Arsenal · Financial analysis
Arsenal's squad cost ratio: a large squad cost against much larger countable revenue
Arsenal's squad cost ratio for the 1 March 2027 test comes out at 60.7%, inside the 85% green threshold with roughly £192m of annual spending headroom. Measured before profit on player sales it is 65.0%, so the club sits comfortably inside the line before any selling is counted. Player trading is worth only 4.3 percentage points, and one of the three years in the three-year average of sale profit produced just £5.7m of profit, against £81.2m and £70.9m in the other two, without it mattering. The squad costs 85% more than Nottingham Forest's and the ratio is about three fifths of Forest's, which is what it means to say the rule measures a relationship rather than an amount. Reconstructed from Arsenal Holdings Ltd's consolidated accounts and Appendix 2 of the Premier League Handbook.
Figures as of 31 October 2026, Orange Engine release V2CI · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture
SCR 2026/27·Post-summer projection
Latest change to the figures, 31 October 2026: the twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%; the ratio, 60.7%, is unchanged. Latest correction, 1 November 2026: the loss in the accounts table, three comparisons and the source of the fee table, with no figure in the ratio changed. All 19 correction notes are at the end.
Arsenal’s squad costs £479.8m, which is 85% more than Nottingham Forest’s £259.6m. Arsenal’s ratio is 60.7% and Forest’s is 97.4%.
| Arsenal | 2026/27 |
|---|---|
| Squad cost ratio, 1 March 2027 test | 60.7% |
| SCR before player trading | 65.0% |
| Merit above the floor and European amounts | 27.7 percentage points |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 4.3 percentage points |
| Green headroom | +£192.4m |
| Assumption range | 57.5 to 64.7% |
| Assumption range against 85% | entirely below the line |
| Stress case (costs only) | 70.4% |
The squad costs £479.8m against £738.2m of the football revenue the rule counts, which is 65.0% before any player trading. Player trading then moves it to 60.7%. Measured at the fifteenth-place floor and with no European money, £220.3m less, the same cost base produces 92.7%, 7.7 points above the green threshold.
- The squad cost is £479.8m: £250.9m of wages, £207.2m of amortisation and about £21.7m of agents’ fees.
- Wages alone are about 34% of the revenue the rule counts, against 73% at Fulham and 71% at Forest.
- The rule pays merit at first place, worth £75.2m against £22.6m at the fifteenth-place floor, and counts £130m of Champions League money.
- £340.1m is owed to the owner’s Delaware company on two years’ notice, subordinated beneath a £100m Barclays facility. The ratio sees none of it.
Taken together, the twenty clubs of this season’s Premier League come to 75.3% on the same basis; Arsenal’s 60.7% is below that. The full table for every club in the series is at Premier League SCR 2026/27.
What the accounts say
Arsenal Holdings Ltd files consolidated accounts to 31 May. The year to 31 May 2025 was second in the Premier League and a Champions League semi-final. Last season, whose finish sets this season’s merit payment, Arsenal won the title.
| FY25, £m | |
|---|---|
| Turnover | 691.0 |
| Wages and salaries | 303.2 |
| Total staff costs, including social security | 346.8 |
| Amortisation of registrations | 171.6 |
| Impairment of registrations | 15.2 |
| Profit on player sales | 81.2 |
| Loss for the year | (1.4) |
Turnover rose £74m: broadcasting £272.8m, commercial £263.2m after the adidas renewal, and matchday £153.9m.
Transfer creditors stood at £210.8m, down from £267.8m, with instalments mainly over the following two years and £4.3m of notional interest running through the finance line. Cash was £56.0m.
The payroll disclosure is unusually detailed: a group payroll of 871 permanent staff, split 101 players, 90 coaching and training, 564 commercial and administrative and 116 ground staff, with a further 1,462 temporary staff filed separately. A large commercial and retail operation therefore sits inside the same staff-cost figure as the squad.
Rebuilding the ratio, before any selling
Wages, about £251m. The rule counts contract players and the head coach. Arsenal’s filed staff cost is £346.8m, and the reconstruction currently attributes 62 to 72% of it to the squad.
The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate that range, and the reason is worth stating rather than burying. The usual test divides the non-playing payroll by the non-playing headcount and asks whether the result is a plausible average wage. Here the answer depends on a question the accounts do not settle: the filing lists 1,462 temporary staff separately from the 871 permanent, and whether their remuneration sits inside the £346.8m decides the denominator. Across the 770 permanent non-playing staff the residual is roughly £126k to £171k a head; across all 2,232 it is roughly £44k to £59k. Until that perimeter is established the test cannot validate the range, and the stored range is retained rather than replaced.
Rolled through the three completed windows, and with the loans out allowed for, the figure for this season is about £250.9m. Against the £738.2m of revenue the rule counts, wages alone are about 34%, against 73% at Fulham and 71% at Forest.
Amortisation, £207.2m. Arsenal publish no forward schedule, so the charge for registrations already on the books at 31 May 2025 is derived from the filed net book value over an estimated remaining life. Players signed in 2025 and 2026 are added on their contract terms, measured from the day of registration to the day the contract ends, each counted at the reported fee plus 12% for the League’s transfer levy and agents’ fees, which is how the rule defines what a registration costs. Those two windows added about £446m of registrations between them at reported fees, which is what produces a charge of this size.
The five-year cap does not reach every registration. It applies to contracts executed, or on this model’s reading extended, on or after 12 December 2023. A contract executed before that date may be amortised over its full initial term under the guidance to the rule, and we treat those that way.
Agents’ fees, about £21.7m, expensed, from the FA’s published figure of £32.1m for February 2025 to February 2026.
Revenue the rule counts, £738.2m.
| Revenue for the test | Basis | £m |
|---|---|---|
| Central funds excluding facility fees | equal share plus merit at first, last season’s finish | 175.2 |
| Facility fees | 32 televised appearances | 22.0 |
| Commercial | estimated 2025/26 income of £284.3m, not yet filed (the £263.2m filed for 2024/25 grown by 8.0%), less £30.9m, the cost of merchandise sold as filed in the 2024/25 accounts | 253.4 |
| Gate | estimated 2025/26 receipts per home match, over the 29 home matches the rule counts, seven of them European | 156.2 |
| European prize money | Champions League, recognised last season and qualified for this one | 130.0 |
| Domestic cups and academy grant | cups rebuilt from Arsenal’s cup ties over three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, provisional | 1.3 |
| Total | 738.2 |
The rows are rounded separately; the total is taken from the unrounded figures. The commercial estimate uses the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue).
The merit basis pays the maximum. The rule takes the best of last season’s finish, the three-year mean and the fifteenth-place floor. Arsenal finished first, the three-year mean is second, and the floor is irrelevant. First-place merit is £75.2m, against £22.6m at the fifteenth-place floor, and the £52.6m difference is what the table below counts. With the equal share, central funds reach £175.2m. Forest, on a three-year mean of thirteenth, are paid £30.1m of merit.
How much of the revenue rests on the rule’s own bases
| Set by the rule’s bases | £m |
|---|---|
| Merit payment above the fifteenth-place floor | 52.6 |
| European distribution under A.1.29(e) | 130.0 |
| European home gate | 37.7 |
| Total | 220.3 |
Arsenal earned the merit by winning the league, £52.6m more than the fifteenth-place floor would pay, and the European amounts follow from reaching the Champions League. Measured at the floor and with no European money, the same cost base would produce 92.7% instead of 65.0%, which is 27.7 points. Unrounded, that is £479.80m against £517.85m, or 92.65%, so the rounded figures above give a slightly lower answer. That figure is the one worth pausing on: on this mechanical measure Arsenal would be above the green threshold, by 7.7 points. All other revenue and the squad cost stay fixed, so this compares the rule’s bases and is not a forecast of Arsenal outside Europe.
At Forest the same three are worth £7.5m.
What player trading does to it
The rule adds the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows and divides it by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). For the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024; we have found no sale by Arsenal with a profit or loss between then and the start of their 2024/25 year on 1 June 2024, so the three financial years below are the whole of it.
| Financial year | Profit or loss, £m | What produced it |
|---|---|---|
| 2024/25 | 81.2 | filed |
| 2025/26 | 5.7 | Kiwior to Porto at £14.6m, whose option Porto exercised on 5 May 2026, Tavares at £7.6m and Karl Hein at £2.6m, whose option Werder Bremen exercised on 23 May, both inside Arsenal’s year to 31 May, against losses on the other summer 2025 and January 2026 disposals |
| 2026/27 to date | 70.9 | Martinelli at £60.0m the largest part, with Trossard, Jesus, Vieira and Nørgaard |
| Three-year average | 52.6 | the figure the rule counts |
£479.8m divided by £738.2m plus £52.6m gives 60.7%.
Sale profit is the fee less what remains of the player’s cost on the books. The rule adds the average of it to revenue, rather than taking it off cost, and £52.6m of averaged profit against £738.2m of revenue is worth 4.3 percentage points. At Brighton, on a far smaller revenue base, the same mechanism is worth 30.4. Arsenal’s compliance does not depend on selling. The whole three-year average of sale profit is worth 4.3 percentage points, and one of its years is a low-profit year of £5.7m, against £81.2m and £70.9m in the other two, without that changing the position.
What that comparison means
| Arsenal | Nottingham Forest | |
|---|---|---|
| Squad cost | £479.8m | £259.6m |
| Football revenue the rule counts | £738.2m | £209.2m |
| SCR before player trading | 65.0% | 124.1% |
| Squad cost ratio | 60.7% | 97.4% |
| Effect of player-sale profits | 4.3 percentage points | 26.7 percentage points |
| Green headroom | +£192.4m | −£33.0m |
Arsenal spend 85% more on their squad than Forest, and their ratio is about three fifths of Forest’s. A squad cost ratio is not a spending table and cannot be read as one.
The size of the support differs too. Player trading reduces Forest’s current ratio by 26.7 points and Arsenal’s by 4.3 points.
What happens at this ratio
Nothing. There is no Breach Notification, no Accounts Confirmation Test, no levy and no feedback loop. The club sits 24.3 points inside the green threshold with £192.4m of annual squad cost to spare, and the stress case, the worst case on costs alone, with every uncertain cost input set against the club at once and revenue held at the central estimate, reaches 70.4%.
That headroom is worth stating carefully. It is squad cost as the rule defines it, wages, amortisation, agents and loan fees together, not a transfer budget. A £100m signing on a contract with five years to run is counted at £112m and consumes £22.4m of amortisation a year plus wages, so the headroom is not £192m of transfer spending. On the current projection, Arsenal have £192.4m of annual squad-cost headroom under this rule.
Initial fees and headline fees
Arsenal do not publish most of their fees, so these come from the public season record of the club’s transfers, and they expose a distinction that runs through transfer reporting generally. Several deals are stated as an initial fee, while the widely reported figures include potential add-ons.
| Player | Season record | Reported elsewhere |
|---|---|---|
| Viktor Gyökeres | £55.0m initial | £64m, £69m, €63.5m |
| Eberechi Eze | £60.0m initial | £67.5m |
| Noni Madueke | £48.5m initial | £52m |
| Cristhian Mosquera | £13.0m initial | £17m |
| Martín Zubimendi | £55.8m | £51m, £60m |
Gyökeres alone spans £14m across public sources.
Ezri Konsa shows how the two diverge. The season record gives £51.0m plus £4.0m of add-ons. The widely reported £55m is those two figures added together. The reconstruction starts from the guaranteed fee. Arsenal’s accounts capitalise a contingent payment once it becomes probable, so the base fee may understate the eventual accounting cost.
The reconstruction uses the initial fee wherever one is recorded, and records for each transaction which source it took.
Three things a window count would miss
A disposal the buying club initiated. Karl Hein and Jakub Kiwior went out on loan in 2025/26 with Arsenal retaining both registrations. Werder Bremen exercised their option to buy Hein for £2.6m on 23 May 2026, and Porto exercised theirs on Kiwior, for £14.6m plus add-ons, on 5 May 2026. Both dates fall inside Arsenal’s 2025/26 financial year and we book both disposals there, although exercising an option does not by itself fix when a sale is recognised, and the moves took effect in the summer. If Arsenal’s accounts recognise them later they move to 2026/27, and the three-year average barely changes. In both cases Arsenal recognise a disposal they did not initiate, a year after the loans that led to it.
A sale after the English window closed. Gabriel Martinelli’s £60m move to Al Hilal completed on 3 September 2026, two days after the English window shut and while the Saudi window was still open. It is Arsenal’s largest disposal of the year and falls outside an English-window census. Each association sets its own deadline, and for as long as a counterparty’s window is open an English club can still complete a disposal after its own has closed.
A loan that straddled a window boundary. Harrison Dudziak’s youth loan to Braintree Town was agreed on 21 December 2025 and ran to 21 January 2026. It began outside a window and ended inside one.
The practical consequence is that a list of window announcements is not a complete registration ledger. The calculation still follows six regulatory windows, but the transactions have to be found and dated first.
The squad, checked against the League’s own registers
The reconstruction was checked against the Premier League’s submitted senior and Under-21 squad lists for February 2025, September 2025, February 2026 and September 2026, which record every registered player rather than only the transfers a club announces.
That check classified 119 identities with none unresolved, and nine of them also appear on another club’s returns in this series. Oleksandr Zinchenko is the clearest of those. Nottingham Forest’s ledger has him arriving on loan on 1 September 2025 and recalled on 1 February 2026; Arsenal’s has him going out on loan that summer and sold permanently to Ajax on 1 February. Both sides agree on both dates, from separate sources reconstructed months apart. The Orange Engine sets out the reconciliation in full.
What this doesn’t say
- That Arsenal’s ratio is exactly 60.7%. The published range is 57.5 to 64.7%, conditional on the current 62 to 72% player-share assumption, on how much of their players’ wages the clubs borrowing them pay, which is reported for only one of this season’s loans, and on 2025/26 commercial and gate figures that are not yet filed. The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate the player-share range, because the filing lists 1,462 temporary staff separately from the 871 permanent, and whether their remuneration sits inside the staff-cost line decides what the residual can be tested against.
- That the headroom is a transfer budget. It is annual squad cost as the rule defines it.
- That the position is riskless in a general sense. It is a statement about one rule. The £340.1m owed to the owner’s company sits entirely outside it.
- Anything about the profitability and sustainability rules, which read the same facts differently.
The rule measures a relationship between cost and countable revenue, not an amount of spending. Arsenal and Forest show that plainly: the larger squad cost produces the smaller ratio.
Sources and caveats.
The accounts. Arsenal Holdings Ltd consolidated accounts for the year to 31 May 2025, filed at Companies House. The filed year ends 31 May, so the 2025 and 2026 windows fall wholly or partly outside the last filed accounts and are reconstructed on top of them.
The rules applied. Premier League Handbook 2026/27, Appendix 2, in particular Rules A.1.4, A.1.13, A.1.17, A.1.22, A.1.29 including (a), (b), (d), (e) and (g), A.1.32, A.1.33 and A.1.53.
What is estimated, and why.
- Player wages, about £251m, with the loans out allowed for: the saving counts in the central figure where a named source reports the split of a loanee's wage, and only in the range where nobody states it. Arsenal's accounts do not separate the wages of the players and the head coach. The filed staff cost is £346.8m across 871 permanent staff, of whom 101 are players, with 1,462 temporary staff filed separately. This reconstruction attributes 62 to 72% of it to the squad. The filed headcount cross-check cannot validate that range. The residual test used elsewhere gives about £126k to £171k a head across the 770 permanent non-playing staff, or about £44k to £59k across all 2,232 including temporary staff, and the accounts do not establish whether the temporary staff's remuneration is inside the £346.8m. A previous version of this article stated the range as 72 to 75%, which did not match the figure the reconstruction uses.
- Amortisation is derived from the filed net book value over an estimated remaining life, because Arsenal publish no forward schedule, with the 2025 and 2026 cohorts added on their contract terms, measured from the day of registration to the day the contract ends, at the reported fee plus 12%. For registrations within the scope of Rule A.1.22(c), the five-year cap applies from the relevant signing or, on this model's reading, extension date; a contract executed earlier may be amortised over its full initial term, and is here.
- Commercial income and gate receipts for 2025/26 are estimated because those accounts are not yet filed. The commercial estimate is the £263.2m filed for 2024/25 grown by 8.0%, the rate one published method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season's commercial revenue), which is £284.3m. Merchandise counts at gross profit, so the filed cost of the goods sold, £30.9m, is taken off commercial income. Gate receipts are taken at the filed 2024/25 figure plus 5%, the mix of home matches being unchanged. Seven European home matches are counted under Rule A.1.29(d)(iii): the higher of the four guaranteed this season and the average of the last three seasons in the Champions League, rounded up. Agents' fees are taken from the FA's published figure, with the share treated as an expense estimated. The European figure is the Champions League distribution under Rule A.1.29(e), which counts because Arsenal qualified for the current season as well as earning it in the last.
Transfers and loans.
- Fees are taken at the initial figure wherever one is recorded, from the public season record of the club's transfers, and the source selected is recorded transaction by transaction. Ezri Konsa is the clearest illustration: the record gives £51.0m plus £4.0m of add-ons, and the widely reported £55m is those two added together. The reconstruction starts from the base; Arsenal's accounts capitalise a contingent payment once it becomes probable.
- Karl Hein and Jakub Kiwior left permanently after loan spells at the clubs that bought them. Werder Bremen exercised their option on Hein on 23 May 2026 and Porto theirs on Kiwior on 5 May 2026 (Porto's filing to the Portuguese market regulator), both inside Arsenal's 2025/26 year.
- Gabriel Martinelli's £60m sale to Al Hilal completed on 3 September 2026, after the English window closed and while the Saudi window was open. Harrison Dudziak's youth loan to Braintree Town ran from 21 December 2025 to 21 January 2026, beginning outside a window and ending inside one.
- Disposal profits are calculated from reported fees and reconstructed book values, with a 5% deduction for direct costs applied to gains but not to losses. The book value of players who have left is measured at the filed year end, 31 May 2025. Takehiro Tomiyasu's £19.8m cost is a reported total with no split between fee and add-ons.
Completeness. The playing population was checked against the Premier League's submitted senior and Under-21 squad lists of 7 February 2025, 12 September 2025, 5 February 2026 and 3 September 2026, with 119 identities classified and none unresolved, and nine of them corroborated against other clubs' returns in this series.
Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.
Independent estimate, not an official calculation, and not advice. Figures produced 22 September 2026; updated 25 September, 1 October, 2 October, 3 October, 4 October, 5 October, 7 October, 9 October, 16 October, 23 October, 24 October, 25 October, 26 October, 28 October, 31 October and 1 November 2026.
Corrections and updates (19)
22 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 22 September 2026. The ratio is 58.0% and 61.8% before player trading, from 58.1% and 61.9%, after one transfer fee was taken to its base amount. The wage-share range quoted in the previous version, 72 to 75%, was a misstatement of the figure the reconstruction actually uses, which is 62 to 72%.
25 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Correction, 25 September 2026. Arsenal’s transfer record was rebuilt from the club’s own announcements and the buying clubs’ filings. Two summer 2026 sales named in the sales table had not been counted: Christian Nørgaard’s move to Everton on 5 August and Fábio Vieira’s to Hamburg on 1 September for about £8.6m, so part of their book value was still being spread across this season. Correcting them lowers amortisation from £200.0m to £191.4m and the squad cost from £479.1m to £470.5m. The rebuild also dated each sale from its completion: Karl Hein’s and Jakub Kiwior’s loans were converted when Werder Bremen and Porto exercised their purchase options on 23 and 5 May 2026, inside Arsenal’s financial year to 31 May, so both sales belong to 2025/26; Kiwior’s is taken at the fixed €17m (£14.6m) in Porto’s filing to the Portuguese market regulator. Kieran Tierney, Thomas Partey and Jorginho are treated as contract expiries and a termination rather than transfers, an unrecorded academy sale (Daniel Oyetunde to Fort Wayne) is added at nil, and four fees now follow the evidence, most importantly Nuno Tavares’s, agreed at €9m (£7.6m) when Lazio took him on loan. As a result 2025/26 shows a profit on player sales of £3.9m rather than a loss, and the three-year average rises from about £50.0m to £52.6m. Together these move the ratio from 58.0% to 56.8%, and from 61.8% to 60.6% before player trading. The comparison with Nottingham Forest uses Forest’s corrected figures, and after a further Forest correction later the same day, James McAtee’s fee taken at the £22m guaranteed at signing, it uses £267.7m of squad cost, 99.4% and 125.2% before player trading, so Arsenal’s squad costs 76% more than Forest’s rather than 75%.
26 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded
Update, 26 September 2026. Arsenal’s own figures are unchanged. The Brighton comparison uses Brighton’s corrected figure: player trading is worth 31.0 points there, from 31.4.
1 and 2 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 56.8% → 55.8% · before player sales 60.6% → 59.6%
Corrections, 1 and 2 October 2026. The ratio is 55.8%, from 56.8%, and 59.6% before player trading, from 60.6%. Agents’ fees now use the FA’s published figure for Arsenal, £32.1m rather than an assumed £44m. The book value of the players who have left is now measured at Arsenal’s own year end, 31 May 2025, and five registrations are corrected: Trossard’s cost is £20m, Martinelli’s 2023 extension is included, Vieira’s sale is taken at the £7.7m base, and Tomiyasu’s and Jorginho’s contract terms follow the clubs. 2025/26 is now a £5.0m profit year, and the three-year average of sale profit is £53.1m. The squad cost is £462.2m. Green headroom is £242.3m, the range 53.1% to 58.6% and the stress case 63.9%; without the revenue the rule supplies the ratio would be 81.1%, still 3.9 points inside the threshold. Arsenal’s squad costs 77% more than Nottingham Forest’s. The conclusion does not change.
3 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 55.8% → 56.6% · before player sales 59.6% → 60.5%
Correction, 3 October 2026. The ratio is 56.6%, from 55.8%, and 60.5% before player trading, from 59.6%. Re-estimated, by our method. Last season’s matchday receipts are not yet filed. We had carried £175.0m; the estimate is now £161.5m: the filed 2024/25 figure of £153.9m, the same mix of home matches as the year before, so last year’s filed figure plus 5%. The method, and how far it could be out, is set out in How we estimate matchday revenue. Matchday revenue under the rule is £140.0m, from £151.7m. The earlier figure was ours and had nothing under it. We had raised Arsenal’s receipts by 14% “for a deep European run”. Arsenal played seven European home matches in 2024/25 and seven in 2025/26, and the same number of home matches in all, so there was no run to allow for. Also moved: the range is 53.9 to 59.4%, from 53.1 to 58.6%; green headroom is £232.4m, from £242.3m; and the stress case is 64.8%, from 63.9%. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.
4 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 56.6% → 60.4% · before player sales 60.5% → 64.7%
Correction, 4 October 2026. The ratio is 60.4%, from 56.6%, and 64.7% before player trading, from 60.5%. The squad cost rule defines three things in its own terms, and in each we had used the figure from a club’s accounts (Three definitions in the squad cost rule, and what they change). What a registration costs. The rule counts everything a club pays in connection with a transfer: the fee, the League’s 4% transfer levy and agents’ fees. For players signed since Arsenal’s last accounts we now count the reported fee plus 12%. Squad cost is £470.7m, from £462.2m, and the three-year average of sale profit is £51.2m, from £53.1m, because a player sold now leaves at a higher book value. This is the result of the review of agents’ fees that our earlier notes promised. Merchandise. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, sales less the cost of the goods, where we had counted sales in full. Arsenal’s accounts give the cost of the goods, and we take off £30.9m. Cup prize money. The rule counts a three-year average of what a club received from the FA Cup and the EFL Cup. We had entered £6.0m for Arsenal, a figure with no calculation behind it. Rebuilt from Arsenal’s cup ties in the last three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, it is £0.4m, in a range of £0.4m to £3.2m. The figure is provisional: the EFL publishes no prize money, some broadcast fees are not published, and the top of the range allows for a share of the gate at away ties, which the rule may or may not count. The revenue the rule counts is £727.7m, from £764.1m. Also moved: the range is 57.6 to 63.6%, from 53.9 to 59.4%; green headroom is £191.4m, from £232.4m; the stress case is 69.0%, from 64.8%.
5 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 60.4% → 60.7% · before player sales 64.7% → 65.1%
Correction, 5 October 2026. The ratio is 60.7%, from 60.4%, and 65.1% before player trading, from 64.7%. We now measure each contract from the day the player was registered to the day it ends. A player who signs in August on a five-year deal has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June; we had spread his cost over five full years. 25 of Arsenal’s contract lengths change, 17 of them against an end date we have derived as the 30 June the announced length points to, where no source states the date. The yearly charge for registrations is £202.8m, from £199.6m. The range is 57.9% to 63.9%, from 57.6% to 63.6%. No threshold is crossed. Most clubs move because contract costs are now measured to their actual or derived expiry dates; six also move for club-specific reasons. See the engine changelog.
7 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Update, 7 October 2026. Arsenal’s own figures are unchanged. The Brighton comparison uses Brighton’s corrected figure: player trading is worth 31.1 points there, from 30.9.
7 October 2026 (second) · Regulatory interpretation · SCR 60.7% → 59.5% · before player sales 65.1% → 63.7%
Correction, 7 October 2026, second correction of the day. The ratio is 59.5%, from 60.7%, and 63.7% before player trading, from 65.1%. We had counted four European home matches; the rule counts seven. The rule adds gate income for a club’s European home matches at the higher of two figures: the home matches it is guaranteed this season, and the average it played at home in the same competition over the last three seasons, rounded up. We had applied only the first. Arsenal played 7, 7 and 5 Champions League home matches in the last three seasons, an average of 6.33, which rounds up to 7, where we had 4. The European home gate is £37.7m, from £21.5m: seven matches, where we had four, at last season’s estimated receipts of about £5.4m a home match. The revenue the rule counts is £743.8m, from £727.7m. We read “the relevant UEFA Club Competition” as the one the club is in this season (how we count matchday revenue). The range is 56.7% to 62.6%, from 57.9% to 63.9%. Green headroom is £203.1m, from £189.4m. Neither of the rule’s thresholds, 85% and 115%, is crossed. The Brighton comparison uses Brighton’s figure of the same date: player trading is worth 30.7 points there, from 31.1. See the engine changelog.
9 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 59.5% → 59.9% · before player sales 63.7% → 64.2%
Correction, 9 October 2026. The ratio is 59.9%, from 59.5%, and 64.2% before player trading, from 63.7%. Last season’s commercial revenue is now estimated by one published method, the same for every club. Arsenal’s 2025/26 accounts are not filed, so the figure is an estimate. We had £290.0m, a judgement of ours. It is now £284.3m: the £263.2m filed for 2024/25, grown by 8.0%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). It is drawn between £231.6m and £336.4m, where we had drawn 7% either way: the new span comes from how far forecasts of this kind have missed in past seasons. The range is 56.6% to 63.7%, from 56.7% to 62.6%. The published ratio crosses no threshold. The stress case is now described as what it is: the worst case on costs alone, with revenue held at the central estimate. See the engine changelog.
15 October 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio
Clarification, 15 October 2026. Wording only; no figure changed. The ranges in this article are assumption ranges, the spread of the model’s inputs between assumed bounds, not calibrated or confidence intervals, and the shares of modelled outcomes above or below a threshold quoted in the notes above are withdrawn.
16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · SCR 59.9% → 60.1% · before player sales 64.2% → 64.4%
Updated 16 October 2026: loans out now recorded; wage relief shown in ranges. The ratio is 60.1%, from 59.9%, and 64.4% before player trading, from 64.2%. Arsenal’s players out on loan are now recorded, with an allowance for the part of their wages the borrowing clubs pay. Where a named source reports the split, the saving counts in the central figure: Borussia Dortmund are reported to pay all of Ethan Nwaneri’s wage this season, and Sevilla all of Albert Sambi Lokonga’s in 2024/25, a saving inside the accounts we start from that is added back, because he has since left and was taken out of the wage bill at his full salary. Both reports are relayed and not confirmed by either club. Where nobody states the split, the saving only widens the range. The squad cost is £475.4m, from £473.8m; the range is 57.0% to 64.1%, from 56.6% to 63.7%; green headroom is £196.8m, from £198.3m; the stress case is 69.9%, from 68.4%. The comparison with Nottingham Forest uses Forest’s figures of the same date. See the engine changelog.
23 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 23 October 2026. The comparison with Nottingham Forest still gave Forest’s figures from before Forest’s correction of 23 October, which counted the profit on player sales over the six transfer windows the rule names (Rule A.1.53): Forest’s ratio is 97.6%, not 99.3%; player trading is worth 26.8 points, not 25.1; and Forest’s squad cost is £33.7m more than 85% of its countable revenue plus its three-year average of sale profit, not £37.6m. The wage figure in the text, about £249m, had also not been brought up to the £251m the sources note gives, our current estimate. Arsenal’s ratio, 60.1%, is unchanged. See the engine changelog.
24 October 2026 · Methodology change · no change to the ratio
Correction, 24 October 2026. No figure changed. The section on player trading described the sale-profit average as three financial years. The rule takes the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows and divides it by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). For the March 2027 test that period starts on 2 February 2024. Arsenal made no sale carrying value between then and the start of their 2024/25 year, so the three financial years in the table are the whole of it and the figure is unchanged. The section now says so.
25 October 2026 · Editorial · no figure changed
Correction, 25 October 2026. No figure changed. Two sentences said more than they meant. The section on the accounts said the season the rule now measures was the title; the rule tests 2026/27, and the title was won in 2025/26, whose finish sets this season’s merit payment (Rule A.1.29(a)). And the comparison with Forest said the support from player trading runs in opposite directions; it lowers both clubs’ ratios, by 26.8 points and 4.3 points, so it is the size that differs. Both sentences now say so.
26 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio
Correction, 26 October 2026. Arsenal’s ratio is unchanged at 60.1%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.0%, from 74.9%. Fees paid and received for head coaches now count, at Manchester City, Chelsea, Brentford, Ipswich, Newcastle and Crystal Palace (Rules A.1.22(d) and A.1.29(g)). Arsenal’s own filed loan income, £0.5m for 2024/25 and £1.4m for 2023/24, now sits in the range, which is unchanged at one decimal place.
28 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 60.1% → 60.7% · before player sales 64.4% → 65.0%
Correction, 28 October 2026. The ratio is 60.7%, from 60.1%, and 65.0% before player trading, from 64.4%. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected sixteen entries at eleven clubs where the club’s announcement or a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different fee, contract length or date. Bruno Guimaraes’s contract runs to June 2030, not June 2031. He signed for four years with an option of a fifth, and an option is not part of the contract until it is taken up, so his fee is spread over a shorter contract (Rule A.1.22(c)). The squad cost is £479.8m, from £475.4m, and the headroom £192.4m, from £196.8m. The range is 57.5% to 64.7%, from 57.0% to 64.1%. Nottingham Forest’s figures, quoted for comparison, follow Forest’s correction of today: 97.4%, from 97.6%, on a squad cost of £259.6m, from £260.4m, so Arsenal’s squad costs 85% more, from 83%, in the description and the summary list as in the body.
31 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 31 October 2026. The twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%, because Chelsea’s and Liverpool’s filed sale profit replaces our modelled figures and 19 transfer entries are corrected across the league. Arsenal’s own ratio, 60.7%, is unchanged. Figures that follow from these are restated with them in the text. The correction does not reverse the article’s conclusion.
1 November 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio
Correction, 1 November 2026. Arsenal’s ratio is unchanged at 60.7%. The loss for the year in the accounts table was given as £13.8m; the group’s loss for the year was £1.4m. £13.8m is its profit before tax excluding the impairment. Arsenal sit 24.3 points inside the green threshold, not 24.9, and the 92.7% comparison is 7.7 points above it, not 6.8. Arsenal spend 85% more on their squad than Forest, not 83%. The fee table was headed as Arsenal’s own record. Its figures come from a public season record, not from the club, and the article now says so. The label “revenue added by the rule” and the section heading on revenue the rule supplies are replaced, because Arsenal earned the merit by winning the league, and the article now separates it from the European amounts. The article said Arsenal made no sale carrying value in February to May 2024, which would not rule out a profit; it now says we found no sale with a profit or loss. The sentence that no club discloses its players’ wage bill now speaks only of Arsenal, and the player-share range is no longer described as under review. The article said only the base fee is capitalised until an add-on triggers; Arsenal’s accounts capitalise one once it becomes probable. It called the window the wrong unit; the rule counts windows, and the point is that an announcement list is not a complete ledger. The sources now list Rules A.1.29(g) and A.1.53. A section repeating the article’s points is removed.