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Bournemouth · Financial analysis

Bournemouth's squad cost ratio: the profitable selling has stopped, and the rule has not noticed yet

Bournemouth's squad cost ratio for the 1 March 2027 test is an estimated 85.4%, in an assumption range of 78.3% to 86.9% that spans the 85% green threshold, and 105.0% before profit on player sales. Two large selling years hold it near the line while this season's completed disposals are a net loss of £9.8m. Reconstructed from AFC Bournemouth Limited's accounts and Appendix 2 of the Premier League Handbook.

By Updated · View updates38 min read

Figures as of 31 October 2026, Orange Engine release V2CI · Latest figures · What the engine does not capture

SCR 2026/27·Post-summer projection
Two charts. Left: Bournemouth's squad cost ratio at 137.2% with merit at the fifteenth-place floor and no European money, 105.0% before player trading and 85.4% on the rule's basis, with an assumption range of 78.3% to 86.9% across the 85% green line. Right: profit on player sales of £91.0m in 2024/25, £75.2m in 2025/26 and a £9.8m loss so far in 2026/27, against a three-year average of £52.1m.
Two positive years carry a negative one. Their sales leave the average by window, over the next two tests. Method: player wages are estimated at 78 to 86% of the filed 158,400k staff cost, a range the accounts cannot test, because they do not separate the players' wages. Amortisation is derived from the filed net book value over an estimated remaining life. European revenue is the reference amount required by Rule A.1.29(e), which UEFA does not publish, reconstructed between bounds. Where the club has published an accounting profit on disposal, that figure governs. Range 78.3 to 86.9%. Orange Engine release V2CI. Independent estimate, not official.

Latest change to the figures, 3 November 2026: the ratio is unchanged at 85.4%; the range is 78.2% to 86.8%, from 78.3% to 86.9%, and 105.1% before player trading, from 105.0%, because the dates of four signings and loans now follow the clubs’ own announcements. All 25 correction notes are at the end.

Bournemouth spent two years selling almost every player anyone wanted to buy: Huijsen to Real Madrid, Kerkez to Liverpool, Zabarnyi to Paris Saint-Germain, Ouattara to Brentford, and Semenyo to Manchester City for a club record. This season the selling has turned to losses: we estimate its completed disposals so far at a net loss of £9.8m. The squad cost rule has not noticed yet, because it averages the profit on player sales over three years, and the two good years are still in the average.

Bournemouth 2026/27
Squad cost ratio, 1 March 2027 test 85.4%
SCR before player trading 105.0%
Merit above the floor and European amounts 32.2 percentage points
Effect of player-sale profits 19.6 percentage points
Green headroom −£1.1m
Assumption range 78.3 to 86.9%
Assumption range against 85% spans the line
Stress case (costs only) 97.8%
Completed disposals this season −£9.8m

The squad costs £238.3m against £226.8m of the football revenue the rule counts, which is 105.0% before any player trading.

The rule then adds to the revenue side the profit on player sales over the six most recent transfer windows, divided by three. For Bournemouth that three-year average of profit on player sales, £52.1m a year, is built from £91.0m in 2024/25 and £75.2m in 2025/26, and it is worth 19.6 percentage points. That brings the central estimate to 85.4%, 0.4 percentage points above the 85% line. In money, squad cost is about £1.1m more than 85% of the revenue the rule counts: that gap is the green headroom in the table, negative because the club is over.

The assumption range is 78.3 to 86.9%, which spans the 85% line, so the estimate cannot say which side of it Bournemouth are on. The range carries the uncertainty of the inputs that are estimated: the squad’s share of the wage bill, last season’s commercial revenue (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue), the European reference amount and cup income. Most of it lies below the central figure, because the squad’s share of wages could be lower than the central value and hardly higher.

The sales behind it leave the calculation over the next two tests: some at the March 2028 test, and the rest, including the June 2025 sales of Huijsen and Kerkez and 2025/26’s selling before February 2026, at the March 2029 test. The sales of February to June 2026, a loss of about £8.4m, leave at the March 2030 test. Holding the present cost base and revenue constant, with no new selling, the figure at the March 2028 test is 88.1%, above the line.

Taken together, the twenty clubs of this season’s Premier League come to 75.3% on the same basis; Bournemouth’s 85.4% is above that. The full table for every club in the series is at Premier League SCR 2026/27.

What the accounts say

AFC Bournemouth Limited files to 30 June. For the year to 30 June 2025:

2024/25, £m 2023/24, £m
Turnover 181.7 160.8
Wages and salaries 139.5 119.7
Total staff costs, including social security and pension 158.4 not disclosed
Profit on disposal of registrations 91.0 0.3

Wages and salaries rose £19.8m in the year, to 77% of turnover. Adding employer social security of £18.4m and pension costs takes the total staff bill to £158.4m, which is 87% of turnover before any amortisation. That is the fact underneath a ratio of 105.0% before player trading, and the 2026 windows added more cost than they removed.

The £91.0m of disposal profit was recognised within the year to 30 June 2025. It includes Solanke’s sale to Tottenham in August 2024, and Huijsen to Real Madrid on 1 June and Kerkez to Liverpool on 26 June, both completed days before the year end.

The same accounts give a second profit figure, for a later period. Note 35, which records events after the year end, gives the profit on registrations sold between 30 June and 5 December 2025, the day the board approved the accounts: £39.6m on £102.1m of initial fees. It does not name them; our ledger has nine sales in that period, which we take to be the same set. The two figures do not overlap, and each is used here for its own period.

Rebuilding the ratio, before any selling

Wages, about £134m. The rule counts contract players and the head coach. The filed staff cost is £158.4m and the accounts do not isolate the playing squad, so the share attributable to it is estimated at 78 to 86%, with a share as low as 70% not excluded by the accounts, and carried forward through the windows that have closed since. This is the largest single uncertainty in the reconstruction, and the largest source of uncertainty in the range.

Amortisation, £86.8m. A signing’s cost is spread evenly over the contract, so a £60m signing on a five-year contract is charged £12m a year; for contracts signed or extended on or after 12 December 2023 the spreading is capped at five years. The figure is derived from the filed net book value over an estimated remaining life, then rolled through the summer 2025, January 2026 and summer 2026 windows, with each signing since the accounts counted at its reported fee plus 12% for the League’s transfer levy, agents’ fees and other direct costs, spread over its contract as measured from the day of registration to the day the contract ends, and including Álex Jiménez’s registration, whose loan converted to a permanent transfer in February 2026.

Agents’ fees, about £14.1m, expensed, from the FA’s published figure of £20.9m for February 2025 to February 2026.

Loans, £3.0m net. Michele Di Gregorio arrived from Juventus on a season-long loan with Bournemouth covering his wages in full, which is about £3.6m of squad cost for a registration the club does not own, and the loan fee of about £1.1m is squad cost in the year it arises rather than spread. Running the other way, Fiorentina are reported to pay Bournemouth a loan fee of £1.7m for Álex Jiménez. The guidance to Rule A.1.29(g) sets a loan fee received against the loaned player’s own costs, his wages first and then his amortisation, so it reduces squad cost by £1.7m. Four players are out on loan, and the borrowing clubs may also pay part of their wages. Nobody has said how much, so that possible saving widens the assumption range and does not move the central figure.

Revenue the rule counts, £226.8m.

Revenue for the test Basis £m
Central distribution equal share plus merit at the best of three bases 156.4
Facility fees televised appearances 14.2
Commercial estimated 2025/26 income, not yet filed: the £20.0m filed for 2024/25 grown by 19.3%, with shop sales counted at gross profit 22.6
Gate estimated 2025/26 ticket and hospitality receipts per home match, over the 26 home matches the rule counts 15.3
European prize money Europa League reference amount 17.0
Domestic cups and academy grant 1.2
Total 226.8

Components are rounded and therefore do not sum exactly to the total.

What counts as gate receipts. Bournemouth’s accounts print matchday income in four lines. Two of them are gate receipts as the rule defines them: ticket income of £6.7m and “hospitality and events” of £4.7m, a line the accounts do not split, £11.4m together in 2024/25. Shop sales of £1.9m are counted as commercial revenue instead, at gross profit: the accounts give the cost of the goods, and £1.2m is taken off. Other income of £2.3m is not gate receipts as the rule defines them. On ticket income alone the ratio would be 87.4%, above the line.

The squad therefore costs £238.3m against £226.8m of revenue, which is 105.0% before any player trading. The squad costs more than the revenue the rule counts.

How much of the revenue rests on the rule’s own bases

Three parts of the calculation come from bases and reference amounts the rule sets, which need not equal what Bournemouth receive this season.

Set by the rule’s bases £m
Merit payment above the fifteenth-place floor 33.8
European distribution under A.1.29(e) 17.0
European home gate 2.4
Total 53.2

These are not the same kind of money. Bournemouth earned the merit by finishing sixth, £33.8m more than the fifteenth-place floor would pay. The European amounts are reference figures the rule requires, which may not match what the club receives. Measured at the floor and with no European money, the same cost base would produce 137.2% instead of 105.0%, which is 32.2 percentage points.

The merit payment and the European money run on different clocks. The merit payment is taken at the best of last season’s finish, the three-year mean and the fifteenth-place floor, so it rests on past finishes and steps down as good seasons roll through the calculation. The European distribution is a reference amount for this season’s competition rather than what the club will actually receive, and it disappears if the club is not in Europe. Neither should be read as permanent.

What player trading does to it

The rule adds profit on player sales to the revenue side of the ratio: the profit or loss on sales in the six most recent transfer windows, divided by three (Rules A.1.13 and A.1.53). It counts windows, not financial years. For the March 2027 test the period runs from February 2024 to the close of the January 2027 window, with the two summer 2025 windows counted as one. That takes in any sales between February and June 2024 as well. We went through those months from club announcements and transfer records and found no sale with a known profit or loss; one academy sale, Wadham’s, has no published fee. So the table counts by financial year.

Financial year Profit or loss, £m What produced it
2024/25 91.0 filed. Solanke to Tottenham in August 2024, and Huijsen to Real Madrid and Kerkez to Liverpool, days before the year end
2025/26 75.2 £39.6m disclosed in note 35, plus Semenyo after that cut-off, net of the £10.7m owed to Bristol City, less the loss on Sinisterra
2026/27 to date −9.8 Ünal and Traoré, against an academy goalkeeper
Three-year average 52.1 the figure the rule counts

£238.3m divided by £226.8m plus £52.1m gives 85.4%.

Part of Semenyo’s profit is not Bournemouth’s to keep. When they signed him from Bristol City in January 2023, Bristol City kept a clause entitling them to 20% of any future profit on him. Measured against the £9m base fee Bournemouth paid, their share of the £62.5m sale is £10.7m, and the 2025/26 row is counted after it.

Read the middle column downward. Two large years, then a negative one. The rule averages them into 19.6 percentage points of support, and all of the positive contribution comes from the two prior seasons while the current year is already pulling the average down.

The two selling years do not leave together. Each test counts the six most recent windows, so a sale leaves by window, not by financial year. At the 1 March 2028 test the period starts in February 2025: the summer 2024 and January 2025 windows leave, Solanke’s sale among them, but Huijsen, Kerkez and Anthony, sold in May and June 2025, stay. At the 1 March 2029 test the summer 2025 window and January 2026 leave together, and with them Huijsen, Kerkez, Anthony, Zabarnyi, Ouattara and Semenyo.

That is what the figure of 88.1% for the March 2028 test represents: the same cost base, the same revenue, no new selling, and Solanke’s window leaving the average. The accounts do not split the £91.0m by window, so the sales of May and June 2025 are rebuilt one by one, from their reported fees and what remained of each registration’s cost, less the shares of the gain reported as owed to Juventus on Huijsen and to AZ on Kerkez: about £65.7m of profit, against the £91.0m filed for the whole year. Revenue is held at this season’s figures; next season’s commercial revenue is not forecast here.

Why this season’s disposals are loss-making

The completed departures are not distress sales. Ünal and Traoré both had contracts to 2028, and the club moved them on early, at a price below what remained on the books.

Marcos Senesi also left for nothing, but not this season. His contract expired on 30 June 2026, the last day of 2025/26, and he joined Tottenham the next day. Measured from the day he was registered to the day it ended, his contract had run its full course, so nothing remained on the books and there is no write-off in either year.

None of those is a failure of judgement. What they show is that the players Bournemouth had left to sell were not the ones the market pays for. Huijsen, Kerkez, Zabarnyi, Ouattara and Semenyo went in the two preceding windows, and this season’s departures are what remained.

Why the transfer headlines always overstated this

A club that sold heavily did not look like it in the accounts, and the reason matters for reading the table above. The club’s note 35 shows how far apart the two can be.

The nine disposals in our ledger for that period £m
Reported transfer fees 105.1
Total initial consideration, per note 35 102.1
Accounting profit on disposal, per note 35 39.6
What a straight-line reconstruction would have implied 71.6

Three things sit between the top line and the third.

The last row is the uncomfortable one, and it is about this reconstruction rather than about Bournemouth. A straight-line calculation of those same nine disposals, each fee less the registration’s remaining book value and a 5% allowance for direct costs, implies £71.6m of profit, nearly twice what the club actually recognised. Our figure already deducts book value and that allowance, so the £32.0m means one of two things: the nine are not exactly the sales note 35 covers, or the club’s book values, costs, sell-ons and discounting came to more than ours. The accounts give no breakdown, so we cannot say which. Where the club has published an accounting profit, that figure governs and the reconstruction is set aside for the period it covers. It cannot be set aside everywhere: the same method still produces Semenyo’s profit and the rebuild of the May and June 2025 sales, so those figures may run high too.

The June sales are not part of any of this. Huijsen and Kerkez completed before the year end and sit inside the filed £91.0m. The summer window straddles the accounting year end, so the summer 2025 window and the population note 35 covers are not the same set of players.

A club in the same position, and where they differ

Bournemouth Brighton
Squad cost ratio 85.4% 79.1%
SCR before player trading 105.0% 109.5%
Merit above the floor and European amounts 32.2 percentage points 22.7 percentage points
Effect of player-sale profits 19.6 percentage points 30.4 percentage points
Completed disposals this season −£9.8m +£78.0m

Both clubs spend more than the revenue the rule counts, and at both it is selling that brings the ratio down: Brighton’s to well inside the line, Bournemouth’s to a central estimate 0.4 percentage points above it, in an assumption range of 78.3 to 86.9% that spans the line. The last row is the difference: Brighton’s selling programme is continuous, while Bournemouth’s has just produced its first loss-making season. The rule does not distinguish those two states, because it blends each with the preceding two years. Both the surge and the loss enter the calculation as one third of a three-year average.

The other difference is where the help comes from. Bournemouth lean more on a sixth-place finish and a first European qualification, and both of those have to be earned again.

What this doesn’t say

The registration book is being written down at £87m a year while this season’s sales produce losses. In the last filed year that comparison ran the other way, with £91.0m of disposal profit against a smaller charge. The reversal took a single season, and the rule’s average will take until 2029 to show all of it.

Sources and caveats.

The accounts. AFC Bournemouth Limited accounts for the years to 30 June 2022 to 30 June 2025, filed at Companies House, in particular the FY25 disposal figure of 91,017k and note 35, a subsequent-events disclosure recording 39,611k of profit on registrations disposed between 30 June 2025 and the board's approval date of 5 December 2025, on total initial consideration of 102,115k. The note gives no names or number of players. The filed year ends 30 June, so the 2025 and 2026 windows fall wholly or partly outside the last filed accounts and are reconstructed on top of them.

The rules applied. Premier League Handbook 2026/27, Appendix 2, in particular Rules A.1.4, A.1.13, A.1.17, A.1.22, A.1.29 including (d)(iii), (e) and (g), A.1.32, A.1.33, A.1.39 and A.1.53.

What is estimated, and why.

  • Player wages, about £134m. Bournemouth's accounts do not separate the wages of the players and the head coach. The filed staff cost is £158.4m and the squad's share is estimated at 78 to 86%, with a share as low as 70% not excluded, carried forward through the windows closed since the accounts date. It is the largest source of uncertainty in the range.
  • The Europa League reference amount required by Rule A.1.29(e) is not published by UEFA and is reconstructed from the competition's distribution structure between bounds. Bournemouth entered the Europa League at the league phase, with four home matches guaranteed, so neither the European revenue nor the home gate depends on a qualifying round.
  • Commercial income and gate receipts for 2025/26 are estimated, because those accounts are not yet filed. Commercial income is the £20.0m filed for 2024/25 grown by 19.3%, the rate one published method, the same for every club, gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season's commercial revenue): £23.8m, drawn between £14.0m and £37.7m. Merchandise is counted at gross profit: the accounts give the cost of the goods sold in the shop, and £1.2m is taken off. Gate receipts are ticket income and the "hospitality and events" line, £11.4m in the filed year; shop sales and other income are not gate receipts as the rule defines them. Agents' fees are taken from the FA's published figure, with the share treated as an expense estimated. Amortisation is derived from filed net book value over an estimated remaining life, because the club publishes no forward schedule, and is capped at five years for contracts signed or extended on or after 12 December 2023 (Rule A.1.22(c)).

Transfers and loans.

  • Fees are taken at the reported base where a base and add-ons are separately reported. Five fees were corrected to their base amounts on 20 September 2026, which moved the ratio from 81.8% to 80.5%.
  • Where the club has published an accounting profit, it governs. Note 35 replaces the reconstruction for the disposals it covers, and not for the whole window, since Huijsen and Kerkez completed in June and fall inside the filed FY25 figure. Disposals after the 5 December cut-off are modelled separately.
  • A registration acquired since the last accounts is counted at the reported fee plus 12%, for the League's 4% transfer levy, agents' fees and other direct costs (range 6% to 20%), and a player's book value at sale is counted on the same basis.
  • Disposal profits and losses are calculated from reported fees and reconstructed book values, with a 5% deduction for direct costs applied to gains but not to losses, and less any share owed to a former club: Bristol City are owed 20% of the profit on Antoine Semenyo over his £9m base fee, £10.7m.
  • Michele Di Gregorio is carried as a loan, with his remuneration in squad cost and no registration capitalised. Juventus published the terms: a €1.3m loan fee rising by up to €0.8m on sporting objectives, and an option to buy at €12.7m rather than an obligation, so nothing is capitalised unless it is exercised.
  • The 2026/27 disposal result is reconstructed through the completed summer 2026 window. January 2027 can still change it before the March test.

Completeness. The playing population was checked against the Premier League's submitted senior and Under-21 squad lists, with 120 identities classified and none unresolved, and all three windows since the accounts date were rebuilt against the club's own published announcements. An earlier version of this article was published before that reconciliation and carried a higher figure.

Methodology. The Orange Engine sets out the population checks, transaction reconciliation, uncertainty ranges and cross-club controls behind these estimates.

Independent estimate, not an official calculation, and not advice. Figures produced 21 September 2026; updated 26 September, 1 October, 2 October, 3 October, 4 October, 5 October, 7 October, 9 October, 16 October, 22 October, 25 October, 26 October, 28 October, 31 October and 1 November 2026.

Corrections and updates (24)

21 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded

Correction, 21 September 2026. The ratio is 80.5%, revised from 81.8%, and 100.2% before player trading, from 101.9%, after five transfer fees were taken to their base amounts. The probability estimate above the threshold falls from 11% to 3.9%, and the range no longer reaches the green line. The population has since been reconciled against the Premier League’s own squad returns, so the figures are no longer marked pending. The article’s argument is unchanged.

23 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded

Correction, 23 September 2026. Two corrections to Antoine Semenyo’s record, both from AFC Bournemouth’s own announcements. His sale to Manchester City is taken at £64.0m on 9 January 2026; the ledger had carried £62.5m and 30 January. And both of his contract extensions, of 8 July 2024 and 1 July 2025, are applied in date order, which raises his carrying value at the sale and so lowers the profit on it. Together they take the three-year average of sale profit to £57.0m, from £56.8m, and before player trading to 100.2%, from 100.3%; next season’s figure falls to 86.9%. The ratio is 80.5% and the argument is unchanged.

24 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded

Correction, 24 September 2026. The range, green headroom and stress case are now 77.3% to 83.7%, £13.0m and 91.1%; they were not updated with the Semenyo corrections of 23 September. The comparison with Brighton uses Brighton’s corrected figures. The headline 80.5% and 100.2% before player trading are unchanged.

25 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded

Correction, 25 September 2026. The ratio is 80.6%, from 80.5%, and 100.2% before player trading is unchanged. Bournemouth’s departure record was rebuilt from the club’s own announcements. Marcos Senesi left when his contract expired on 30 June 2026, the last day of 2025/26, so the write-off of his remaining book value belongs to that year rather than this one. Hamed Traoré’s move to Marseille was a season-long loan in 2025/26 that became permanent on 2 July 2026, at £6.4m. Nine sale dates were replaced with the club’s completion dates and six academy departures were added, none of them priced. And Antoine Semenyo’s sale to Manchester City is taken at the £62.5m guaranteed fee, not £64.0m: the deal carries a further £1.5m of performance-related add-ons, and add-ons are counted only once they are earned. The correction of 23 September attributed £64.0m to Bournemouth’s own announcement, but that announcement gives no figure, only a club record; £64.0m is the reported total including the add-ons. 2025/26 disposal profit is now £84.2m and this season’s loss £5.2m. The three-year average is £56.7m, green headroom £12.7m, the range 77.4% to 83.8%, the stress case 91.2%, 4.2% of modelled outcomes land above 85%, and next season’s figure is 87.1%. The table of the years behind the average also now shows the figures it is built from; it had still carried those from before the Semenyo corrections of 23 September. Separately, Brighton’s transfer record was rebuilt from the club’s own announcements, and the comparison below uses its corrected 77.8% and 31.4 points. Brighton’s completed disposals this season fall from £137.4m to £85.2m because Jan Paul van Hecke’s £52m sale to Tottenham completed on 18 June 2026, inside Brighton’s previous financial year.

26 September 2026 · Data correction · figures not recorded

Correction, 26 September 2026. The ratio is 80.8%, from 80.6%, and 100.5% before player trading, from 100.2%. Veljko Milosavljević’s fee from Red Star is taken at the reported €15m, £13.0m, rather than a £10m placeholder, and he is dated from his transfer on 1 September 2025. Amortisation is £86.8m, green headroom £12.1m, the range 77.6% to 84.1%, 5.0% of modelled outcomes land above 85%, the stress case is 91.4%, and next season’s figure is 87.3%. The comparison with Brighton uses Brighton’s corrected figures: 76.9%, 107.9% before player trading, 21.5 points added by the rule and 31.0 points from player sales.

1 and 2 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 80.8% → 83.0% · before player sales 100.5% → 101.9%

Corrections, 1 and 2 October 2026. The ratio is 83.0%, from 80.8%, and 101.9% before player trading, from 100.5%. Agents’ fees now use the FA’s published figure for Bournemouth, £20.9m rather than an assumed £15.0m. Milos Kerkez’s book value had been removed from the pool written down this season although he left before the year end, which understated amortisation. Bristol City’s 20% sell-on on Antoine Semenyo, £10.7m, is now deducted, and the costs, terms and dates of Zabarnyi, Ünal, Senesi, Doak, Billing and Ouattara follow the clubs and contemporaneous reports; Ouattara’s sale is taken at the £37m base fee. The squad cost is £237.7m and the three-year average of sale profit £53.2m, with this season’s disposals a net loss of £8.2m. Green headroom is £5.8m, the range 79.6% to 86.3% and the stress case 94.1%, and about 22% of modelled outcomes land above 85%, up from 5%. Next season’s figure, with the oldest selling year leaving the average and nothing replacing it, is 92.8%, not about 89% as first given. The conclusion does not change: the central estimate is inside the line, the top of the range crosses it, and next season’s figure is above it.

3 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 83.0% → 82.8% · before player sales 101.9% → 101.6%

Correction, 3 October 2026. The ratio is 82.8%, from 83.0%, and 101.6% before player trading, from 101.9%. Counted, from archived match reports. The rule counts the average number of home FA Cup and League Cup matches over the last three seasons, rounded up. Bournemouth played eight (four, three and one), so the rule counts three, where we had assumed two. The rule divides last season’s receipts by last season’s home matches. Bournemouth played 20 (19 league and one cup), where we had assumed 21. Re-estimated, by our method. Last season’s matchday receipts are not yet filed. We had carried £17.0m; the estimate is now £16.1m: the filed 2024/25 figure of £15.6m, scaled for the change in home matches (cup ties from 3 to 1), with a cup tie counted as 0.15 of a league match and a European match as 0.25, plus 5% for the year. The method, and how far it could be out, is set out in How we estimate matchday revenue. Matchday revenue under the rule is £21.0m, from £20.2m. The chance that Bournemouth’s ratio is above 85% is about 20%, from about 22%. Also moved: the range is 79.4 to 86.1%, from 79.6 to 86.3%; green headroom is £6.4m, from £5.8m; and the stress case is 93.8%, from 94.1%. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.

3 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · SCR 82.8% → 81.7% · before player sales 101.6% → 100.3%

Correction, 3 October 2026 (second of the day). The ratio is 81.7%, not the 82.8% we published earlier today, and 100.3% before player trading, not 101.6%. We had charged one signing twice. Adrien Truffert signed on 16 June 2025, two weeks before Bournemouth’s financial year ended on 30 June, so his cost is already inside the book value in the accounts this reconstruction starts from. We had dated him to 10 July, a date with no source, and charged him again as a signing made after the year end. The club’s accounts are consistent with the correction: they give £115.9m for registrations acquired after 30 June 2025, which fits the five other summer signings and not six. Charged once, the squad costs £234.8m, from £237.7m. Also moved: the range is 78.4 to 85.1%, from 79.4 to 86.1%; green headroom is £9.4m, from £6.4m; the stress case is 92.6%, from 93.8%; and the chance that the ratio is above 85% is about 10%, from about 20%. This figure may move again. Bournemouth’s accounts split matchday income into four lines and we had added all four together; two of them, shop sales and other income, are not gate receipts as the rule defines them. We are setting one definition of gate receipts for all 20 clubs, and at Bournemouth it would raise the ratio. A separate review of agents’ fees on signings since the last accounts is under way and may raise this figure; we will report its result.

4 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 81.7% → 85.2% · before player sales 100.3% → 104.7%

Correction, 4 October 2026. The ratio is 85.2%, from 81.7%, and 104.7% before player trading, from 100.3%. The squad cost rule defines three things in its own terms, and in each we had used the figure from a club’s accounts (Three definitions in the squad cost rule, and what they change). What a registration costs. The rule counts everything a club pays in connection with a transfer: the fee, the League’s 4% transfer levy and agents’ fees. For players signed since Bournemouth’s last accounts we now count the reported fee plus 12%. Squad cost is £237.6m, from £234.8m, and the three-year average of sale profit is £51.9m, from £53.2m, because a player sold now leaves at a higher book value. This is the result of the review of agents’ fees that our earlier notes promised. Merchandise. The rule counts merchandise at gross profit, sales less the cost of the goods, where we had counted sales in full. Bournemouth’s accounts give the cost of the goods, and we take off £1.2m. Gate receipts. Bournemouth’s accounts print four lines and we had added all four together. Two of them, shop sales and other income, are not gate receipts as the rule defines them. The base is now ticket income of £6.7m and the “hospitality and events” line of £4.7m, which the accounts do not split: £11.4m, where we had £15.6m. Matchday revenue under the rule is £15.3m, from £21.0m. On ticket income alone the ratio would be 87.2%. Cup prize money. The rule counts a three-year average of what a club received from the FA Cup and the EFL Cup. We had entered £2.5m for Bournemouth, a figure with no calculation behind it. Rebuilt from Bournemouth’s cup ties in the last three seasons and the FA’s published prize fund and broadcast fees, it is £0.3m, in a range of £0.3m to £1.4m. The figure is provisional: the EFL publishes no prize money, some broadcast fees are not published, and the top of the range allows for a share of the gate at away ties, which the rule may or may not count. The revenue the rule counts is £226.9m, from £234.0m. Also moved: the range is 79.8 to 87.4%, from 78.4 to 85.1%; squad cost is £0.6m more than 85% of the revenue the rule counts, where it was £9.4m less; the stress case is 96.3%, from 92.6%; the chance that the ratio is above 85% is about 34%, from about 10%. On the line. The central figure is 85.2%, 0.2 points above the 85% threshold; the range is 79.8 to 87.4%, and about 34% of the modelled outcomes are above 85%. The estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line Bournemouth are on. The range now carries the uncertainty of three inputs we had entered without a calculation, as well as the cup figure: the share of the wage bill that is the squad, last season’s commercial revenue and the European reference amount. Most of the range lies below the central figure because the squad’s share of wages could be lower than we take it to be and hardly higher. If a club’s share of the gate at away cup ties counts as cup income, and is at its upper bound, the central figure is 84.9%. Three bands for the squad’s share of the wage bill need telling apart. 76 to 84% was printed in this article in error. 78 to 86% is what the model used, and its midpoint, 82%, is still the central value. 70 to 86% is the new range of uncertainty, deliberately widened, because the accounts do not exclude a share as low as 70%.

5 October 2026 · Methodology change · SCR 85.2% → 85.5% · before player sales 104.7% → 105.2%

Correction, 5 October 2026. The ratio is 85.5%, from 85.2%, and 105.2% before player trading, from 104.7%. We now measure each contract from the day the player was registered to the day it ends. A player who signs in August on a five-year deal has a contract of four years and ten months, because contracts end on 30 June; we had spread his cost over five full years. 22 of Bournemouth’s contract lengths change, 16 of them against an end date we have derived as the 30 June the announced length points to, where no source states the date. The yearly charge for registrations is £87.1m, from £86.1m. The range is 80.1% to 87.7%, from 79.8% to 87.4%. About 38% of our modelled outcomes are above the 85% line, from 34%; the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line the club is on. No threshold is crossed. Most clubs move because contract costs are now measured to their actual or derived expiry dates; six also move for club-specific reasons. See the engine changelog.

7 October 2026 · New evidence · no change to the ratio

Update, 7 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 85.5%, in a range of 80.1% to 87.7%. About 37% of our modelled outcomes are above the 85% line, from 38%; the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line the club is on. Two signing dates now follow the announcements of the day (Djordje Petrovic, 16 July 2025; Amine Adli, 21 August 2025). See the engine changelog.

7 October 2026 (second) · Data correction · no change to the ratio

Update, 7 October 2026, second correction of the day. Bournemouth’s own figures are unchanged. The comparison with Brighton uses Brighton’s corrected figures: its ratio is 79.5%, from 79.9%, and 110.2% before player trading, from 110.9%; the revenue the rule adds is worth 23.1 points to Brighton, from 22.4, and player trading 30.7 points, from 31.1.

9 October 2026 · Methodology change · no change to the ratio

Correction, 9 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 85.5%, and 105.2% before player trading, unchanged. Last season’s commercial revenue is now estimated by one published method, the same for every club. Bournemouth’s 2025/26 accounts are not filed, so the figure is an estimate. We had £23.9m, a judgement of ours. It is now £23.8m: the £20.0m filed for 2024/25, grown by 19.3%, the rate the method gives a commercial income of that size (how we estimate last season’s commercial revenue). It is drawn between £14.0m and £37.7m, where we had £20.0m to £28.9m: the new span comes from how far forecasts of this kind have missed in past seasons. The range is 79.5% to 87.8%, from 80.1% to 87.7%. About 35% of our modelled outcomes are above the 85% line, from 37%: the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line Bournemouth are on. The published ratio crosses no threshold. This article said the Europa League reference amount was the second largest source of modelled variance; it now says that last season’s commercial and gate revenue, which are not yet filed, are the second largest, about a fifth of the variance against about three-fifths for the wage estimate. The comparison with Brighton uses Brighton’s figures of this update. The stress case is now described as what it is: the worst case on costs alone, with revenue held at the central estimate. The table of later tests holds this season’s revenue fixed and does not forecast next season’s commercial revenue; it is now labelled so. See the engine changelog.

15 October 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio

Clarification, 15 October 2026. Wording only; no figure changed. The ranges in this article are assumption ranges, the spread of the model’s inputs between assumed bounds, not calibrated or confidence intervals, and the shares of modelled outcomes above or below a threshold quoted in the notes above are withdrawn.

16 October 2026 · Assumption revision · no change to the ratio

Updated 16 October 2026: loans out now recorded; wage relief shown in ranges. The central figure is unchanged at 85.5%. Bournemouth’s players out on loan are now recorded. Nobody has said how much of their wages the borrowing clubs pay, so the possible saving widens the assumption range rather than moving the central figure: the range is 79.0% to 87.6%, from 79.5% to 87.8%, and still spans 85%, so the estimate does not reliably tell which side of the line Bournemouth are on. The stress case, the worst case on costs alone, is 97.9%, from 96.6%. See the engine changelog.

22 October 2026 · Methodology change · ratio unchanged; March 2028 figure 96.0% → 88.2%

Correction, 22 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 85.5%, and 105.2% before player trading. The figure for the March 2028 test is 88.2%, not 96.0%. The rule averages the profit on sales in the six most recent transfer windows (Rule A.1.53), not in financial years. The figure had taken the whole of 2024/25’s £91.0m out of the average at the March 2028 test, but the period for that test starts in February 2025, so the June 2025 sales of Huijsen, Kerkez and Anthony stay in it for one more test. The accounts do not split the £91.0m by window, so those three sales are rebuilt one by one from their reported fees and remaining costs, less the shares of the gain reported as owed to Juventus and AZ: about £65.7m of profit. Costs and revenue are held at this season’s figures, with no new selling. The current test is not materially affected: its period also takes in February to June 2024, and the filed profit for the whole of 2023/24 was £0.3m.

  • Solanke: the £91.0m also includes Dominic Solanke’s sale to Tottenham in August 2024, which the article had left out.
  • Loans: the £1.7m that reduces the loan line is the loan fee Fiorentina are reported to pay for Álex Jiménez, set against his own costs under the guidance to Rule A.1.29(g). The article had described it as wage contributions from six loanees. Four players are out on loan, and what their borrowers pay towards wages still only widens the range.
  • Ünal: neither club published the terms of his move to Getafe. The article now says no upfront fee was reported, and that any bonus or sell-on would count only when earned.
  • The twenty clubs together come to 74.9%, from 75.6%, with the same correction at other clubs.
  • Editorial: the title says the profitable selling has stopped. The revenue set by the rule’s bases is no longer described as revenue Bournemouth did not earn. The closing summary list, which repeated the figures above it, is removed, and the description and image descriptions are shortened.
23 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio

Correction, 23 October 2026. Bournemouth’s squad cost is £1.4m more than 85% of the revenue the rule counts plus the three-year average of sale profit, where the article said £1.5m in two places: the figure had not been brought up to date when an earlier correction moved it. The ratio, 85.5%, and everything else are unchanged. See the engine changelog.

24 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio

Correction, 24 October 2026. Squad cost is about £1.4m a year more than 85% of the revenue the rule counts, from £1.5m, in the list of what the estimate does not say. The note of 23 October said £1.5m had been corrected in two places; it was in three, and this is the third. The ratio, 85.5%, is unchanged. Separately, the article said all of 2025/26’s selling leaves the average at the March 2029 test. The rule averages the sales of the six most recent transfer windows (Rule A.1.53), so the sales of February to June 2026, a loss of about £8.4m, stay in for that test and leave at the March 2030 test. The sentence now says so; the article prints no figure for either test.

25 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio

Correction, 25 October 2026. No figure changed. The sources said amortisation is capped at five years under Rule A.1.22(c) without the cut-off: the cap applies to contracts signed or extended on or after 12 December 2023, and earlier contracts run their full term. The sentence now says so, as the body has since 25 October.

26 October 2026 · Regulatory interpretation · no change to the ratio

Correction, 26 October 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 85.5%. Bournemouth’s loan income is now in the range. Fees a club receives for lending players count with the profit on player sales (the guidance to Rule A.1.29(g)). The filed accounts give a total for loan income without saying how much is fee and how much is wages recharged, so the central figure counts none of it and the range allows anything from none to all of it; only income from 2 February 2024 counts (Rule A.1.53), and 2025/26’s waits for the accounts. Bournemouth filed £15.2m for 2024/25 and £8.3m for 2023/24. The range is 78.4% to 87.0%, from 79.0% to 87.6%. Elsewhere in the article, the twenty clubs together come to 75.0%, from 74.9%. Fees paid and received for head coaches now count, at Manchester City, Chelsea, Brentford, Ipswich, Newcastle and Crystal Palace (Rules A.1.22(d) and A.1.29(g)).

28 October 2026 · Data correction · SCR 85.5% → 85.4% · before player sales 105.2% → 105.0%

Correction, 28 October 2026. The ratio is 85.4%, from 85.5%, and 105.0% before player trading, from 105.2%: 0.4 percentage points above the 85% line, from 0.5. We checked every transfer in our records against published sources and corrected sixteen entries at eleven clubs where the club’s announcement or a reputable report, read on the page, gives a different fee, contract length or date. Alex Toth signed for five and a half years, to June 2031, not June 2030. His fee is spread over the longer contract (Rule A.1.22(c)). Amortisation is £86.8m, from £87.1m, and the squad cost £238.3m, from £238.6m, £1.1m over the line, from £1.4m. The range is 78.3% to 86.9%, from 78.4% to 87.0%; without the revenue the rule adds the ratio is 137.2%, from 137.4%; the stress case 97.8%, from 97.9%. The March 2028 test is 88.1%, from 88.2%. Bournemouth’s Amine Adli fee is a headline: if only the reported €21m is guaranteed, the ratio would be 84.8% (the engine’s known limits now say so).

31 October 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio

Correction, 31 October 2026. The twenty clubs together come to 75.3%, from 75.1%, because Chelsea’s and Liverpool’s filed sale profit replaces our modelled figures and 19 transfer entries are corrected across the league. Bournemouth’s own ratio, 85.4%, is unchanged. Figures that follow from these are restated with them in the text. The correction does not reverse the article’s conclusion.

1 November 2026 · Editorial · no change to the ratio

Correction, 1 November 2026. Bournemouth’s ratio is unchanged at 85.4%. The opening gave the March 2028 test as 88.2%; it is 88.1%, as the rest of the article said. The gap to the line is 0.4 points, where two passages said 0.5. The article said the club itself discloses nine sales; note 35 gives no names or number, and nine is the count in our ledger. It said the three mechanisms answered the difference between fees and profit; £32.0m between our reconstruction and the filed profit remains unexplained, and the nine are our assumption of what the note covers. It now also says that the same method produces Semenyo’s profit and the May and June 2025 rebuild. Enes Ünal and Hamed Traoré were said to have reached the ordinary end of their contracts; both had contracts to 2028. Ünal’s move was made permanent in May 2024, which the article had not said, and his £6.7m loss is marked as an estimate. Jaidon Anthony’s sale was dated to June 2025; Burnley announced it in May. The label “revenue added by the rule” is replaced, because Bournemouth earned the merit by finishing sixth, and the article now separates it from the European reference amounts. The sources said the European money depended on progressing beyond the qualifying stage; Bournemouth entered at the league phase. The sentence that no club discloses its players’ wage bill now speaks only of Bournemouth, and the passage on February to June 2024 now says what we found in those months, not what the annual figure implied.

2 November 2026 · Data correction · no change to the ratio

Correction, 2 November 2026. Bournemouth’s ratio is unchanged at 85.4%. The article said that on ticket income alone, without the unsplit hospitality and events line, the ratio would be 87.5%. Recomputed on the current figures, with the gate estimate rebuilt on ticket income of £6.7m in place of £11.4m, it is 87.4%; the 87.5% had not been updated with later corrections. It is still above the line.

3 November 2026 · Data correction · SCR unchanged at 85.4% · before player sales 105.0% → 105.1%

Correction, 3 November 2026. The ratio is unchanged at 85.4%; the range is 78.2% to 86.8% (previously 78.3% to 86.9%), and 105.1% before player trading (previously 105.0%). The dates of four signings and loans now follow the clubs’ own announcements.