Everton · Financial analysis
Everton's squad cost ratio: a cost base close to the line, and one loan that costs £16m a year
Everton's squad cost ratio for the 1 March 2027 test comes out at about 72%, inside the 85% green threshold with £36.7m of annual spending headroom. Measured before profit on player sales it is 85.0%, and measured at the fifteenth-place merit floor it is 87.6%, which is 2.6 percentage points above the threshold, less than the uncertainty in the wage estimate. Jack Grealish's loan adds about £16m of annual squad cost for a registration Everton do not own and do not amortise. And a new stadium has roughly doubled the matchday line in the year the rule measures, while the £813m it cost sits outside the calculation. Reconstructed from Everton's accounts and Appendix 2 of the Premier League Handbook.
Figures as of 31 October 2026, Orange Engine release V2CI · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture
SCR 2026/27·Post-summer projection
Latest change to the figures, 31 October 2026: the ratio is 72.5%, from 72.3%, because two entries are corrected. Latest correction, 2 November 2026: outlets’ names are removed from an earlier note, with no figure changed. All 23 correction notes are at the end.
Everton’s squad would sit 2.6 percentage points above the line with merit measured at the fifteenth-place floor: 87.6% on that basis, 85.0% before player trading, and 72.5% after it.
| Everton | 2026/27 |
|---|---|
| Squad cost ratio, 1 March 2027 test | 72.5% |
| SCR before player trading | 85.0% |
| Merit above the fifteenth-place floor | 2.6 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 12.5 percentage points |
| Green headroom | +£36.7m |
| Assumption range | 67.9 to 76.0% |
| Assumption range against 85% | entirely below the line |
| Stress case (costs only) | 81.5% |
The squad costs £211.9m against £249.4m of countable revenue, which is 85.0% before any player trading. That figure already includes £7.5m of merit above the fifteenth-place floor; measured at the floor, the same cost base produces 87.6%, 2.6 percentage points above the threshold.
- The squad cost is £211.9m: £121.1m of wages, £68.0m of amortisation, about £6.7m of agents’ fees and £16.1m of loan remuneration.
- Jack Grealish’s loan adds about £16.1m of annual squad cost, roughly 5.5 points of the ratio, without Everton owning or amortising the registration.
- Merit above the fifteenth-place floor is worth £7.5m here, and there is no European money. At Bournemouth the same comparison is worth £53.2m.
- A new stadium has roughly doubled the matchday line in exactly the year the rule measures. The £813m it cost appears nowhere in the calculation.
- Amortisation is £68.0m on a registration book that has been shrinking, from £120.2m to £96.9m.
Taken together, the twenty clubs of this season’s Premier League come to 75.3% on the same basis; Everton’s 72.5% is below that. The full table for every club in the series is at Premier League SCR 2026/27.
What the accounts say
For the year to 30 June 2025:
| FY25, £m | |
|---|---|
| Turnover | 196.7 |
| Total staff costs | 152.1 |
| Amortisation of registrations | 50.9 |
| Profit on player disposals | 31.3 |
| Registrations, net book value | 96.9 |
Two lines point the same way. Amortisation has fallen from £64.6m, and the registration book from £120.2m. Everton have been shrinking the asset side of the squad for two years, which is the main reason the cost base comes close to fitting.
Gate receipts of £20.3m were the final figure at Goodison Park.
Rebuilding the ratio, before any selling
Wages, about £121m. The rule counts contract players and the head coach. Everton’s filed staff cost is £152.1m across 483 permanent employees and 405 temporary matchday staff, and the reconstruction attributes 72 to 80% of it to the squad.
The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate that range, because both halves of the usual test are unsettled. The filing groups 190 people as playing, training and management, so a player count cannot be isolated. And the 405 temporary matchday staff are filed separately from the permanent 483, so the population a residual would be divided by is not settled either. Everton also carry a proportionately large non-playing establishment, with 79 in the youth academy, 86 in marketing and media, 74 in management and administration and 54 in maintenance, security and ground staff.
Then one line that is not in the filed staff costs at all. Jack Grealish arrived on loan from Manchester City, with Everton reported to cover about 90% of a reported £300,000 a week, up from 75% on the 2025/26 loan. Grossed up for employer charges that is roughly £16.1m a year, about 13% of the reconstructed squad wage bill, and it is squad cost under the rule in full. That is a full-year rate on reported terms, and the reconstruction counts it in full. He joined on 1 September 2026, so the loan runs for ten months, and the rule counts amounts payable in the season (Rule A.1.22(e)). On a ten-month basis the cost would be about £13.4m and the ratio about 71.5%.
It sits outside the filed staff-cost line because the year to 30 June 2025 closed before he arrived, so it is added separately rather than bridged. Everton capitalise nothing for him: the registration stays with Manchester City, so there is no amortisation and no asset to sell. A reported £50m option would change that only if exercised.
That single line is worth about 5.5 points of the ratio, which is more than every missing permanent transfer found in this article’s earlier rebuild combined.
Amortisation, £68.0m, derived from the filed net book value of £96.9m less the charge belonging to players who have left, over an estimated 2.6 to 3.6 years, with the 2025 and 2026 cohorts added at the reported fee plus 12%, for the League’s transfer levy, agents’ fees and the other costs of a transfer, over the length of their contracts, measured from registration to the date each ends. Nothing is capitalised for Grealish, so his cost is entirely remuneration and does not appear in the amortisation at all.
The five-year cap does not reach every registration. It applies to contracts executed, or on this model’s reading extended, on or after 12 December 2023. A contract executed before that date may be amortised over its full initial term under the guidance to the rule, and we treat those that way.
Agents’ fees, about £6.7m, expensed, from the FA’s published figure of £10.0m for February 2025 to February 2026.
Revenue the rule counts, £249.4m.
| Revenue for the test | Basis | £m |
|---|---|---|
| Central funds excluding facility fees | equal share plus merit at thirteenth, last season’s finish | 130.1 |
| Facility fees | 26 televised appearances | 17.7 |
| Commercial | 2025/26 income, not yet filed, estimated: the £47.2m filed for 2024/25 grown by 15.5%, by the one method used for every club; retail is run by a partner and filed net, so no cost of merchandise is taken off | 54.5 |
| Gate | last season’s receipts, estimated at £42.0m, over 21 home matches, times 19 league games and 4 cup ties | 46.0 |
| European prize money | not in a UEFA competition | nil |
| Domestic cups and academy grant | cups rebuilt from Everton’s ties over three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees; provisional | 1.1 |
| Total | 249.4 |
The merit payment provides relatively little. Everton finished thirteenth, thirteenth and fifteenth, so last season’s finish is the best of the three bases and merit pays £30.1m, against £48.9m at Brighton on an eighth-place finish and £56.4m at Bournemouth on a sixth. Everton are paid £18.8m less than Brighton on that component alone.
The facility payment is a different matter, at £17.7m on 26 televised appearances, well above what the fifteen-match floor would give.
The stadium, and what the rule counts
The gate figure has roughly doubled. The rule uses last season’s per-match takings, and last season was Everton’s first at the Hill Dickinson Stadium: 52,888 seats against Goodison’s 39,000, with 21 home matches played there. The £20.3m in the filed accounts was the final Goodison figure. Those accounts are not yet filed, so last season’s receipts are our estimate, £42m, across the 21 home matches Everton played there; the rule spreads that over the 23 home matches it counts for this season (19 league and the three-season average of four home cup ties), which is £46.0m. Commercial is at £54.5m, an estimate made by one published method, the same for every club: the £47.2m filed for 2024/25, grown by 15.5%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue).
This is where the rule shows its shape most clearly. It counts every pound the stadium earns and none of what it cost. Everton have spent £813m building it. Operating costs excluding player trading rose to £210.5m in FY25, with stadium running costs nearly doubling across maintenance, utilities, rates, safety and staffing, and £350m of thirty-year debt is secured against it.
The squad cost ratio sees £46m of gate receipts and nothing else. For Everton, the new stadium lifts the gate revenue this rule counts, while the £813m construction cost and the financing attached to it sit outside the calculation.
How much of the revenue rests on the rule’s own bases
| Set by the rule’s bases | £m |
|---|---|
| Merit payment above the fifteenth-place floor | 7.5 |
| European distribution under A.1.29(e) | nil |
| European home gate | nil |
| Total | 7.5 |
All of it is merit, because there is no European football, and Everton earned it by finishing thirteenth. Measured at the fifteenth-place floor, the same cost base would produce 87.6% instead of 85.0%, which is 2.6 points above the green threshold. That difference is smaller than the uncertainty in the reconstruction: last season’s commercial and gate revenue remain unfiled, and the squad’s share of the wage bill is estimated. It describes the central estimate, not a breach. At Bournemouth the same comparison is worth £53.2m and 32 points.
The low headline figure rests very little on that step. The 2.6 points move the cost base from 2.6 percentage points above the line to a little inside it, and player trading does the rest.
What player trading does to it
The rule adds the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows and divides it by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). For the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024, five months before Everton’s 2024/25 year.
| Period | Profit or loss, £m | What produced it |
|---|---|---|
| February to June 2024 | 11.9 | Dobbin to Aston Villa at a reported £10m, an academy player, and Godfrey to Atalanta at €10m against about £6m on the books |
| 2024/25 | 31.3 | filed |
| 2025/26 | 4.6 | a buying window: Chermiti to Rangers against his remaining book value, Tyrer to Cardiff at nil, and a reported £3.1m share of Newcastle’s profit on Gordon’s sale to Barcelona |
| 2026/27 to date | 81.6 | Ndiaye at £60m against about £10m of book value, McNeil at £21.7m against about £4m with a year of his five-year contract left, Beto at £15.4m against about £6m, Iroegbunam at £13.0m against about £2.8m |
| Three-year average | 43.1 | the figure the rule counts |
£211.9m divided by £249.4m plus £43.1m gives 72.5% before rounding.
Note 21’s £114.3m is the club’s own figure for the transfers agreed after 30 June 2025, together with contingent milestones triggered on existing deals, and it is a net payment rather than a profit. Everton bought heavily and sold almost nothing. The reconstruction records it as reconciliation evidence and does not let it anchor the disposal ledger. So nothing filed yet checks the ledger for any period after June 2025; 2024/25’s £31.3m is filed.
Two clubs 5.8 percentage points apart, from opposite directions
| Everton | Crystal Palace | |
|---|---|---|
| SCR before player trading | 85.0% | 100.4% |
| Squad cost ratio | 72.5% | 78.2% |
| Merit above the floor and European amounts | 2.6 percentage points | 16.5 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 12.5 percentage points | 22.1 percentage points |
The published figures are 5.8 percentage points apart and the positions behind them are much further apart than that. Palace’s squad costs 15.4 percentage points more of their countable revenue than Everton’s, and Palace end 5.8 percentage points higher on far more support: 38.7 percentage points of combined help against Everton’s 15.2.
That is the distinction the headline number hides. Headline ratios 5.8 percentage points apart can sit over starting positions 15.4 percentage points apart. Everton begin 2.6 percentage points above the line with merit at the floor, while Palace begin well outside it.
Why this differs from another published model
Paul Quinn writes on Everton’s finances as the esk, and has modelled the club’s squad cost ratio through the same regime change this series is built around. His model and this one agree on the accounts and differ on forward assumptions, which is the useful kind of disagreement: both work from the same filed figures, so the gap is entirely in what each assumes about the year ahead.
| 2026/27 assumption | Orange Ledger | Quinn, 31 August |
|---|---|---|
| Relevant wages | £121m, range £110m to £130m | £125m |
| Amortisation | £68.0m | £70m |
| Expensed agents | £6.7m, from the FA’s published £10.0m | £12m |
| Revenue for the test | £249m | £235m |
| Player-trading profit | £43.1m, three-year average | scenario basis, no material sale |
| Result | about 72% and 85.0% before trading | high 80s before a sale |
The player-trading row is a difference of question rather than of arithmetic. Quinn models a no-material-sale scenario deliberately, to show what the window committed the club to before any further trading. This reconstruction applies the rule’s three-year average, which is what the test itself uses.
A remaining difference is amortisation. £70m against £68.0m diverges on how fast the pre-2025 cohort is assumed to run off against a net book value of £96.9m that has fallen for two consecutive years. The agents’ figure here now rests on the FA’s published total for February 2025 to February 2026.
The refinancing that followed the takeover
At 30 June 2024 Everton owed £593.8m to 777 Partners, Rights and Media Funding and MSP Sports Capital, at an interest cost of £10.5m, with a charge over Goodison Park and eight other properties, alongside a shareholder loan of £450.8m from Farhad Moshiri.
On 18 December 2024 the Friedkin Group’s acquisition completed, the £450.8m shareholder loan was capitalised into equity, and Roundhouse Capital Holdings subscribed for new shares taking it to 99.5%.
Two facilities replaced the old structure:
- A £130m five-year credit facility with JPMorgan Chase for working capital, £127.6m drawn. The debenture gives JPMorgan, as security agent, mortgages over the Goodison Road properties and security over the club’s receivables.
- £350m of thirty-year debt secured against the new stadium.
The point is not that Everton borrowed from a bank. It is that the club’s principal recurring League cashflows form part of the security package supporting that borrowing, which is the same architecture found at Brentford with Macquarie.
And then, on 27 June 2025, three days before the year end, the group sold Everton Football Club Women Ltd and Goodison Park Stadium Ltd to Roundhouse Capital, its own parent, for £50m. That is the second such transaction this series has found in the final week of a 2024/25 financial year, alongside Newcastle’s. Everton booked it as a £49.2m profit on disposal of investments, and the rule leaves exactly that out of commercial revenue (Rule A.1.19(e)), subject to the Board’s judgement, so we count none of it.
The transfer book
Everton were owed more by other clubs than they owed until June 2024. At June 2025 they were owed £29m and owed £82m, a net debtor of about £53m, before the £114m of net payments committed in the summer of 2025. The accounts price the instalments at £7.7m of discount unwinding.
What this doesn’t say
- That Everton’s ratio is exactly 72.5%. The published range is 67.9 to 76.0%, conditional on the current 72 to 80% player-share assumption. The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate that range, because the filing groups 190 people as playing, training and management and lists 405 temporary matchday staff separately, so neither the share nor the population it would be tested against is settled.
- That the Grealish figure is filed. It is not. It rests on a reported wage and a reported cover percentage, and the stress case assumes Everton cover 100% rather than the reported 90%.
- That the stadium makes the club better off. The ratio counts the revenue and not the cost, which is a statement about the rule rather than about the club.
- That a low ratio means a strong financial position. It means squad cost is low relative to countable revenue. £813m of stadium capital, £127.6m drawn under the JPMorgan facility and £350m of stadium debt sit outside the calculation entirely.
- Anything about the profitability and sustainability rules, which read the same facts differently.
With merit at the fifteenth-place floor, Everton start 2.6 percentage points above the green line. Palace arrive at a published ratio 5.8 percentage points higher from a position well outside it.
Sources and caveats.
The accounts. Everton Football Club Company Limited accounts for the years to 30 June 2022 to 30 June 2025, filed at Companies House, together with the group's, and the charges registered on 23 December 2024 in favour of JPMorgan Chase as security agent. The filed year ends 30 June, so the 2025 and 2026 windows fall wholly or partly outside the last filed accounts and are reconstructed on top of them.
The rules applied. Premier League Handbook 2026/27, Appendix 2, in particular Rules A.1.4, A.1.13, A.1.17, A.1.19 including (e), A.1.22 including (c), A.1.29 including (a), (b), (d), (e) and (g), A.1.32, A.1.33 and A.1.53.
What is estimated, and why.
- Player wages, about £121m. Everton's accounts do not separate the wages of the players and the head coach. The filed staff cost is £152.1m across 483 permanent employees and 405 temporary matchday staff, with 190 in playing, training and management and the rest across youth academy, marketing and media, management and administration, and maintenance, security and ground staff. This reconstruction uses 72 to 80%. The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate that range, because the filed category combines players with training and management staff so no player count can be isolated, and because the temporary population is filed separately from the permanent one, so the denominator for a residual test is not settled either.
- Jack Grealish's remuneration is added separately rather than bridged, because the filed year closed before he arrived. Everton are reported to cover about 90% of a reported £300,000 a week, which grosses up to roughly £16.1m a year. He joined on 1 September 2026, so that is a full-year rate on a ten-month loan; ten months would be about £13.4m and the ratio about 71.5%. Nothing is capitalised for him: the registration remains with Manchester City, so there is no amortisation, and the reported £50m option would change that only if exercised. The adverse stress assumes Everton cover 100%.
- Amortisation is derived from the filed net book value of £96.9m over an estimated 2.6 to 3.6 year average remaining life. Signings since the accounts are counted at the reported fee plus 12%, for the League's transfer levy, agents' fees and the other costs of a transfer. For registrations within the scope of Rule A.1.22(c), the five-year cap applies from the relevant signing or, on this model's reading, extension date; a contract executed earlier may be amortised over its full initial term, and is here.
- Gate receipts for 2025/26 are estimated at £42m, the first season at the Hill Dickinson Stadium, against £20.3m in the filed Goodison year. The rule's gate figure is £46.0m: last season's receipts per home match over the 23 home matches the rule counts this season. Commercial income for 2025/26 is estimated at £54.5m by one published method, the same for every club: the £47.2m filed for 2024/25, grown by 15.5%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season's commercial revenue); Everton's retail is run by a partner and filed net, so no cost of merchandise is taken off. Facility fees use a published club-source estimate of £17.7m on 26 confirmed televised appearances; the Premier League does not publish official figures. Agents' fees are taken from the FA's published figure, with the share treated as an expense estimated.
Transfers and loans.
- Fees are taken at the reported base where a base and add-ons are separately reported. The current-year disposal figure is £81.6m. Beto's cost is a reported total with no split between fee and add-ons, and Chermiti's is the €12.5m Sporting's filing records.
- Note 21's £114.3m is a net payment, not a profit on disposals, so it is recorded as reconciliation evidence and does not govern the reconstructed ledger. Nothing filed yet checks the disposal ledger for any period after June 2025.
- Disposal profits are calculated from reported fees and reconstructed book values, with a 5% deduction for direct costs applied to gains but not to losses.
Completeness. The playing population was checked against the Premier League's submitted senior and Under-21 squad lists, with 110 identities classified and none unresolved. An earlier version of this article was published before that reconciliation and before a reader identified a missing transfer; the rebuild that followed also found two further arrivals, one further departure, and that the model had no path for players on loan in.
The comparison with another published model. Paul Quinn's analysis at the esk is used as a like-for-like check on the forward assumptions rather than as a source for any figure here.
Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.
Independent estimate, not an official calculation, and not advice. Figures produced 23 September 2026; updated 25 September, 1 October, 2 October, 3 October, 4 October, 5 October, 9 October, 16 October, 21 October, 23 October, 25 October, 26 October, 28 October, 31 October and 1 November 2026.
Corrections and updates (23)
23 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 23 September 2026. The ratio is 72.4% and 83.2% before player trading, from 72.6% and 83.2%, after the current-year disposal figure was corrected to £79.4m in the series-wide fee sweep. The population has since been reconciled against the Premier League’s own squad returns, so the figures are no longer marked pending. Two earlier corrections, on 15 and 18 September, added a missing transfer raised by a reader, rebuilt three windows, and gave the model a path for players on loan in; those moved the ratio from 66.3% to 72.6% and that work stands.
24 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 24 September 2026. The ratio is 73.5%, from 72.4%, and 84.4% before player trading, from 83.2%. Thierno Barry and Tyler Dibling were carried on five-year terms; Everton’s own announcements put both at four years, corroborated by PA and the Premier League. A four-year term is below the rule’s five-year cap, so each is amortised over four: £3.1m more a year between them. Without the £7.5m the rule supplies, the same cost base now produces 87.0% rather than 85.8%, two points outside the green line rather than 0.8, so the article no longer describes that position as almost inside the line. Headroom is £32.7m, the range 70.6% to 76.6% and the stress case 82.7%. The club remains inside the threshold.
25 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 25 September 2026. The ratio is 73.3%, from 73.5%, after Everton’s transfer record was rebuilt from the club’s own announcements. Iliman Ndiaye, Beto, Tim Iroegbunam and Nathan Patterson all completed on deadline day, 1 September, and Dwight McNeil on 11 August, where placeholder dates had been used. Ndiaye’s fee is corrected to the £60m base, from £58.8m, Beto’s to £15.4m and Patterson’s to about £0.85m, which lifts 2026/27’s profit on player sales from £79.4m to £82.0m and the three-year average from £36.8m to £37.7m. Idrissa Gueye, Tyler Onyango and Séamus Coleman left when their contracts expired rather than by transfer, and three academy sales are added at undisclosed fees. Headroom is £33.5m, the range 70.3% to 76.3% and the stress case 82.5%. The comparison with Crystal Palace now uses Palace’s current figures, and the book values quoted for McNeil and Beto are corrected.
27 September 2026 · Editorial · figures not recorded
Update, 27 September 2026. Everton’s squad cost ratio is unchanged at 73.3%. Without the revenue the rule adds, the same cost base produces 87.1% rather than 87.0%: the engine’s figure is 87.05%, which rounds to 87.1, and the article, images and series table now agree with it.
1 and 2 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 73.3% → 71.7% · before player sales 84.4% → 82.7%
Corrections, 1 and 2 October 2026. The ratio is 71.7%, from 73.3%, and 82.7% before player trading, from 84.4%. Agents’ fees now use the FA’s published figure for Everton, £10.0m rather than an assumed £14m. Four transfers were checked against the other club’s record of the same deal: Dewsbury-Hall’s fee is the £25m base, George’s £18.0m, Nørgaard’s £7.0m and Iroegbunam’s sale £13.0m. The costs and terms of Chermiti (€12.5m, £10.8m, from Sporting’s filing), Ndiaye (£20m), Beto (£25.75m over four years) and Patterson follow the clubs and reported fees; Chermiti’s sale to Rangers is now a small profit, so 2025/26 is a £2.1m profit rather than a loss. The squad cost is £205.2m and the three-year average of sale profit £38.0m. Green headroom is £38.1m, the range 68.8% to 74.7% and the stress case 80.6%. Without the £7.5m the rule supplies, the cost base produces 85.3%, about a quarter of a point above the threshold rather than two points, and the title now says only that it is just outside. No fee was published for Dwight McNeil, who left in the exchange for Brennan Johnson; at the £20m Crystal Palace’s side implies, the ratio would be 71.8%. The conclusion does not change: Everton sit comfortably inside the green line, and the cost base before supplied revenue sits just outside it.
3 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 71.7% → 70.7% · before player sales 82.7% → 81.4%
Correction, 3 October 2026. The ratio is 70.7%, from 71.7%, and 81.4% before player trading, from 82.7%. Counted, from archived match reports. The rule counts the average number of home FA Cup and League Cup matches over the last three seasons, rounded up. Everton played ten (four, four and two), so the rule counts four, where we had assumed two. Matchday revenue under the rule is £46.0m, from £42.0m. This changes how this article describes Everton’s starting position: without the revenue the rule supplies, the cost base is 83.9%, not 85.3%, which is on the line and not just outside it. The title and the passages that carried the old description are rewritten. Also moved: the range is 67.8 to 73.6%, from 68.8 to 74.7%; green headroom is £41.5m, from £38.1m; and the stress case is 79.5%, from 80.6%. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
3 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 3 October 2026 (second of the day). Everton’s own figures are unchanged. In the comparison with Crystal Palace, Palace’s ratio is now 75.2%, from 74.9%, and 97.1% before player trading, from 96.6%; the effect of its player-sale profits is now 21.9 points, from 21.7, and its combined support 37.7 points, from 37.5; the two clubs are now 4.5 points apart, from 4.2, and 15.7 points apart before trading, from 15.2, after a copying error in Palace’s filed gate receipts was corrected. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
4 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 70.7% → 72.8% · before player sales 81.4% → 83.6%
Correction, 4 October 2026. The ratio is 72.8%, from 70.7%, and 83.6% before player trading, from 81.4%. The squad cost rule defines three things in its own terms, and in each we had used the figure from a club’s accounts (Three definitions in the squad cost rule, and what they change). What a registration costs. The rule counts everything a club pays in connection with a transfer: the fee, the League’s 4% transfer levy and agents’ fees. For players signed since Everton’s last accounts we now count the reported fee plus 12%. Squad cost is £208.9m, from £205.2m, and the three-year average of sale profit is £36.8m, from £38.0m, because a player sold now leaves at a higher book value. This is the result of the review of agents’ fees that our earlier notes promised. Merchandise. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, sales less the cost of the goods, where we had counted sales in full. Everton’s shops are run by a partner, so its accounts already hold merchandise net and nothing is taken off. Cup prize money. The rule counts a three-year average of what a club received from the FA Cup and the EFL Cup. We had entered £2.5m for Everton, a figure with no calculation behind it. Rebuilt from Everton’s cup ties in the last three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, it is £0.2m, in a range of £0.1m to £1.0m. The figure is provisional: the EFL publishes no prize money, some broadcast fees are not published, and the top of the range allows for a share of the gate at away ties, which the rule may or may not count. The revenue the rule counts is £249.9m, from £252.2m. Also moved: the range is 69.9 to 75.9%, from 67.8 to 73.6%; green headroom is £34.8m, from £41.5m; the stress case is 81.6%, from 79.5%. This changes how this article describes Everton’s starting position: without the revenue the rule supplies, the cost base is 86.2%, from 83.9%, which is above the line and no longer on it. The title and the passages that carried the old description are reworded.
5 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 72.8% → 73.3% · before player sales 83.6% → 84.2%
Correction, 5 October 2026. The ratio is 73.3%, from 72.8%, and 84.2% before player trading, from 83.6%. We now measure each contract from the day the player was registered to the day it ends. A player who signs in August on a five-year deal has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June; we had spread his cost over five full years. 16 of Everton’s contract lengths change, 13 of them against an end date we have derived as the 30 June the announced length points to, where no source states the date. The yearly charge for registrations is £66.5m, from £64.9m. The range is 70.4% to 76.3%, from 69.9% to 75.9%. No threshold is crossed. Most clubs move because contract costs are now measured to their actual or derived expiry dates; six also move for club-specific reasons. See the engine changelog. From 2025/26 the women’s team sits outside the accounts we read, after its sale to the club’s parent in June 2025. The rule still counts its revenue, which is not published separately; counting it would lower this ratio slightly.
7 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 7 October 2026. Everton’s own figures are unchanged; two signing dates now follow the club’s own records (Thierno Barry, 9 July 2025; Tyler Dibling, 25 August 2025). In the comparison with Crystal Palace, Palace’s ratio is now 78.9%, from 78.5%, and 101.8% before player trading, from 101.2%; the revenue the rule adds is now worth 17.1 points there, from 17.0, the effect of its player-sale profits 22.9 points, from 22.7, and its combined support 39.9 points, from 39.7; the two clubs are now 5.6 points apart, from 5.2, and 17.6 points apart before trading, from 17.0, after Palace’s signing fees, dates and one contract length were checked against the club’s own announcements (the engine changelog).
9 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 73.3% → 73.4% · before player sales 84.2% → 84.4%
Correction, 9 October 2026. The ratio is 73.4%, from 73.3%, and 84.4% before player trading, from 84.2%. Last season’s commercial revenue is now estimated by one published method, the same for every club. Everton’s 2025/26 accounts are not filed, so the figure is an estimate. We had £55.0m, a judgement of ours. It is now £54.5m: the £47.2m filed for 2024/25, grown by 15.5%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). It is drawn between £36.2m and £79.0m, where we had drawn 7% either way: the new span comes from how far forecasts of this kind have missed in past seasons. The range is 68.9% to 77.1%, from 70.4% to 76.3%. The published ratio crosses no threshold. This article said the range on Everton’s ratio was about three points either side, almost all of it from the share of the wage bill attributed to the squad; it now says the range runs from about four and a half points below the central figure to about three and a half above, about half of it from last season’s commercial and gate revenue, which are not yet filed, and most of the rest from the wage share. This article said commercial revenue was £55m after the stadium naming-rights deal, which it put at about £6.5m a season rising to £7.5m against a widely reported £10m. It cited no source for those figures. They are removed: no sponsorship is an input to the estimate, and they are no part of the argument. The stress case is now described as what it is: the worst case on costs alone, with revenue held at the central estimate. See the engine changelog.
15 October 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Clarification, 15 October 2026. Wording only; no figure changed. The ranges in this article are assumption ranges, the spread of the model’s inputs between assumed bounds, not calibrated or confidence intervals, and the shares of modelled outcomes above or below a threshold quoted in the notes above are withdrawn.
15 October 2026 (second) · New evidence · SCR 73.4% → 73.4% · before player sales 84.4% → 84.9%
Correction, 15 October 2026, second correction of the day. The ratio is unchanged at 73.4%; before player trading it is 84.9%, from 84.4%. Two things changed, and their effects on the ratio nearly cancel. Iliman Ndiaye’s fee. Everton paid Marseille a guaranteed €18.5m for Ndiaye in July 2024, £15.7m at the exchange rate of the day, with €1.5m to €2.5m in add-ons reported but not known to have been paid. We had recorded £20m, which was the fee Marseille paid Sheffield United for him in 2023. The add-ons are noted and not counted. Everton publish no schedule of future amortisation, so we charge the players still at the club from the filed book value less the book value of those who have left. At the lower fee Ndiaye took less book value with him, so the rest of the squad carries £1.3m a year more: amortisation is £67.8m, from £66.5m, and the squad cost £211.7m, from £210.4m. His book value when he was sold to Manchester City in September was lower too, so the profit on that sale is higher. A sell-on Marseille are reported to hold on that sale is not counted: it rests on one report and its terms are not known. The Gordon sell-on. Everton are owed a share of the profit on Anthony Gordon’s sale from Newcastle to Barcelona in May 2026: reports put it at 15%, about £3.1m, though they disagree on how it is worked out. We now count it as income at Everton and as a cost at Newcastle, as a reported figure rather than a confirmed one. Sale profit is £4.6m in 2025/26, from £1.5m, and £81.6m so far in 2026/27, from £79.0m; the three-year average is £39.2m, from £37.3m. Also moved: without the revenue the rule adds the figure is 87.5%, from 87.0%; the assumption range is 68.9% to 77.0%, from 68.9% to 77.1%; green headroom is £33.5m, from £33.2m; the stress case is 82.1%, from 82.2%. See the engine changelog.
16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · no change to the ratio
Updated 16 October 2026: loans out now recorded; wage relief shown in ranges. The central figure is unchanged at 73.4%. Everton’s players out on loan are now recorded. Nobody has said how much of their wages the borrowing clubs pay, so the possible saving widens the assumption range rather than moving the central figure: the range is 68.7% to 76.9%, from 68.9% to 77.0%, still wholly below 85%. The stress case, the worst case on costs alone, is 82.6%, from 82.1%. See the engine changelog.
21 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 73.4% → 73.3% · before player sales 84.9% → 84.8%
Correction, 21 October 2026. The ratio is 73.3%, from 73.4%, and 84.8% before player trading, from 84.9%; the assumption range is 68.6% to 76.8%, from 68.7% to 76.9%. Two signing dates now follow Everton’s own records: Merlin Röhl’s permanent transfer on 1 July 2026, not 1 August, and Hayden Hackney on 2 July, not 15 July, so each contract is measured from its true start. Without the revenue the rule adds the cost base is 87.4%, 2.4 percentage points above the line, from 87.5% and 2.5. The comparison with Crystal Palace uses Palace’s corrected figures (77.8% and 100.0% before player trading). See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 73.3% → 72.3% · before player sales unchanged at 84.8%
Correction, 23 October 2026. This article estimated Everton’s ratio at 73.3%; the corrected figure is 72.3%, and 84.8% before player trading is unchanged. We had missed £11.9m of profit on player sales. The rule averages the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53), and for the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024. We had averaged three financial years starting on 1 July 2024, so Lewis Dobbin’s sale to Aston Villa and Ben Godfrey’s to Atalanta, both completed in June 2024, were left out. Nothing in Everton’s own figures changed; the error was in how we read the rule.
- Moved: the three-year average of sale profit is £43.1m, from £39.2m, worth 12.5 percentage points, from 11.5. Green headroom is £37.2m, from £33.8m. The range is 67.8% to 75.8%, from 68.6% to 76.8%. The stress case is 81.4%, from 82.5%. Everton and Crystal Palace are 5.5 percentage points apart, from 4.5.
- The conclusion holds: Everton are inside the line, and the cost base on its own, before the revenue the rule supplies, is still 2.4 percentage points above it. The twenty clubs together come to 74.9%, from 75.6%. The lead chart and the cover are redrawn with these figures. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 23 October 2026 (second of the day). The comparison with Crystal Palace gave the effect of Palace’s player-sale profits as 22.3 points; it is 22.2 points, as Palace’s own article gives it: the comparison had been left at an earlier value. Everton’s figures are unchanged. See the engine changelog.
25 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 25 October 2026. The ratio, 72.3%, is unchanged. Jack Grealish’s loan is worth about 5.5 points of the ratio, from 5.6: the correction of 23 October raised the three-year average of sale profit, which enlarges what the ratio divides by, and missed the three sentences that give his share. The note of 21 October also left out two figures that moved with it: the stress case went to 82.5%, from 82.6%, and green headroom to £33.8m, from £33.5m. Those are the starting points the note of 23 October gives, so the record now runs without a gap.
26 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio
Correction, 26 October 2026. Everton’s ratio is unchanged at 72.3%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.0%, from 74.9%. Fees paid and received for head coaches now count, at Manchester City, Chelsea, Brentford, Ipswich, Newcastle and Crystal Palace (Rules A.1.22(d) and A.1.29(g)). Crystal Palace’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Palace’s correction of today: the two clubs are 5.8 percentage points apart, from 5.5, and 15.6 before player trading, from 15.2; Palace’s combined support is 38.8 points, from 38.7.
28 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 28 October 2026. Everton’s ratio is unchanged at 72.3%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.1%, from 75.0%. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected sixteen entries at eleven clubs where the club’s announcement or a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different fee, contract length or date. The corrections move Arsenal, Chelsea, Sunderland, Crystal Palace and Tottenham up, and Coventry, Nottingham Forest and Bournemouth down. Crystal Palace’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Palace’s correction of today: 78.2%, from 78.1%, so the two clubs are 5.9 percentage points apart, from 5.8; Palace’s combined support is 38.7 points, from 38.8.
31 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 72.3% → 72.5% · before player sales 84.8% → 85.0%
Correction, 31 October 2026. The ratio is 72.5%, from 72.3%, and 85.0% before player trading, from 84.8%. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected the entries where a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different figure. Adam Aznou’s contract runs to June 2029, not 2030, so his fee is charged over four years, and Mason Holgate’s loan ended in May 2025, not June. Lewis Dobbin’s fee is unchanged and its sources are replaced. The cost base without the rule’s own revenue is 87.6%, 2.6 percentage points above the line, from 2.4. Figures that follow from these are restated with them in the text, and the twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%. The correction does not reverse the article’s conclusion: Everton are inside the 85% line. It was not a change in the rules: our contract date was a year too long.
1 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Correction, 1 November 2026. Everton’s ratio is unchanged at 72.5%. The heading said Everton and Palace are 5.9 points apart; it is 5.8, as the text said. Everton’s combined support is 15.2 points, from 15.1, and one sentence kept 2.5 points where the figure is 2.6. Grealish’s £16.1m is a full-year rate. He joined on 1 September 2026, so the loan runs ten months; the article now says so and gives the ten-month figures, about £13.4m and about 71.5%. The label “revenue added by the rule” and the wording of revenue the rule supplies are replaced, because Everton earned the merit by finishing thirteenth. Note 21’s £114.3m was described as the figure for the summer 2025 window; it covers the transfers agreed after the year end together with contingent milestones on existing deals. The article said Everton have no filed disposal figure; 2024/25’s £31.3m is filed, and it now says that nothing filed yet checks the ledger after June 2025. The security comparison named Bournemouth, whose article describes no such borrowing. The sentence on the related-party sale now gives the £49.2m profit and the rule that leaves it out, Rule A.1.19(e), which is subject to the Board’s judgement. Gate receipts of £42m are marked as our estimate. The sentence that no club discloses its players’ wage bill now speaks only of Everton, and the player-share range is no longer described as under review. The sources now list Rules A.1.19(e), A.1.29(g) and A.1.53. Two repeating sections, on the squad lists and on what the article says, are removed; the squad-list check stays in the sources.
2 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Correction, 2 November 2026. The note on Thierno Barry’s and Tyler Dibling’s contract lengths named outlets that corroborated Everton’s announcements; it now names only PA and the Premier League. The others are not sources this publication cites. No figure changes.