Liverpool · Financial analysis
Liverpool's squad cost ratio: £615m of signings, and not one of them grandfathered
Liverpool's squad cost ratio for the 1 March 2027 test comes out at 73.6%, inside the 85% green threshold with roughly £88m of annual spending headroom. Measured before profit on player sales it is 80.0%, so the club sits inside the line before any selling is counted. £615m of registrations were bought across three windows and every one was signed after 12 December 2023, so none is grandfathered and all are capped at five years. Player trading supplies only 6.4 points, and three of the largest salaries at the club left on free transfers in a single summer. Reconstructed from UKSV Holdings' consolidated accounts and Appendix 2 of the Premier League Handbook.
Figures as of 31 October 2026, Orange Engine release V2CI · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture
SCR 2026/27·Post-summer projection
Latest change to the figures, 31 October 2026: the ratio is 73.6%, from 72.7%, because Liverpool’s filed sale profit replaces our modelled figure. Latest correction, 2 November 2026: the sale-profit tables still showed the old figure, the Chelsea comparison was out of date, and the European derivation named the wrong rounds, with no figure in the ratio changed. All 19 correction notes are at the end.
Liverpool have spent £615m on player registrations across three transfer windows, and every one of them is amortised over a maximum of five years.
| Liverpool | 2026/27 |
|---|---|
| Squad cost ratio, 1 March 2027 test | 73.6% |
| SCR before player trading | 80.0% |
| Merit above the floor and European amounts | 20.8 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 6.4 percentage points |
| Green headroom | +£88.2m |
| Assumption range | 69.4 to 78.3% |
| Assumption range against 85% | entirely below the line |
| Stress case (costs only) | 84.0% |
The squad costs £569.4m against £712.1m of the football revenue the rule counts, which is 80.0% before any player trading. Liverpool are inside the green threshold before a single pound of sale profit is added, and player trading then moves the figure to 73.6%.
- The squad cost is £569.4m: £323.8m of wages, £213.2m of amortisation, about £22.9m of agents’ fees and £9.5m from loans.
- Every fee-bearing registration in the three reconstructed windows postdates 12 December 2023. The £615.3m added across them was all executed after the cut-off, so all of it is capped at five years. Registrations signed earlier sit in what is left of the filed book value, £260.5m, charged over their remaining contracts.
- The filed accounts close at 31 May, so the two largest windows sit entirely outside them and are built on a filed net book value of £334.0m.
- Player trading supplies only 6.4 points. Three of the largest salaries at the club left for nothing in a single summer.
- Fifth place in 2025/26 qualified Liverpool for the Champions League, so the European provision pays here. At Chelsea and Forest it pays nothing.
Taken together, the twenty clubs of this season’s Premier League come to 75.3% on the same basis; Liverpool’s 73.6% is below that. The full table for every club in the series is at Premier League SCR 2026/27.
What the accounts say
UKSV Holdings Company Limited files consolidated accounts to 31 May. For the year to 31 May 2025:
| FY25, £m | |
|---|---|
| Turnover | 702.8 |
| Media revenue | 263.7 |
| Total staff costs | 427.7 |
| Profit on player disposals | 53.3 |
| Registrations, net book value | 334.0 |
Media revenue rose from £203.7m, a step of £60.0m the accounts attribute mainly to Champions League participation in 2024/25 replacing the Europa League, with stronger Premier League media revenue besides.
The year end is 31 May, which matters more here than at most clubs: both the summer 2025 and summer 2026 windows fall outside the last filed accounts, so the two largest pieces of spending in this reconstruction are built on top of the filed figures rather than read from them.
Amortisation, and nothing grandfathered
This is where Liverpool and Chelsea differ most.
The five-year cap applies to contracts executed, or on this model’s reading extended, on or after 12 December 2023, and was not backdated. The guidance carries the exemption forward in a single sentence:
“a contract which spans a period greater than five years that was executed prior to 12 December 2023, may be amortised across the initial period of that contract.”
Chelsea hold eight registrations carrying £311.9m of base fees on the far side of that date.
Liverpool hold none in the three windows reconstructed here. All three fall after the cut-off, and every registration in them is capped at five years:
| Window | Registrations | Fees, £m | Annual charge, £m |
|---|---|---|---|
| Summer 2025 | 9 | 416.2 | 93.3 |
| January 2026 | 1 | 1.0 | 0.3 |
| Summer 2026 | 4 | 198.1 | 45.2 |
| Total | 14 | 615.3 | 138.7 |
Both window totals tie to the club’s published spend, £417.2m including the January arrival for 2025/26 and £198.1m for 2026/27. The fees are as reported; the annual charge is on the reported fee plus 12%, for the League’s transfer levy, agents’ fees and other costs of the transfer.
Older registrations are a different matter. Liverpool signed Cody Gakpo, Dominik Szoboszlai and Ryan Gravenberch before the cut-off, and all three have extended since, which on this model’s reading brings them under the cap. We charge that older pool as a whole rather than player by player, so we do not say that no contract in it runs past five years.
Where the £213.2m comes from
The charge is built from the residual of the squad at the filed year end, with the book value of every registration that has left since removed, plus each cohort signed since at the reported fee plus 12% over its contract, measured from the day of registration to the day the contract ends and capped at five years. The filed book value was £334.0m; at the 31 May 2025 year end, £73.5m of it belonged to players no longer at the club (Darwin Núñez £36.6m, Luis Díaz £16.1m, Diogo Jota £11.9m, Ibrahima Konaté £8.7m and Ben Doak £0.2m), and the £260.5m that remains, spread over about three and a half years, supplies £74.4m. The three post-filing windows contribute £138.7m.
Set £213.2m against £712.1m of countable revenue and amortisation is 30% of it, against 57% at Chelsea and about 28% at Arsenal.
The largest single charges
| Player | From | Fee, £m | Annual charge, £m |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alexander Isak | Newcastle United | 125.0 | 28.0 |
| Bradley Barcola | Paris Saint-Germain | 106.0 | 24.6 |
| Florian Wirtz | Bayer Leverkusen | 100.0 | 22.4 |
| Hugo Ekitike | Eintracht Frankfurt | 69.0 | 15.5 |
| Jérémy Jacquet | Rennes | 55.0 | 12.3 |
| Miloš Kerkez | AFC Bournemouth | 40.0 | 9.0 |
Three registrations carry more than £20m a year each. At Chelsea only Morgan Rogers passes £20m, at about £26.2m on a £117m fee. Caicedo’s £100m base fee costs about £14.8m a year: his original eight-year contract spread it thinly until his April 2026 extension brought the remainder inside the five-year cap, while Isak’s five-year term was capped from the start.
Two of those transfers cross-check against reconstructions already built in this series. Isak is carried in Newcastle’s ledger at his £55m acquisition cost and marked departed, and Kerkez is marked departed in Bournemouth’s, where his sale falls inside the profit Bournemouth’s own accounts report for 2024/25. Two independently built ledgers record the same transactions from opposite directions.
Wages, and a rebuild that cost nothing on the way out
Wages, about £324m. The rule counts contract players and the head coach. Liverpool’s filed staff cost is £427.7m across 1,083 employees, and the reconstruction attributes 62 to 72% of it to the squad.
The filed headcount cannot test that range. The accounts state that 238 of the 1,083 are players, managers and coaches, so the player count cannot be isolated from the coaching staff, and the residual test used at clubs with a clean player count cannot be run. The disclosed categories do sum to the filed total of 1,083, and no separate temporary category is reported, which makes the filed denominator internally complete. That is not the same as establishing that no temporary or external labour sits outside the employee note. This is the dominant uncertainty in the numerator.
The roll-forward runs up sharply and then back down. Summer 2025 added a great deal, with Wirtz, Isak, Ekitike, Kerkez, Frimpong and Mamardashvili arriving against Alexander-Arnold, Díaz, Núñez and Quansah leaving.
Summer 2026 ran the other way. Mohamed Salah left for Trabzonspor, Ibrahima Konaté for Real Madrid and Andy Robertson for Tottenham, all three on contract expiry and all three for nothing. Three of the largest salaries at the club came off the payroll without a fee changing hands, which is why the net wage movement for that window is estimated negative even though it also brought in £198m of registrations.
Agents’ fees, about £22.9m, expensed, from the FA’s published figure of £33.9m for February 2025 to February 2026, being the portion not directly attributable to acquiring a registration, which capitalises with the fee instead.
Loans, £9.5m. Ronald Araújo is a loan in from Barcelona to 30 June 2027 and carries no amortisation, because the registration does not transfer. Only the remuneration Liverpool bear enters the numerator. Liverpool are reported to pay his wage in full, after he took a pay cut, and no loan fee. The reports give no salary, so the £9.5m is our estimate. They also report a non-mandatory option to buy him at about €55m, which adds nothing to this test.
Revenue, and why the European provision pays here
| Revenue for the test | Basis | £m |
|---|---|---|
| Central funds excluding facility fees | equal share plus merit at third, the three-year mean | 167.7 |
| Facility fees | 30 televised appearances | 20.6 |
| Commercial | estimated 2025/26 income of £346.5m, not yet filed (the £323.5m filed for 2024/25 grown by 7.1%), less an estimated £24.7m for the cost of merchandise | 321.8 |
| Gate | estimated 2025/26 receipts per home match, over the 27 home matches the rule counts | 115.2 |
| European distribution | Rule A.1.29(e): the highest of three amounts, here our estimate for 2025/26 | 85.0 |
| Domestic cups and academy grant | cups rebuilt from Liverpool’s cup ties over three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, provisional | 1.7 |
| Total | 712.1 |
The rows are rounded separately; the total is taken from the unrounded figures. The commercial estimate uses the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue).
The merit payment is calculated at third place, not fifth. The rule takes the most favourable of last season’s finish, the three-year mean and the fifteenth-place floor. Liverpool finished fifth in 2025/26, first in 2024/25 and third in 2023/24, a mean of exactly third, which beats both the actual finish and the floor. The title-winning season two years back is still paying, and it is worth about £7.5m a year more than fifth place alone.
And the European provision contributes. Fifth place qualified Liverpool for the 2026/27 Champions League league phase, so Rule A.1.29(e) pays. At Chelsea, which finished tenth, and at Forest, which finished sixteenth, it reads nil.
A club that qualifies gets the distribution, keeps in the test whatever commercial income last season brought, and has its European home matches counted in the gate at last season’s receipts per home match. A club that does not keeps that commercial income in the test for one more year, and loses the European matches from the gate count and the distribution immediately. A European campaign can genuinely lift a club’s commercial income. The commercial estimate contains no specific allowance for this European campaign.
The European figure is the largest estimate in this reconstruction, because Liverpool disclose no UEFA line at all: their stated policy classifies European income into matchday and media income as appropriate. It is not a confirmed UEFA payment. The rule takes the highest of three amounts: what Liverpool recognised from the competition in 2025/26, which we estimate at £85.0m; the mean over the seasons they played in it, which on our estimates is lower; and the estimated mean for the round of 16, £73.0m. The first sets the figure. Were it below £73.0m, the third would apply, so on the downside this input can lose at most £12.0m, about 1.2 points. It may be low: tables built from UEFA’s published amounts put Liverpool’s 2025/26 money at about £94m to £95m, which would take the ratio down by about 0.9 points. Neither itemises Liverpool’s total, so its value-pillar share, exchange rate and timing in Liverpool’s accounts cannot be checked, and we have not adopted them. The derivation is in the sources at the end.
How much of the revenue rests on the rule’s own bases
| Set by the rule’s bases | £m |
|---|---|
| Merit payment above the fifteenth-place floor | 45.1 |
| European distribution under A.1.29(e) | 85.0 |
| European home gate | 17.1 |
| Total | 147.2 |
The rows are rounded separately and sum to £147.2m. Liverpool earned the merit through their finishes, and the European amounts follow from reaching the Champions League. Measured at the fifteenth-place floor and with no European money, the same cost base would produce 100.8%, which is 15.8 percentage points above the green threshold. All other revenue stays fixed, so this compares the rule’s bases and is not a forecast. These amounts matter far more to Liverpool’s position than player trading does: they move the before-trading ratio by 20.8 percentage points, against 6.4 from sale profit.
The sales that do not do very much work
| Financial year | Profit, £m | What produced it |
|---|---|---|
| 2024/25 | 53.3 | filed |
| 2025/26 | 105.3 | not yet filed: £104.7m disclosed in the 2024/25 accounts for the period to 22 September 2025 (note 26), plus our estimated £0.6m for Trent Kone-Doherty in February 2026 |
| 2026/27 to date | 26.0 | Curtis Jones at £24.4m, and very little else |
| Three-year average | 61.5 | the figure the rule counts |
£569.4m divided by £712.1m plus £61.5m gives 73.6%.
£61.5m is worth 6.4 points, and less than a tenth of Liverpool’s denominator comes from selling players.
| Liverpool | Chelsea | |
|---|---|---|
| Squad cost | £569.4m | £529.9m |
| Football revenue the rule counts | £712.1m | £459.3m |
| Three-year average of player trading | £61.5m | £121.4m |
| That average as a share of the denominator | 8.0% | 20.9% |
| SCR before player trading | 80.0% | 115.4% |
| Squad cost ratio | 73.6% | 91.3% |
Chelsea’s average is not all sale profit: its pool includes £17.0m for releasing their head coach, about £5.7m a year.
That table is the structural difference between the two clubs. Chelsea spend slightly less on their squad and earn two thirds of what Liverpool earn, and fill the gap by selling, so about a fifth of their denominator is player trading. Liverpool spend similarly, earn half as much again, and barely sell at all.
The reason is in the departures. Liverpool’s summer 2026 exits were almost entirely contract expiries, and a free transfer produces no proceeds and no profit. The only material sale was Curtis Jones to Inter Milan, and because he is an academy registration with no book value, the whole fee, less the 5% deduction for direct costs, is profit.
Disposal profit is the fee less the remaining book value, with 5% taken off gains for direct costs, which is why it is lower than the headline fees suggest. Luis Díaz went for £60m but still carried about £15m of book value. Darwin Núñez went for £46.0m carrying about £34m, so the profit is about a quarter of the fee. Players carried at no acquisition cost are the opposite. Alexander-Arnold, Quansah, Morton and Jones came through the academy, and Kelleher and Bajcetic were bought young for fees never established, so all six are carried at nil and everything received, less that 5%, is profit. Those are our estimates by player, and for the sales of summer 2025 they come to £132.3m. The accounts print £104.7m and do not itemise it, so the table uses their figure. We cannot close the £27.6m difference from public information.
The expiry clock
Holding squad cost and countable revenue where they are and rolling only the profit pool:
| Test | Sales counted, £m | Average, £m | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 March 2027 | nothing (February to May 2024), 53.3, 105.3, 26.0 | 61.5 | 73.6% |
| 1 March 2028 | nothing (February to May 2025), 105.3, 26.0 | 43.8 | 75.3% |
| 1 March 2029 | 0.6 (February to May 2026), 26.0 | 8.9 | 79.0% |
| 1 March 2030 | nothing | nil | 80.0% |
Each row holds squad cost and revenue at this season’s figures, assumes no further selling, and divides the sales of the six transfer windows before its test by three (Rule A.1.53); where a test counts only part of a financial year, the row gives that part. This is arithmetic, not a forecast.
A club with 6.4 points of trading support has little to lose when that support expires. Liverpool’s ratio moves 6.4 points across four tests of no selling at all, and stays inside the threshold. Chelsea’s equivalent table runs 91.3%, 97.5%, 100.0% and then 115.4%, which ends 0.4 percentage points above the 115% red line.
Depending on trading cuts both ways: it holds a ratio down, and it is the thing that goes.
The squad, checked against the League’s own registers
Liverpool’s registration population is proved against four fixed Premier League submitted squad returns, from February 2025 to September 2026, covering senior and Under-21 registrations, with none unresolved.
Three registrations disappear from a return and reappear on a later one: Vítězslav Jaroš, Kostas Tsimikas and Harvey Davies. Every one is a loan out rather than a departure. A ledger built by differencing consecutive returns would record each as a sale followed by a signing, inventing a disposal, a profit and a purchase that never happened. That is why the reconstruction reads the four returns as a chain rather than as four snapshots. The Orange Engine sets out the reconciliation in full.
What this doesn’t say
- That Liverpool’s ratio is exactly 73.6%. The published range is 69.4 to 78.3%, conditional on the current 62 to 72% player-share assumption, on how much of their players’ wages the clubs borrowing them pay, which is reported for only one of Liverpool’s loans, and on 2025/26 commercial and gate figures that are not yet filed. The filed headcount cannot test the player-share range, because the accounts group 238 players, managers and coaches in a single category and do not separate their pay.
- That the European figure is filed. It is not. Liverpool disclose no UEFA line, and the estimate is anchored on their own media-revenue narrative and cross-checked against Arsenal’s disclosed figure. It is the largest single estimated input here.
- That the two most recent windows are in the filed accounts. The year end is 31 May, so summer 2025 and summer 2026 both fall outside them.
- That £615m of registration spending itself determines the ratio. It does not. What matters is the annual squad cost it produces against the revenue base, and Liverpool’s squad cost is £569.4m against £712.1m of countable revenue.
- That the grandfathering comparison is a criticism of Chelsea. It is a description of a cut-off date. Chelsea signed long contracts when they were permitted, and these Liverpool registrations came after the rule changed. Neither club chose the date.
- That head-coach costs are fully captured. The wage input is a share of the filed staff-cost line with no separate head-coach ledger. Arne Slot departed on 30 May 2026 and Andoni Iraola was appointed on 4 June 2026. The filed line closes at 31 May 2025, a year earlier, so it cannot contain any termination payment to Slot. No amount has been added for one.
Sources and caveats.
The accounts. UKSV Holdings Company Limited consolidated accounts to 31 May 2025, filed at Companies House, with the registrations note's roll-forwards reconciled to the filed closing net book value of £334.0m. The filed year ends 31 May, so the summer 2025 and summer 2026 windows both fall outside the last filed accounts and are reconstructed on top of them.
The rules applied. Premier League Handbook 2026/27, Appendix 2, in particular Rules A.1.4, A.1.13, A.1.17, A.1.22 including (c), A.1.29 including (a), (b), (d), (e) and (g), A.1.32, A.1.33, A.1.39 and A.1.53.
What is estimated, and why.
- Player wages, about £324m, with the loans out allowed for: the saving counts in the central figure where a named source reports the split of a loanee's wage, and only in the range where nobody states it. Liverpool's accounts do not separate them. They disclose 1,083 employees of whom 238 are players, managers and coaches, 772 administration and commercial and 73 ground staff, and the squad's share of the £427.7m staff-cost line is taken at 62 to 72%. The filed headcount cannot test that range, because the filed category combines players with managers and coaches, so the residual cannot be tested against a player-only headcount. The disclosed employee categories sum to the filed total of 1,083 and no separate temporary category is reported, which makes the filed denominator internally complete; that does not establish that no temporary or external labour sits outside the employee note.
- The European figure is the largest single estimate here. Liverpool disclose no UEFA line: their stated policy classifies European income into matchday and media income as appropriate. Media revenue rose £60.0m in FY25, which the accounts attribute mainly to Champions League participation replacing the Europa League. Removing about £7.5m of merit for finishing first rather than third leaves roughly £52.5m as the competition step; against a Europa League season put at £20m to £30m, in which Liverpool reached the quarter-finals, that implies a Champions League round-of-16 season of about £72m to £82m. Cross-checked against Arsenal, whose FY25 accounts disclose £99.9m of Champions League income on a run to the semi-finals, and adjusted for Liverpool's quarter-final in 2025/26, giving £85m.
- Commercial income and gate receipts for 2025/26 are estimated because those accounts are not filed until 2027. The gate estimate carries a Champions League quarter-final. The commercial estimate is the £323.5m filed for 2024/25 grown by 7.1%, the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season's commercial revenue), which is £346.5m. The commercial estimate contains no specific allowance for this European campaign. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, and Liverpool's accounts give no merchandise figure, so the cost of the goods is estimated from the clubs that do, at £24.7m in a range of £10.2m to £54.7m, and taken off commercial income. The rule otherwise retains the commercial income in full and counts the gate at last season's receipts per home match, over the 27 home matches it counts this season, while excluding the European prize money itself.
Transfers and loans.
- Every registration in the reconstructed windows was executed after 12 December 2023 and is capped at five years under Rule A.1.22(c). Registrations signed earlier are charged from what is left of the filed book value over their remaining contracts.
- Fees are taken at the reported base where a base plus add-ons is recorded: Wirtz £100.0m against a reported £116.5m ceiling, Ekitike £69.0m against £79.0m, Barcola £106.0m against £123.0m, Muñoz £34.5m against £60.0m, Jacquet £55.0m plus £5.0m, Leoni £26.0m against £30.0m. Only the base capitalises until an add-on triggers, and cost is counted at that base plus 12%.
- Three registrations were agreed in one window to transfer at the start of the following season, Mamardashvili, Jacquet and Ndukwe, and amortisation begins at the registration date rather than the agreement.
- Disposal profits are calculated on the accounting carrying value, with a 5% deduction for direct costs applied to gains but not losses. The acquisition costs of Luis Díaz, Darwin Núñez and Ben Doak are carried so their disposals are not recorded as pure profit. Academy registrations at nil acquisition cost produce profit equal to the whole fee less that 5%, which is correct rather than an artefact; Caoimhín Kelleher and Stefan Bajcetic were bought for fees never established and are carried at nil on the same basis. The book value of players who have left is measured at the filed year end, 31 May 2025.
- Ronald Araújo is a loan in from Barcelona to 30 June 2027 and carries no amortisation, because the registration does not transfer. Liverpool are reported to pay his wage in full, after a pay cut, with no loan fee and a non-mandatory option to buy at about €55m. No outlet states his salary, so the £9.5m is estimated. Neither club has published the terms.
Completeness. The playing population is proved against four fixed Premier League submitted squad returns of 7 February 2025, 12 September 2025, 5 February 2026 and 3 September 2026, with none unresolved. Identity resolution closes on an explicit alias or not at all, because the League files legal names and several do not contain the playing name. Three registrations disappear from a return and reappear on a later one, and each is a loan out rather than a departure.
Two matters outside the calculation. Diogo Jota died on 3 July 2025 and Liverpool retired his number. He is not a transfer and is not counted as one: he is excluded from the departure analysis and the disposal pool, and carries no 2026/27 squad cost because the club no longer holds the registration. Any write-off of remaining book value falls in the year to 31 May 2026, which is not yet filed. Separately, a 38% stake in the club was sold to 1892 Holdings on 14 August 2026, which is an ownership change rather than revenue and does not enter the ratio on either side.
Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.
Independent estimate, not an official calculation, and not advice. Figures produced 22 September 2026; updated 1 October, 2 October, 3 October, 4 October, 5 October, 9 October, 16 October, 23 October, 25 October, 26 October, 28 October, 31 October and 2 November 2026.
Corrections and updates (19)
22 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 22 September 2026. The ratio is 71.5% and 79.0% before player trading, from 71.7% and 79.0%, after the 2025/26 disposal year was corrected from £141.5m to £146.3m in the series-wide fee sweep.
25 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Update, 25 September 2026. Liverpool’s own figures are unchanged. Two references to Chelsea are brought up to date: Chelsea now hold nine grandfathered registrations carrying £320.3m, worth about three points, after Moisés Caicedo’s April 2026 extension brought his inside the cap; and Chelsea’s rebuilt figures give the expiry table quoted below.
26 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Update, 26 September 2026. Chelsea’s figures in the comparison below, including its squad cost, its amortisation as a share of countable revenue, its largest single charge and its grandfathered registrations, are updated to its corrected reconstruction. Liverpool’s own figures are unchanged.
1 and 2 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 71.5% → 70.6% · before player sales 79.0% → 77.8%
Corrections, 1 and 2 October 2026. The ratio is 70.6%, from 71.5%, and 77.8% before player trading, from 79.0%. Agents’ fees now use the FA’s published figure for Liverpool, £33.9m rather than an assumed £38m. Two players who have left were still being written down: Ibrahima Konaté had been recorded as costing nothing, and Diogo Jota’s book value, about £10.5m, stayed in the pool, although this article said his registration carried no 2026/27 squad cost. Both now leave it; Jota’s is treated as a write-off on his death. Ben Doak’s and Tyler Morton’s sales are taken at their base fees, £20m and £8.7m, and the book value of departed players is measured at Liverpool’s own year end, 31 May 2025. The squad cost is £557.8m and the three-year average of sale profit £73.2m. Green headroom is £113.6m, the range 67.3% to 74.1% and the stress case 80.1%. Caoimhín Kelleher and Stefan Bajcetic were bought young, for fees never established, rather than coming through the academy, which changes no figure. Chelsea now hold eight grandfathered registrations carrying £311.9m, after David Datro Fofana’s sale. The conclusion does not change: Liverpool are inside the green line before any sale profit is added.
3 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 70.6% → 69.6% · before player sales 77.8% → 76.6%
Correction, 3 October 2026. The ratio is 69.6%, from 70.6%, and 76.6% before player trading, from 77.8%. Counted, from archived match reports. The rule counts the average number of home FA Cup and League Cup matches over the last three seasons, rounded up. Liverpool played twelve (five, three and four), so the rule counts four, where we had assumed two. Re-estimated, by our method. Last season’s matchday receipts are not yet filed. We had carried £120.0m; the estimate is now £123.7m: the filed 2024/25 figure of £115.6m, scaled for the change in home matches (cup ties from 3 to 4 and European matches from 5 to 6), with a cup tie counted as 0.15 of a league match and a European match as 0.25, plus 5% for the year. The method, and how far it could be out, is set out in How we estimate matchday revenue. Matchday revenue under the rule is £115.2m, from £103.4m. Also moved: the range is 66.4 to 73.0%, from 67.3 to 74.1%; green headroom is £123.6m, from £113.6m; and the stress case is 78.9%, from 80.1%. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
4 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 69.6% → 73.9% · before player sales 76.6% → 81.4%
Correction, 4 October 2026. The ratio is 73.9%, from 69.6%, and 81.4% before player trading, from 76.6%. The squad cost rule defines three things in its own terms, and in each we had used the figure from a club’s accounts (Three definitions in the squad cost rule, and what they change). What a registration costs. The rule counts everything a club pays in connection with a transfer: the fee, the League’s 4% transfer levy and agents’ fees. For players signed since Liverpool’s last accounts we now count the reported fee plus 12%. Squad cost is £570.4m, from £557.8m, and the three-year average of sale profit is £71.6m, from £73.2m, because a player sold now leaves at a higher book value. This is the result of the review of agents’ fees that our earlier notes promised. Merchandise. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, sales less the cost of the goods, where we had counted sales in full. Liverpool’s accounts give no merchandise figure, so we estimate the cost of the goods from the clubs that do: £24.7m, in a range of £10.2m to £54.7m. Cup prize money. The rule counts a three-year average of what a club received from the FA Cup and the EFL Cup. We had entered £4.0m for Liverpool, a figure with no calculation behind it. Rebuilt from Liverpool’s cup ties in the last three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, it is £0.8m, in a range of £0.7m to £7.4m. The figure is provisional: the EFL publishes no prize money, some broadcast fees are not published, and the top of the range allows for a share of the gate at away ties, which the rule may or may not count. The revenue the rule counts is £700.5m, from £728.4m. Also moved: the range is 70.5 to 77.7%, from 66.4 to 73.0%; green headroom is £85.9m, from £123.6m; the stress case is 83.5%, from 78.9%.
5 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 73.9% → 74.0% · before player sales 81.4% → 81.5%
Correction, 5 October 2026. The ratio is 74.0%, from 73.9%, and 81.5% before player trading, from 81.4%. We now measure each contract from the day the player was registered to the day it ends. A player who signs in August on a five-year deal has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June; we had spread his cost over five full years. 14 of Liverpool’s contract lengths change, 8 of them against an end date we have derived as the 30 June the announced length points to, where no source states the date. The yearly charge for registrations is £213.2m, from £212.9m. The range is 70.6% to 77.8%, from 70.5% to 77.7%. No threshold is crossed. Most clubs move because contract costs are now measured to their actual or derived expiry dates; six also move for club-specific reasons. See the engine changelog.
7 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 7 October 2026. Liverpool’s own figures are unchanged. Chelsea’s figures in the comparison below are updated to its corrected reconstruction: its ratio is now 93.2%, from 94.3%, its squad cost £525.5m, from £531.5m, and its ratio before player trading 115.5%, from 116.8%, and its table on frozen costs now runs 93.2%, 96.5%, 102.7% and 115.5%. Its three-year average of sale profit, £108.9m, and that profit’s share of its denominator, 19.3%, are unchanged.
7 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 7 October 2026, second correction of the day. Liverpool’s own figures are unchanged. One comparison uses another club’s corrected figure: Arsenal’s amortisation is about 27% of the revenue the rule counts, from about 28%, because that revenue is now £743.8m, from £727.7m, with seven European home matches counted for Arsenal, where we had counted four.
9 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 74.0% → 72.9% · before player sales 81.5% → 80.1%
Correction, 9 October 2026. The ratio is 72.9%, from 74.0%, and 80.1% before player trading, from 81.5%. Last season’s commercial revenue is now estimated by one published method, the same for every club. Liverpool’s 2025/26 accounts are not filed, so the figure is an estimate. We had £335.0m, a judgement of ours. It is now £346.5m: the £323.5m filed for 2024/25, grown by 7.1%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). It is drawn between £288.6m and £398.9m, where we had drawn 7% either way: the new span comes from how far forecasts of this kind have missed in past seasons. The range is 69.0% to 77.7%, from 70.6% to 77.8%. The published ratio crosses no threshold. This article said Chelsea’s ratio before player trading was 115.5%, above the 115% red line; it now says 114.4%, 0.6 of a point below it, a margin that does not reliably tell which side it is on, with Chelsea’s ratio at 92.5%, from 93.2%, on the same method. The caveat said the commercial estimate carried a Champions League quarter-final; it now says the commercial estimate contains no specific allowance for that campaign. The stress case is now described as what it is: the worst case on costs alone, with revenue held at the central estimate. The table of later tests holds this season’s revenue fixed and does not forecast next season’s commercial revenue; it is now labelled so. A sentence sizing what the five-year cap would add at Chelsea is removed while that calculation is reviewed. See the engine changelog.
15 October 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Clarification, 15 October 2026. Wording only; no figure changed. The ranges in this article are assumption ranges, the spread of the model’s inputs between assumed bounds, not calibrated or confidence intervals, and the shares of modelled outcomes above or below a threshold quoted in the notes above are withdrawn.
16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · SCR 72.9% → 72.7% · before player sales 80.1% → 80.0%
Updated 16 October 2026: loans out now recorded; wage relief shown in ranges. The ratio is 72.7%, from 72.9%, and 80.0% before player trading, from 80.1%. Liverpool’s players out on loan are now recorded, with an allowance for the part of their wages the borrowing clubs pay. Where a named source reports the split, the saving counts in the central figure: Levante are reported to pay all of Ifeanyi Ndukwe’s wage this season, a relayed report not confirmed by either club. Where nobody states the split, as for every other Liverpool loan, the saving only widens the range. The squad cost is £569.4m, from £570.6m; the range is 68.6% to 77.4%, from 69.0% to 77.7%; green headroom is £96.1m, from £94.9m; the stress case is 83.0%, from 82.4%. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 · Methodology change · no change to the ratio
Correction, 23 October 2026. Liverpool’s ratio is unchanged at 72.7%, and 80.0% before player trading. The figures this article gave for the 2028, 2029 and 2030 tests, 74.4%, 79.0% and 80.0%, are withdrawn while they are rechecked. The rule averages the profit or loss on player sales in the six most recent transfer windows (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53), and the table took whole financial years out of the average instead. For the March 2027 test the two readings agree, because Liverpool made no sale between 2 February and 30 June 2024; for later tests they do not.
- Also changed: the comparison with Chelsea quoted that club’s forward figures, which are withdrawn too. It now gives the figure each club reaches with no sale profit at all: 80.0% for Liverpool, 114.4% for Chelsea.
- The argument stands: Liverpool are inside the line before any selling is counted, so the expiry of their trading support cannot take them over it. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 (second) · Methodology change · no change to the ratio
Correction, 23 October 2026 (second of the day). The figures for the 2028, 2029 and 2030 tests are 74.4%, 79.0% and 80.0%, as the article first gave them, and the 2029 average is £8.9m, from £8.7m. Each row now averages the sales in the six transfer windows before its test (Rule A.1.53) rather than whole financial years; Liverpool made no sale between February and June 2025, and one small one between February and June 2026.
- Also corrected: the comparison with Chelsea had kept that club’s figures from before today’s earlier correction. Chelsea’s three-year average of sale profit is £133.5m, 22.5% of its denominator, where the table gave £108.9m and 19.2%; its squad cost is £528.5m, its ratio 89.1% and its ratio before player trading 115.1%, after Chelsea’s own correction today under Rule A.1.22(c). Chelsea’s table on the same arithmetic runs 89.1%, 96.2%, 100.6% and 115.1%.
- The argument stands: Liverpool are inside the line before any selling is counted, so the expiry of their trading support cannot take them over it. See the engine changelog.
25 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 25 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 72.7%. The article said Liverpool hold no fee-bearing registration that predates the five-year cap’s cut-off of 12 December 2023. That is true of the three windows it reconstructs, not of the squad: players signed earlier sit in the £260.5m left of the filed book value, charged over their remaining contracts. Three sentences now say so. Chelsea’s amortisation is 57% of countable revenue, from 56%, a figure the second correction of 23 October changed in Chelsea’s article and missed in two sentences here. And the expiry table gave its part-year slices as February to June; Liverpool’s year ends on 31 May, so each slice runs from February to May, and the 2027 row now shows its slice, which holds no sales (Rule A.1.53). The table’s averages are unchanged.
26 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio
Correction, 26 October 2026. Liverpool’s ratio is unchanged at 72.7%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.0%, from 74.9%. Fees paid and received for head coaches now count, at Manchester City, Chelsea, Brentford, Ipswich, Newcastle and Crystal Palace (Rules A.1.22(d) and A.1.29(g)). Chelsea’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Chelsea’s correction of today: the three-year average is £139.2m, from £133.5m, the ratio 88.3%, from 89.1%, and the table with no further selling runs 88.3%, 95.2%, 99.5% and 115.1%, from 89.1%, 96.2%, 100.6% and 115.1%.
28 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 28 October 2026. Liverpool’s ratio is unchanged at 72.7%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.1%, from 75.0%. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected sixteen entries at eleven clubs where the club’s announcement or a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different fee, contract length or date. The corrections move Arsenal, Chelsea, Sunderland, Crystal Palace and Tottenham up, and Coventry, Nottingham Forest and Bournemouth down. Chelsea’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Chelsea’s correction of today: 88.6%, from 88.3%, and 115.4% before player trading, from 115.1%, on a squad cost of £529.9m, from £528.5m; Arsenal’s amortisation is 28% of its countable revenue, from 27%.
31 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 72.7% → 73.6% · before player sales unchanged at 80.0%
Correction, 31 October 2026. The ratio is 73.6%, from 72.7%; 80.0% before player trading is unchanged. Liverpool’s accounts print a lower sale profit than we had modelled. The accounts of UKSV Holdings to 31 May 2025 give £104.7m of profit on player sales from the year end to their approval on 22 September 2025 (note 26, printed page 39), where we had £132.5m, and we now use the filed figure (Rule A.1.13). Darwin Nunez’s sale fee is £46.0m, the EUR 53m guaranteed converted at the rate of the day, from £46.2m, with add-ons left out. Reece Trueman left when his contract expired in summer 2025, not 2026, and no figure moves with that. The three-year average of sale profit is £61.5m, from £70.8m, and the headroom to the 85% line is £88.2m, from £96.1m. Figures that follow from these are restated with them in the text, and the twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%. The correction does not reverse the article’s conclusion: Liverpool sit inside the line, and inside it before any selling is counted. It was not a change in the rules, or in what Liverpool filed: we modelled a figure the accounts print.
2 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Correction, 2 November 2026. Liverpool’s ratio is unchanged at 73.6%. The correction of 31 October did not reach every table. The 2025/26 sale profit is £105.3m, from £133.1m, and the three-year average in the table is £61.5m, from £70.8m; the expiry table, which still printed £133.1m in two rows, now agrees with its own averages. Sale profit moves the ratio by 6.4 points, from 7.2, and across the four tests of the expiry table by 6.4, from about seven. Darwin Núñez’s fee is £46.0m where one sentence still said £46.2m. The Chelsea comparison is brought up to date: Chelsea’s three-year average is £121.4m, from £115.0m, its ratio 91.3%, from 92.3%, and its table with no further selling 91.3%, 97.5%, 100.0% and 115.4%, ending 0.4 points above the red line, from 0.1. Sale profit is 8.0% of Liverpool’s denominator, from 9.0%, and 20.9% of Chelsea’s, from 22.5%. The European derivation named the wrong rounds. Arsenal’s £99.9m came from a run to the semi-finals, not the final, and Liverpool reached the quarter-finals of the Europa League in 2023/24, not the round of 16; the £85.0m is not changed. The article now sets out the three amounts Rule A.1.29(e) compares. Grandfathering. “Liverpool hold none” is now limited to the three reconstructed windows, and the article says that Gakpo, Szoboszlai and Gravenberch were signed before the cut-off and have extended since. The chart note had the same fault. Ronald Araújo. The article said no purchase option was disclosed. Liverpool are reported to pay his wage in full, with no loan fee and a non-mandatory option at about €55m; the £9.5m remains our estimate. The label “revenue added by the rule” and the wording of revenue the rule supplies are replaced, because Liverpool earned the merit through their finishes. Also corrected. The 2025/26 figure is described as not yet filed: £104.7m disclosed in the accounts to 31 May 2025, plus our estimate of £0.6m. Chelsea’s average is no longer labelled all sale profit, because it includes a head-coach release. Profit on nil-cost players is the fee less 5%, not every pound received. The filed staff-cost line closes a year before Arne Slot left, so it cannot hold a termination payment to him; the article had called that unresolved. The sources now list Rule A.1.53. A section repeating the article’s points and a repeated explanation under the expiry table are removed.