from 75.6%. The lead chart and the cover are redrawn with these figures. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 (second) · Methodology change · no change to the ratio
Correction, 23 October 2026 (second of the day). The ratio at the 2028 test is 100.3%, from 100.2%, and at the 2029 test 108.1%, from 108.3%. Each test now averages the sales of the six transfer windows before it (Rule A.1.53), rather than whole financial years, so a year’s February to June sales stay in the average for one test longer. The 2028 test counts Forest’s sales from February to June 2025, a £0.9m loss, with the two years that follow, an average of £50.3m; the 2029 test counts £1.5m of sales from February to June 2026 with the current year, £31.7m. The 1 March 2027 figure of 97.6%, and the 2030 row of 124.5%, are unchanged. See the engine changelog.
25 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 25 October 2026. The ratio, 97.6%, is unchanged. The article said amortisation has risen by about two thirds in two years while revenue rose by about a sixth. The two thirds runs from FY24’s £61.7m to the £102.7m estimated now, which is three years, and the sixth was one year’s growth in turnover, FY24 to FY25. The sentence now gives each span. The list of notes also holds two of 16 October: the first, which records no figure, was published in error beside the second, which gives the change that day, 102.3% to 99.3%. Both stay, because the notes are a record; the second is the one that counts.
26 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio
Correction, 26 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 97.6%. Forest’s loan income is now in the range. Fees a club receives for lending players count with the profit on player sales (the guidance to Rule A.1.29(g)). The filed accounts give a total for loan income without saying how much is fee and how much is wages recharged, so the central figure counts none of it and the range allows anything from none to all of it; only income from 2 February 2024 counts (Rule A.1.53), and 2025/26’s waits for the accounts. Forest filed £4.4m for 2024/25 and £15.5m for 2023/24. The range is 88.6% to 99.9%, from 89.0% to 100.3%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.0%, from 74.9%. Fees paid and received for head coaches now count, at Manchester City, Chelsea, Brentford, Ipswich, Newcastle and Crystal Palace (Rules A.1.22(d) and A.1.29(g)). Bournemouth’s range, quoted for comparison, is 78.4% to 87.0%, from 79.0% to 87.6%, for the same reason.
28 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 97.6% → 97.4% · before player sales 124.5% → 124.1%
Correction, 28 October 2026. The ratio is 97.4%, from 97.6%, and 124.1% before player trading, from 124.5%. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected sixteen entries at eleven clubs where the club’s announcement or a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different fee, contract length or date. Daniel Munoz cost £20m guaranteed, not £22m, with up to £2m of add-ons. A fee counts what is payable or has fallen due, and an add-on only once it is due (Rules A.1.43 and A.1.22(c)), so add-ons not yet due now count in the range only. Mason Ayre’s scholarship runs to June 2028, not June 2029. Amortisation is £101.9m, from £102.7m, and the squad cost £259.6m, from £260.4m, £33.0m over the 85% line, from £33.7m. The range is 88.4% to 99.7%, from 88.6% to 99.9%; without the revenue the rule adds the ratio is 128.7%, from 129.1%. On frozen costs the later tests are 100.0%, 107.8% and 124.1%, from 100.3%, 108.1% and 124.5%. Bournemouth’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Bournemouth’s correction of today. In the amortisation table the summer 2026 signings still at Forest are £99.9m of registrations, from £102.0m, charging £28.5m, from £29.3m, and the summer 2025 signings £193.1m, where £193.0m was printed.
31 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 31 October 2026. Nicolo Savona’s fee is £11.3m, from £11.2m: the EUR 13m Juventus state, at the rate of the day. Amortisation is £102.0m, from £101.9m, and the summer 2025 cohort £193.2m, from £193.1m. The twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%, because Chelsea’s and Liverpool’s filed sale profit replaces our modelled figures and 19 transfer entries are corrected across the league. The ratio, 97.4%, is unchanged. Figures that follow from these are restated with them in the text. The correction does not reverse the article’s conclusion.
1 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Correction, 1 November 2026. Forest’s ratio is unchanged at 97.4%. The article said the seventh-place finish leaves the three-year merit mean after the March 2027 test. It stays in for the 2028 test and leaves for 2029. The article said note 28’s £52.5m records cash received; the note says income “taking into account the applicable levies and sell on clauses”, and does not say what that measures, so the article now quotes it. The label “revenue added by the rule” is replaced with what the figure measures, merit above the fifteenth-place floor. The article said this European campaign’s revenue appears in the estimates for this season; the prize money does not count, and the home matches feed the gate figure. Bournemouth’s trading effect was given as 19.7 points; it is 19.6. The sentence that no club discloses its players’ wage bill now speaks only of Forest, and the player-share range is no longer described as under review. The sources now list Rules A.1.29(g) and A.1.53. Two repeating sections, on the squad lists and on what the article says, are removed; the squad-list check stays in the sources.
1 November 2026 (second) · Data correction · SCR 97.4% → 97.5% · before player sales 124.1% → 124.5%
Correction, 1 November 2026. The ratio is 97.5%, from 97.4%, and 124.5% before player trading, from 124.1%. Gustavo Sá is now treated as on loan to Olympiacos, not sold. We had recorded a sale on 16 October because Forest list him nowhere; Lusa, citing a source close to the deal, reported a loan, and no report describes a sale. His amortisation now counts, and the £2.0m modelled loss on the sale goes. Omari Hutchinson’s reported loan fee now counts: €3m to €4m, about £3.0m at the middle, set against his amortisation; neither club states it. The sale-profit average is £58.1m, from £57.4m, and player trading is worth 27.1 points, from 26.7. Squad cost is £260.5m, from £259.6m. The range is 87.6% to 99.4%, from 88.4% to 99.7%, and the stress case is 110.5%, from 110.4%. On frozen costs the 2028 test is 100.1%, from 100.0%, the 2029 test 107.9%, from 107.8%, and the 2030 test 124.5%, from 124.1%. The twenty clubs together come to 75.4%, from 75.3%. No threshold is crossed.
2 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Correction, 2 November 2026. The note on Forest’s cup ties named the outlet whose match report evidences the tie with Burnley in August 2023. It is not a source this publication cites, so the note now describes the source without the name. No figure changes.