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What we told the football regulator

The Independent Football Regulator asked for views on its first State of the Game report. We sent our evidence from clubs' filed accounts and asked it to measure whether football's financial rules produce clubs that pay their way, not only whether clubs follow them.

By 9 min read

Figures in this article: release V2CQ, 12 November 2026 · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture

I had just finished Part 5 of our history of football’s financial rules, where I proposed lowering the Premier League’s squad cost limit. Then I read the Independent Football Regulator’s draft of its first State of the Game report. It gave a very detailed view of the finances of the whole league system, the Premier League and the EFL, and it showed me how bad the financial situation is. I had to get involved, or watch the game I love be destroyed.

On 13 November 2026 we sent our evidence to the regulator (IFR), the body set up under the Football Governance Act 2025, which had asked for views on that report. We support the report’s diagnosis, and our main point builds on it. The regulator should measure whether football’s financial rules produce clubs that can pay their way, not only whether clubs keep to them.

The two are not the same thing. The Premier League’s new squad cost rule has its first test on 1 March 2027. On our estimates, the 20 clubs together spend 75.2% of the revenue the rule counts on their squads, well inside the rule’s 85% line. Yet the regulator’s report puts the average Premier League club’s loss before tax in 2025/26 at £44m. The two figures are for different seasons, so we set them side by side rather than add them.

The full response and the tables of evidence behind it can be downloaded at the end of this article.

Why a club can follow the rule and still lose money

The squad cost ratio (SCR) divides what a club spends on its squad by the football revenue the rule counts plus profit on player sales. Squad cost means player and head-coach wages, agents’ fees and the cost of signings spread over their contracts. The rule adds the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows and divides it by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). For the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024. A club at or below 85% complies.

Two features of the ratio let a league sit inside the line and still lose money. It counts profit on player sales as if it were revenue, and it leaves out every cost outside the squad. Before player trading, the 20 clubs’ squad costs of £6,265.5m take 87.5% of the revenue the rule counts. That leaves a regulatory difference of £892.2m, or 12.5%, before any cost outside the squad: staff, the stadium, running costs, depreciation and interest. It is not a profit in the accounts. The regulator’s report finds that Premier League clubs’ non-player operating costs rose by 68% between 2021/22 and 2025/26.

0%25%50%75%100%As the rule counts it, with profit onplayer sales75.2%Before player trading87.5%The rule's limit, 85%0%25%50%75%100%As the rule counts it, with profit onplayer sales75.2%Before player trading87.5%The rule's limit, 85%
Pooled, the clubs are at 75.2% on the rule's measure, inside its 85% line, and at 87.5% before player trading. Pooled: the twenty clubs' squad costs added up and then divided (never an average of ratios), on the V2CQ estimates for the first squad cost test. The regulator's report puts the average Premier League club's loss before tax in 2025/26 at £44m (page 22; quoted, not tested). It is a different season, so it sits beside these figures and is not added to them. Our estimates for the rule's first test, release V2CQ, as submitted on 13 November 2026 (our evidence tables, table 6). Regulator's figure: the IFR's draft State of the Game report, quoted.
The figures in this chart
Squad costs as a share of the revenue the rule counts, the clubs pooled
MeasureShare
As the rule counts it, with the three-year average of profit on player sales75.2%
Before player trading87.5%
The rule's limit85%

Reported profit can also flatter the business. Premier League clubs lost £4,428.3m before tax over the 20 seasons to 2024/25, and that figure includes £711.8m of gains and credits from their owners, in 11 items. Without them the loss is £5,140.1m.

0−1,000−2,000−3,000−4,000−5,000Reported profit before tax, 2005/06to 2024/25−£4,428.3mLess owner-related gains and credits,11 items£711.8mProfit before tax without them−£5,140.1m0−2,000−4,000Reported profit before tax, 2005/06 to2024/25−£4,428.3mLess owner-related gains and credits, 11items£711.8mProfit before tax without them−£5,140.1m
Premier League clubs lost £4,428.3m before tax from 2005/06 to 2024/25; without £711.8m of gains and credits from their owners, the loss is £5,140.1m. Owner-related gains are asset sales inside the owner's group, loans an owner released and costs a parent took over. Accounts filed at Companies House, the nearest group that holds only the club, each read twice; as submitted on 13 November 2026 (our evidence tables, table 1).
The figures in this chart
Premier League profit before tax, 2005/06 to 2024/25, £m
Measure£m
Reported profit before tax−4,428.3
Less owner-related gains and credits (11 items)711.8
Profit before tax without them−5,140.1

Five things we asked the regulator to measure

We grouped our proposals into five areas, each with an example from the filed accounts.

1. Profitability, measured directly

We asked the regulator to publish profit before tax and an underlying profit for each division. Beside them would go the share of losses that owners fund, and how long clubs could run without new money from their owners. By underlying profit we mean profit before tax less gains from the owner and less profit on player sales. Chelsea’s accounts for 2023/24 show why the first adjustment matters: they include a gain of £198.7m on an asset sold inside the owners’ group, which improves reported profit without improving the business.

2. A clear view of owner funding and debt

Owner money reaches clubs as shares, as loans and as balances owed to other companies in the group, and the accounts label these inconsistently. Which company is read matters as much. Millwall’s club company owed £177.6m to its parent, Millwall Holdings, which is money moving inside one group. Millwall Holdings itself owed £9.7m. We proposed a common schedule for every club, at the club and at the top UK company above it, naming the company that reports.

3. Who carries the risk in transfer financing

A buying club often pays a transfer fee in instalments, and the selling club can sell its right to those instalments to a lender, which is called factoring. The regulator’s report puts transfer factoring at £779m in 2024/25. In the Premier League accounts we read for 2020/21 to 2024/25, three borrowing lines are labelled as factoring, £67.7m in total. Factoring that passes the risk to the lender may leave no borrowing in the selling club’s accounts, so the regulator’s data from clubs covers far more than the public accounts can. None of the borrowing notes we read says whether a lender can come back to the selling club if the buyer does not pay. At Crystal Palace in 2022/23, the selling club had assigned a £5.6m fee owed for a player to a bank, so Palace owed the bank. We asked the regulator to find out, for every arrangement, where a loss would land.

0200400600800Burnley, 2021/22£17.2mSheffield United, 2023/24£18.0mAston Villa, 2024/25£32.5mThe three lines together£67.7mThe regulator's figure for transferfactoring in 2024/25 (quoted, nottested)£779m0400800Burnley, 2021/22£17.2mSheffield United, 2023/24£18.0mAston Villa, 2024/25£32.5mThe three lines together£67.7mThe regulator's figure for transferfactoring in 2024/25 (quoted, not tested)£779m
Three borrowing lines in the Premier League accounts we read are labelled as factoring, £67.7m together; the regulator's report puts transfer factoring in 2024/25 alone at £779m. The regulator's figure (page 23; quoted, not tested) comes from data clubs gave it and may cover more than the Premier League. Borrowing lines as printed in the clubs' filed accounts, both readings agreed; as submitted on 13 November 2026. Regulator's figure: the IFR's draft State of the Game report, quoted.
The figures in this chart
Borrowing lines labelled as factoring, and the regulator’s figure, £m
Line£m
Burnley, 2021/2217.2
Sheffield United, 2023/2418.0
Aston Villa, 2024/2532.5
The three lines together67.7
The regulator's figure for transfer factoring in 2024/25 (quoted, not tested)779

4. Distribution judged by what it does to stability

Parachute payments are the money a relegated club receives from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Some are pledged before they arrive. In 2022/23, while still in the Premier League, Leeds United had £41.6m of other loans secured on the next season’s parachute payments. No Championship filing on the pages we read prints the parachute payments a club received. We asked that any new way of sharing money be judged on three counts. Two are owners’ share of debt and the number of clubs relying on their owner to continue. The third is the number with net liabilities, where everything a club owes is larger than everything it owns. If those do not fall over the life of the arrangement, we said, the money has funded more spending rather than more stability.

5. Results that others can check

The figures that decide whether a club complies are not public. The Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR) judge a club’s loss over three years. Our calculation of Everton’s PSR loss for the three years to 2021/22 is about £45m larger than the published figure. For Nottingham Forest’s three years to 2022/23 the gap is about £21m. The deductions clubs may make for youth, women’s football and community rest on audited information that is not public, so the gap cannot be explained from outside. We asked for common definitions and for a published reconciliation from each club’s accounts to its regulatory result, subject to confidentiality where a figure is commercially sensitive.

0−50−100−150Everton, three years to 2021/22Commission's figure−£124.5mOur reconstruction (an upperestimate)−£169.4mGap: about £45mNottingham Forest, three years to 2022/23Commission's figure−£95.5mOur reconstruction (an upperestimate)−£116.4mGap: about £21m0−100Everton, three years to 2021/22Commission's figure−£124.5mOur reconstruction (an upper estimate)−£169.4mGap: about £45mNottingham Forest, three years to 2022/23Commission's figure−£95.5mOur reconstruction (an upper estimate)−£116.4mGap: about £21m
Our reconstruction from the public accounts shows a loss about £45m larger than the Commission's figure for Everton's three years to 2021/22, and about £21m larger than the Commission's figure for Nottingham Forest's three years to 2022/23. Our reconstruction starts from the loss in the filed accounts and takes off the Covid amount allowed, Everton's stadium agreement and our estimates of the deductions; it is an upper estimate. The Commission's figures: Everton, period ending 2021/22 (Commission 17 Nov 2023, para 83); Nottingham Forest, period ending 2022/23 (Commission 18 Mar 2024, para 1.2). Our reconstruction: our calculation from the clubs' filed accounts, as submitted on 13 November 2026.
The figures in this chart
The Commission's figure and our reconstruction, £m
Club and periodCommission's figureOur reconstruction (an upper estimate)Gap
Everton, three years to 2021/22−124.5−169.4about £45m
Nottingham Forest, three years to 2022/23−95.5−116.4about £21m

Dynamic SCR: a proposal for the regulator to test

Our main proposal is Dynamic SCR. Instead of a fixed 85%, the League would calculate each season the squad cost limit that would deliver a league profit before tax of 3% of revenue, if every club spent to it. The limit clubs must meet would start at 85% and move towards that target by at most 5 percentage points a year. Each club’s limit would be that base plus its own adjustment, and the allowance above the limit before sporting sanctions would fall from 30 percentage points to 15. The adjustments serve competitive balance, not the profit target. The five clubs with the best three-season record would lose 2 percentage points a year from the fourth season, down to 10 below the base. Newly promoted clubs would start 10 points above it and come down 2 a year. The Dynamic SCR page sets out the model in full.

The regulator’s report puts Premier League revenue in 2025/26 at about £7.5bn, including estimates for a season not yet in filed accounts. A profit of 3% would be about £225m, a change of about £1.1bn. We divided the regulator’s league totals among the clubs ourselves. On that basis, the limit that delivers 3% is 61.3% in 2026/27, while the limit clubs must meet is still 85%. The two meet in 2031/32. If every club spends to its permitted limit, the league reaches 3% in 2031/32.

The limit clubs must meet, from 85% towards the targetThe limit that delivers a league profit before tax of 3% of revenue55%60%65%70%75%80%85%90%2026/272027/282028/292029/302030/312031/322032/332033/34They meet in 2031/3285.0%61.3%64.5%64.5%66.2%The limit clubs must meet, from 85%towards the targetThe limit that delivers a leagueprofit before tax of 3% of revenue55%60%65%70%75%80%85%90%26/2728/2930/3132/33Meet in 2031/3285.0%61.3%64.5%64.5%66.2%
On the regulator's league totals the limit that delivers 3% is 61.3% in 2026/27, while the limit clubs must meet is 85%; the two meet in 2031/32. A static scenario, not a forecast: the regulator’s league totals divided among the clubs by us, and every club spending to its permitted limit. Our Dynamic SCR model, from the IFR's league totals (its draft State of the Game report, quoted); as submitted on 13 November 2026 (our evidence tables, table 7).
The figures in this chart
The Dynamic SCR path from the IFR's league totals
SeasonThe limit clubs must meetThe limit that delivers 3%
2026/2785.0%61.3%
2027/2880.0%61.4%
2028/2975.0%61.5%
2029/3070.0%62.5%
2030/3165.0%63.5%
2031/3264.5%64.5%
2032/3364.5%65.3%
2033/3464.5%66.2%

The response states what the model cannot show. It assumes that each £1 taken out of squad cost as the rule counts it adds £1 to profit before tax, which the two measures do not guarantee. It keeps the same 20 clubs for eight seasons, with no promotion or relegation. A club’s red line is its limit plus its allowance. One stress test keeps today’s fixed allowance, not the proposal as designed, and every club above its red line stays at that line. There the league does not reach 3% within eight seasons on either starting point. How the rule is enforced therefore matters. Nor does the league reach 3% on the regulator’s totals if costs outside the squad keep rising faster than revenue. A profitable league can also contain clubs that lose money, so the proposal would sit beside the League’s solvency tests rather than replace them.

We also set out one limit on the regulator’s powers. Under section 22 of the Football Governance Act 2025, a discretionary licence condition may restrict a club’s overall spending but not spending of a particular kind. Choosing a squad cost limit is the League’s decision. So we offered Dynamic SCR as research for the regulator to test on its own club data and publish. We put six questions to it. The first asks which limit would have delivered a 3% profit in each of the last five seasons.

My view is simple. Compliance shouldn’t be the finish line. A league can follow its own squad cost rule and still lose money, so the question for the regulator is whether the rules produce clubs that can stand on their own. Dynamic SCR is one way to test that, and it’s the League’s choice whether to use it. We’ve put the evidence on the table. The next step is for someone with the clubs’ own numbers to test it properly.

Read the full response

The consultation closes on 8 December 2026 at 5pm. Anyone can respond through the IFR’s consultation page.

We also responded to the IFR’s levy consultation on 14 November, and to its liquidity and licensing consultation the same day.

Sources and caveats

What the figures are. Every figure in this article is taken from our response as submitted on 13 November 2026, and each is in the response’s register of figures with its source. Figures as of 13 November 2026, Orange Engine release V2CQ. Figures on this site’s club pages may since have moved; this article keeps those of the response.

The accounts. Profit, debt and owner funding come from clubs’ accounts filed at Companies House, each read twice and independently and counted only where the two readings agree. Owner-related gains are asset sales inside the owner’s group, loans an owner released and costs a parent took over.

What is estimated. The squad cost figures for the 1 March 2027 test are our estimates from public accounts, because neither the Premier League nor UEFA publishes a club’s ratio. Our PSR figures are our calculation from the accounts; the clubs’ own deductions are not public.

The regulator’s figures. Figures attributed to the report or the regulator are the IFR’s, from data clubs gave it, quoted from its draft State of the Game report. We do not test them.

The model. Dynamic SCR’s results are a static scenario, not a forecast. The model was first published in October 2026, and its results here are those on the Dynamic SCR page, which sets out the model and its assumptions in full.

Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.

This is an independent analysis, not an official calculation by the Premier League, the EFL or the IFR, and not financial advice.